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THE ECONOMIC POLICIES OF RICHELIEU
Car chacun salt que, quoique vous fassiez,
En guerre, en paix, en Toyage, en affaires,
Vous vous trouvez toujours dessus vos pieds.
Works of Voiturs, II, 426-7.
Edition Ubicini.
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
If one were to ask the average well informed man con-
cerning the career of the Cardinal da Richelieu, the reply would
be one which would convey an intelligent appreciation of the po-
litical acts of this great and interest in man, for tnese have
been regarded as constituting; the dominant phase of his life.
His genius along this line has been clearly brought out in his
conduct of the French participation in the Thirty Years' War,
his settlement of the religious question in France, and his re-
lations with foreign powers, the nobility, the Pope, the Queen
Mother, and other eager opponents of his ideas. "One is accus-
tomed by habit to consider Richelieu in his struggle against
Austria on the outside and the nobles and Protestants on the in-
side, as only a diplomat of keen and profound conceptions, a man
of the state advancing to his designs with an unflinching- ener-
gy, t.ie founder of the absolute monarchy.""'"
Pigeonneau, Mist oi re du Commerce de la France , 3 vols.,
Paris, 1889, 375.

2However, there is another side to his career which had
no inconsiderable importance in directing and influencing his
entire life and accomplishments, namely the economic phase of his
administration. History has placed such an emphasis on the
other part of his life that it is difficult even to ask if eco-
nomic interests held any place in that spirit which was agitated
by such great designs. For example, did Richelieu have an eco-
nomic purpose in his capture of La Rochelle? Whas his aim in
entering the Thirty Years' War purely political? Did the Cardi-
nal have an economic philosophy? It is to be the purpose of
this thesis to determine the economic elements which entered into
the life and deeds of Richelieu, and thereby to establish the
claim that this man was not only a magnificent political states-
man, but was also fundamentally an economist, with all the crude
but important economic conceptions of his time. In other words
he was an economic statesman as well as a political statesman.
To build Prance up as a strong economic and political unit was
the goal of his ambition, which a premature death prevented him
from reaching.
Before going further, it seems best to explain the
term Economic Statesman. A man who holds sn important public
office like the Cardinal's has two principal ways of developing
his country and thus carrying out the requirement of his office;
namely, to make her strong first politically and second econom-
ically. Both may be of equal importance and effect, and may
interact on each other. In so far as he follows the theoreti-
cal principles of political science in carrying out the work of

3his administration, he is a political statesman, and in so far
as he follows the theoretical principles of economics in that
work he is an economic statesman.
The latter aspect of Richelieu' s achievements has been
almost universally neglected. It is admitted that he was a
great statesman and it seems only fair to include under that gen-
eral title both the political and economic elements which entered
into it,
A few writers have called attention to the general neg-
lect of this aspect of Richelieu's activities. One says that
"most historians have glided rapidly over the economic side of
Richelieu's career. Other writers have claimed that there is
a gap in our general histories and if Richelieu had despised or
neglected these questions it would have been due to a weakness
in his spirit. Yet, far from putting them back to second place,
he has brought them to the front and has studied them v.ith pas-
sion. He certainly has not imparted second rate ideas in his
treatment of commerce, the marine > and colonization,"^" Another
writer, who has treated Richelieu's career from the administra-
tive point of view, claims that the Cardinal's work as an ad-
ministrator is not inferior to his political ability. He cre-
ated in all directions a vigorous impulsion to national energy,
which if continued along those lines would have produced won-
derful results. The same writer in defending the case of
Pigeonneau, II, 375-6.
2 ^ v
Caillet, J • , L '.administration en France sous le Minister
e
du Cardinal de Richelieu
.
Paris, 1857, Introduction, T^lV

4Richelieu as far as concerns his entire administrative career
has succeeded in bringing to light the economic aspect of the
man. In fact most of his administrative reforms were of direct
or indirect economic importance. When Caillet proceeds to
point out the fact that he centralized the monarchy and laid
Prance open to administrative reforms, by ruining the political
positions of the Protestants and the nobles, by giving the coun-
cil of state a superior place, by diminishing the power of local
government and establishing fixed duties in the generalities;^"
he really indicates the first steps taken toward an economic re-
form of the country which Richelieu fully intended to carry
through. Many difficulties, however, prevented the great min-
ister from accomplishing all he desired. Most people have neg-
lected to take these into consideration and thus he has been
denied a fair judgment of his career upon the economic side.
His great internal and external accomplishments seem
impossible when one considers his poor physical health. Sick
throughout his life, one wonders how he was able to carry out
or even to conceive the things he did. Then there were the
many external and internal difficulties to be removed, some of
which indeed, were of a sort directly opposed to the material
development of any nation, as the Huguenot situation, for ex-
ample. Indeed, says one writer, the historian who studies the
Caillet, Introduction, I-IV.
2
Ibid., VI -IX.

5government of the greatest statesman France ever had without
considering at that time the gravity of the internal situation
and the many difficulties of the internal organization; without
appreciating the diversity of provinces, and the multiplicity of
their franchises; without seeing the conflicts of religious be-
liefs, the variety of taxes, customs, etc. in permanent conflict;
without considering the immense interests of the kingdom and the
conditions of its power and security, will never comprehend
either the power or the ability of this man, or the genius of
his work.* Indeed the pressing need to encounter these many
problems is best illustrated in the opening passages of Riche-
lieu's Testament Politique , where he maintained that his first
problems were to ruin the political power of the Huguenots,
lower the pride of the nobles, reduce all rebellious subjects
to their duties, and raise the king's name again in foreign af-
2fairs, to the place where it ought to be. He then goes on to
discuss some of the multitude of foreign troubles. The very
fact that he had so many problems to encounter and still had
time to carry out and plan some economic accomplishments, would
seem to indicate that he laid or at least tried to lay especial
emphasis on that side of his administration.
A good example of the difficulties encountered by
1 <
Th. Funck Bentano, Antoyne de Montcretien, Traicte de
l'oeconomie Politique
,
Introduction,XCI.
Richelieu, Testament Politique
,
Londres, 1770, pt.l>8

Richelieu is shown in the opposition of public opinion or sec-
tions of it. In fact in 16£6 he was accused of ruining the
rights and interests of France by remaining at peace. This ac-
cusation was voiced by some so-called "libelles" in Germany, who
saw no good in his actions.^ However it is interesting to no-
tice that "theologians" in reply maintain that the reasons which
guided the king and the Cardinal with regard to the so-called
resolutions of peace are unrecognized by his opponents. "Why
not praise what has been accomplished rather than condemn what
has not been carried out? Since you bear the names of Chris-
tians would it not be better to judge those things which are be-
neath the surface rather than to condemn the surface indications?"
In other words, criticised by some because he fostered wars, and
by others because he made peace, his problems were very modern
indeed, and it is no wonder that many sides of his career (the
economic for example) have been submerged because of a mistaken
perspective of the difficulties involved.
Because of this, it seems profitable to dwell for a
while upon the economic activities of the man and to show that
most phases of his administration were more or less influenced
by concepts of that nature, as brought out by a study of his past
deeds and accomplishments. However in doing so one must look
upon history not only as a progressive development and as the
continuous and uninterrupted growth of one vast organism, each
century of which forms an organic part of the living whole and
Mercure Francois ^(1604-44), a Paris, XII, 516-18.

7apart from that whole has no separate life or meaning, but one
must also realize that in each cross section of this whole are
found many separate threads, all of which are directly or in-
directly related, and which as a sum total go to form that part
of the whole which in turn is never ending. The economic
thread is our problem. Let us examine its importance in the
confusing unsolved period of the first half of the seventeenth
century, the age of Richelieu.

8Chapter II
THE AGE OP MERCANTILISM
The seventeenth century was distinctly the age when
mercantilism reached its height. It was the natural outcome of
a series of historical events which caused men to grasp and un-
derstand the economic theories of this doctrine without realizing
that they really were developing a distinct school of economic
thought. However, it did not take men long to discover the
philosophy behind it and to formulate this along definite lines,
once it had become the cardinal feature of a nation's develop-
ment. It is desirable to distinguish some of the important
factors which led to the practice of mercantilistic ideas and
the consequent theoretical formulation, because as will be shown,
Richelieu based his entire administration on the principles of
the mercantilistic doctrine and in doing so was one of the most
enlightened exponents of that system.
The mercantilistic age seems to fall in the period of
transition from medieval to modern conditions, and really grew
out of those changes. "In fact," says one writer, "the decom-
position of medieval feudal life into modern existence is one of
the two chief aspects of modern life."^ He goes on to say that
the new system based on individual activity and scientific
1 Bridges, L. H., France Under Richelieu and Colbert , Edin-
burgh, 1866, 5-10.

9conviction has superseded the old military activity and super-
natural beliefs of the middle age. In other words he maintains
that industry has been substituted for v-arfare. However it often
seems better to put industry as another cause for warfare. More-
over the beginnings of the separation of church and state, the
growth of commerce and industries, and the discovery of the new
world with all its important consequences had a strong influence
in developing the modern age to the detriment of the medieval age
with its feudalistic basis of existence. It resulted in the
growth of the state as the vital force which was to expel all
the needless and unhappy phases of the past ages, and a new kind
of feudalism came into existence in which the state, or its king,
was the actual feudal lord and his subjects were his vassals. As
a result when one reaches the stage in history where the state
takes the lead in controlling the destinies of man, then appears
the modern age and with it the so-called period of mercantilism.
As to a definition of the mercantilistic age, it may
best be defined in terms of the state. "It is not," says
Schmoller, "so much a doctrine of money or tariff barriers, pro-
tective duties, or navigation laws as it is a doctrine which in-
volves something far greater, namely, the total transformation
that
of society, and its organization as well as A of the state and its
institutions, in the replacing of a local and territorial pol-
icy by that of the state. Now followed a struggle between
state and district against the great nobility, the towns, the
corporations, and provinces, the economic as well as the politi-
cal blending of the struggle of these isolated groups into large
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wholes, the struggle for uniform measures and coinage and for a
well ordered currency and credit*"* In other words the mercan-
tilistic doctrine was that philosophy which centered everything
economic and political in the hands of the state. Centraliza-
tion was the keynote of this system, which really required poli-
tical and economic methods to carry it out.
In this connection, one discovers that Richelieu was
really the first statesman to carry out this dominant idea to
any great extent. He had a consistent policy which was plainly
mercant ilistic, of a very enlightened sort, and he constantly
adhered to it in spite of many hindrances. What better example
of his efforts to centralize the government could be found than
his appointment of the Intendants, or on the other hand his pol-
icy towards the Huguenots? "Richelieu's razing of the fortress-
es of the nobility has often been extolled as one of the most
important steps toward internal freedom of intercourse within
France." His active measures for the creation of a marine
were among the most important contributions toward the develop-
ment of an independent commercial policy in relation to other
countries. "Mercantilism," says Schmoller again, "is nothing
more than state making, in the replacing of a local territorial
economic policy by that of the state." Who had a better policy
than Richelieu, so far as these ideas are taken as the standard
Schmoller, G. , The Mercantile System , N. Y. 190£, 51
2
Ibid., 54-55.
3 Ibid., 50-51.
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of the highest economic development?
Even though Richelieu was, as will be shown, one of the
leading mercantilists of his time, in fact the first in France to
put the theories into force by means of his office, he has, never
theless, been neglected by most economic writers of the time, and
a just economic interpretation of his administration has thus
been lacking. For example one writer says, "between the admin-
istration of Sully and that of Colbert, was that of two priests,
Richelieu and Mazarin, both wasteful of their means though from
different motives. Colbert was the only minister who had a sys-
tem settled, complete, and consistent in all its parts. " How-
ever one will note that men like Schmoller, Caillet, Deschamps,
and Pigeonneau, in their respective works covering this period,
seem to comprehend the importance of the man in other ways be-
sides the political.
When one assumes the general definition of Schmoller,
that mercantilism implies state-building, it is also necessary
to realize that this general idea includes a series of theories
which prevailed in various degrees in different minds. In the
first place, a tendency towards overestimating the importance
secondly
of possessing a large amount of the precious metals; Atowards an
undue exaltation (a) of industry which works up material over
industry which provides it, and (b) of foreign trade over do-
mesticj thirdly, towards attaching too high a value to a dense
population as an element of national strength; and fourthly,
towards invoking the action of the state in furthering
1 Blanqui, L. A., History of Political Economy , N. Y.
,
1880,
279.
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artificially the attainments of several ends thus proposed as
desirable."^" Thus the three earmarks of the mercantile Bystem are
(1) Attention to commerce, whose importance was exaggerated, (2)
Favorable balance of trade, (3) Prohibition in duties, bounties,
p
and development of monopolies, etc. All these things led to the
struggle of nations not only for political but for economic pre-
dominance. States became as it were artificial hothouses for
3
the rearing of urban industries, etc. Most of these character-
istics will be found existing in the administration of the great
Cardinal.
In following out the policies of his administration
one finds that Richelieu conformed on the whole pretty nearly to
the common mercantile conception as portrayed above. In doing
so he was especially fortunate in having some predecessors to
guide him in his actions. Henry IV and his minister. Sully,
laid the foundation or at least made the excavations for the eco-
nomic system of that century. The economist Montchretien drew
up in 1615 the first French work on the subject of economics. Its
crude but timely ideas correspond to the theoretical basis for
Richelieu's administration. It represented the thought of the
time and so Richelieu, whether he read it or not, followed its
precepts with astonishing accuracy.
For such reasons, before turning to a study of the
± Ingram, L. K.
,
History of Politi cal Economy
,
London, 1904,
36-37.
2
Ibid., 50.
3
Ibid., 39.
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economic ideas and accomplishments of the Cardinal, which estab-
lished the firm foundations of the economic system of France for
the century, it seems best to consider briefly the activities of
Henry IV and Sully, and then the work of Montchretien. For by
that means one can understand the basis upon which Richelieu
built, and just what he contributed towards the completion of the
common conception held by all, a strong centralized economic unit,
namely the state.

14
Chapter III
THE ADMINI STRATI OK OF HENRY IV AND SULLY
The age of Henry IV and Sully contained the rise in
France of a consciousness of the economic side of life. People
were not really aware of its presence in the fifteenth century,
but it was there. The progress of public peace and well being,
the influence of the Italian custom, had given to the commerce
of luxuries a start hitherto unknown. The age of discoveries
had awakened the enterprise of the Norman mariners who began
following in the tracks of the Portuguese and Spanish navigators
about the same time as the English.^- Thus France began to as-
sume a place of economic as well as political importance in the
affairs of the world. As a consequence the men at the head of
the government, whether they be kings or prime ministers, began
to consider and solve matters which were primarily of economic
importance, on that basis alone, and began to be influenced in
their political policies by the economic results to be obtained
thereby.
Louis XI, at the close of the fifteenth century,
started the economic growth of France especially by his central-
ization and unification of the government. But it was left to
Henry IV and Sully, who came in after the religious wars, at the
Pigeonneau, II, 54-55.
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end of the sixteenth century, to make the first direct efforts
to solve the commercial problems confronting the French nation.
The first problem to be met was the proposition of se-
curing internal peace. The edict of Nantes settled the matter
so far as the religious strife was concerned. The nobles were
also subdued by a combination of payments and force. Thus in
a short time both Henry and Sully were ready to strengthen the
economic position of France. Now at this time we have the pecu-
liar situation where a king and his helper both had their own
ideas on the subject and tried to carry them out regardless of the
opinion of the other party. For example, Henry IV tried to make
France, and especially Paris, the artistio and industrial center
of the world, much to the disgust of Sully, who favored the en-
couragement of agriculture. 1 As a consequence industry and ag-
riculture underwent temporary expansion at this time.
In addition to the growth of industry and agriculture,
commerce was restored. One writer says that this was the best
part of the economic program of Henry IV, for the restoration of
commerce was the complement and the condition of the regeneration
of labor. In other words France began to assume the position
of an important nation in the commercial world, and this growth
was not to be only on the internal side.
Henry IV and Sully saw the importance of increased
foreign commerce, colonies, and thus of a greater marine. Steps
were taken in all these directions, but the untimely death of
Pigeonneau, II, £90.
Ibid., 290-291.
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Henry IV in 1610 prevented the laying of the solid foundation
for these plans.
The thrifty, though not novel, financial policy of Sully
extinguished the debt of the nation and left a balance in the
which
treasury. Direct attempts Awere made to centralize the govern-
ment, weaken the nobility, and make France a strong absolute
nation on the economic side all cling to the common mercant ilistic
theory.
However, one can not designate either Henry IV or Sully
as an ideal exponent of the doctrine of mercantilsm. There was
as yet no theoretical exposition of this commercial doctrine,
and neither Henry IV nor Sully left any evidence that they had
any conception of an economic doctrine which should guide them
in their work. They seem to do only those things which the con-
dition of the times required. For example the progress of dis-
coveries made them desire a part in this work. The building of
large marines made them desire to construct a French navy. They
had no general idea which would be defined as mercant ilistic . In
fact they disagreed on many points vital to the doctrine. For
example Sully was for freedom of trade. He realized that some
countries were best able to raise certain products.
1
Another
writer of the time, named Laffemas, believed that home industries
should be built up, to the exclusion of others. The king com-
promised on both ideas. Also one must admit that the Utopian
o
Cm
idea of universal peace or A league of nations fostered by one of
these men is scarcely a doctrine which would come from a man
Pigeonneau, II, 314-317.
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dominated by the national self-centered doctrines of mercantilism.
So, in some ways, Henry IV and Sully were ahead of the mercantil-
ists, while in other ways they were not up to the advanced ideas
of that philosophy. It took two men to try to meet the difficul-
ties confronting France at that time and in doing so they followed
no set theory exactly, nor did they succeed in obtaining any im-
portant permanent result. However, there was one important con-
sequence of their accomplishments and that was the economic work
of Montchretien entitled Le Traite a 1
'
Eeonomie Politique . He
realized that these rules were to a certain extent carrying out
the doctrine of a logical economic scheme and as a consequence
he wrote the first theoretical treatise on the subject. Con-
sideration of this will be deferred until the next chapter.
In considering this brief review of the accomplishments
of Henry IV and Sully one might say that they laid, in a more or
less haphazard and incomplete way, the foundations which Riche-
lieu and Colbert were to complete or ruin. One writer aptly
sums up the work of Henry IV as follows: "He did his best to
facilitate the downfall of the old system (feudal) and to en-
courage the new. He tried to remove the shackles upon industry
and commerce; to improve the finances and found trans -Atlantic
colonies, etc. He looked forward to a common European arbi-
tration agreement, of a universal peace, and to accomplish this
which might be by others defined as a policy of the balance of
power, he set in motion the movement against the forces of re-
tardation, namely Austria and Spain." 1 In other words the
1
Bridges, 25-26.
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policy of Henry IV was directed in one way along the line of in-
ternational relations, and thus, while attention was given to the
building up of the state, it was not the central theme of his ad-
ministration. However, all of these excellent and well planned
policies were ended when Henry IV was killed in 1610, and four-
teen years of economic, as well as political stagnation, were to
follow.
When this great man died his task was far from achieved!
Another writer says that "the death of Henry IV was deplorable
in that the brilliant impulse which he had impressed on the eco-
nomic life of the country were stopped and existed no more."^
However this was not so, for one can find in the treatise of
Montchretien a clear presentation of the doctrine of the time,
and this work had a definite influence on the economic future
of France. Yet, in a practical sense, the tasks of Henry IV
were incomplete. "The peasants existed but that was all; credit
and commerce reestablished itself with difficulty; the systems
of roads and canals were only outlined; colonial experiences only
begun and habits of order, of economy, and of honesty, which
Sully had introduced into the financial administration, had not
yet become traditions, etc."
It would be interesting to speculate upon what might
have happened if Richelieu had succeeded Henry IV in 1610. But
Pigeonneau, II, 350-351.
2 *
Gouraud, C. M. , Historie de la Politique Commercial de la
Prance et son influence sur le progress de la*""Richesse Publique
,
Paris, T854, 174-175.
3
Pigeonneau, II, 351-352.
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as it actually happened, the government declined greatly under
Marie de Medici. She was not able to understand or follow the
good policy of her husband* The money saved by Sully was spent,
taxes went up, colonies and the marine were neglected, and the new
colonial policy was saved only through the energy and ability of
Champlain.
There was an attempt to remedy the unfortunate condi-
tions by a meeting of the Estates General in 1614. Called to
establish good order by honorable methods, protection was to be
given to the poor people as well as aid to the rich. Richelieu
was there as a member of the clergy. As the orator of that
body he mentioned no reform. However the nobles desired treat-
ment befitting a nobleman and the merchants or middle class asked
for reforms in behalf of the overburdened poor people. Some
significant demands were made in the cahiers, as for example,
the establishment of a new council near the person of the king,
besides persons of blood, etc. The suspension of the sale of of-
fices and the right of paulette was desired, the establishment
of a commission to look over the finances, and lastly, the sup-
p
pression of pensions as soon as possible. The king promised to
carry these propositions out to the best of his ability. One
thus sees that four years after the death of Henry IV a reaction
against the poor government of the time and the unfortunate eco-
nomic conditions of the age was taking place. All this had an
Pigeonneau, II, 351-352.
fo Isambert, Recueil General des Anciennes Lois ffrancaise s,
Paris, 1829, XVI, 52-59.
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important influence upon the problems confronting Richelieu, then
a member of the Estates General.
Indeed when one studies the effect of the mal admini-
stration, he sees that the foreigners during this period took a
latter
place on the markets which rendered tlie A still more sensible of
the distance which separated France fromthem. "Disorder stopped
any progress, Concini ruined the finances, Delor/nes had all he
could do to supervise and put down the revolts of the nobles and
Protestants and, as the inevitable voice of the people appeared,
the good intentions of the monarchy went up in smoke." 1 At this
critical time in French history arose one of those few men to
whom it is given to modify largely the life of humanity, to in-
crease and aid the speed of progress and to hasten the arrival of
a new civilization. That man was Armand Duplessis, at first
bishop of Luzon and later Cardinal de Richelieu. At first a
favorite of the queen, the unfortunate administration paved the
way for him. In 1624 he assumed control of affairs and "Louis
XIII," says one writer, "not void of insight, not without a
sense of duty, but timid, melancholy, frivolous, pietistic,
equally unambitious and incapable of power, handed over the helm
to this man and from that time until 1642 Richelieu was sole dic-
2
tat or of France." Thus it was the duty of that great man to
obliterate the misfortunes of the immediate past and build upon
the foundations laid by Henry IV and Sully. Before considering
1
Gouraud, 174-175.
2
Bridges, 27.
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how he went about doing this, it is desirable to consider the
work of Mont Chretien, which had a strong influence upon the policy
of Richelieu.
9
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Chapter IV
MONTCHRETIEN 1 S ECONOMIC IDEAS AS
RELATED TO CARDINAL RICHELIEU'S
Montchretien seems to have been the only French con-
tributor to economic theory in the period. A brief survey of
his work will lead to an acquaintance with the rise of commercial
doctrines in France, and will reveal a good economic picture of
France in the early seventeenth century, as well as of other na-
tions at that time. It will appear also that Richelieu was
largely dominated by the views expressed by Montchretien either
directly or indirectly as being typical of the age.
As said before, 1 the death of Henry IV meant an in-
dustrial crisis both of a commercial and a monetary nature.
Troubles which he had settled appeared again. Foreign states
disregarded treaties with France, excluded French commerce, sunk
French vessels, and imposed unfair duties upon French vessels
entering their ports, in spite of the privileges they had in
French harbors. At such a time Montchretien wrote his book.
He based his ideas upon the accomplishments of Henry IV. Riche-
lieu and Colbert in turn carried out the industrial and commer-
cial conceptions depicted in his work. He saw the trouble and
^ See page 18.
,
2 Montchretien, Antoyne de. Trait e de 1 'E conomie Politique
.
Paris, 1889, Introduction, LXZXIX.
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suggested the remedy. Another event has a certain signif icance»
seeing that it took place about the time that Montchretien wrote
his treatise. It was the meeting of the Estates General in
1614.
The result of this gathering was not of much account.
Richelieu, in his Memoirs, says that the assembly ended as it
begun, by doing nothing of advantage for either the king or the
public. "It was a financial burden in itself, "he claims,
"while the corruption it opposed still continued."^- However he
fails to mention the fact that the king promised to carry out
the reforms asked by the assembly and failed to do so. But the
interesting things about the whole event are that it indicates a
reaction against the bad conditions of the time, that Richelieu
was present at the meeting and thus realized what was wrong, and,
finally, that Montchretien published his book at that time, in
which he planned a solution for the troubles. The Cardinal
must have been strongly influenced by these tv/o events and his
later actions indicate that he was. Thus, at the very begin-
ning of his career the economic problems were placed before him
alongside of the beneficial, practical beginnings of Henry IV
and Sully, so that he could not help but be influenced by all
these things. It is important, indeed, that the ideas were
furnished by an assembly of the people, and by the first French
economist. Surely the modern world in a commercial sense, both
practically and theoretically, began for France at that period.
^ Richelieu, Cardinal de, Memoires
,
(Petitot Edition),
Paris, 1821, X, 383.
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Mont Chretien was very careful to develop his conception
of a paternalistic form of government. "The education of the
nation," he says, "is the same as in the family.""1" However,
there were some liberal conceptions in this treatment, as he rec-
ognized the development of the third estate and a certain amount
2
of individualism. Furthermore, he maintained that the social
organization extended beyond the interest of indixriduals and the
family, of the locality and the province, or even the particular
interest of the nation. This idea involves a multiplicity of
relations between the different divisions of government and ter-
ritories, which only the great men by their genius can compre-
hend, end by their position and resources can justify so as to
increase the general prosperity, or, aided by science and guided
according to
by the experience of individuals, can by practice justify, £he
theories of political economy. In other words he said that the
situation called for a great man, and this individual in the per-
son of Richelieu presently took advantage of the opportunity, and
indeed carried out the major part of the program outlined by
Montchretien. A brief outline of the leading ideas of this
early economist may be cited, with relation to similar ideas or
practices on the part of Richelieu.
He begins by describing to the king the excellent re-
sources and situation of Prance. Richelieu in his Testament
Politi que repeated Montchretien' s ideas almost verbatim. He
then complains that France lacks men to invent and to do. Many
^ Montchretien, Introduction, LV.
p
Ibid., Introduction LV.
3 Ibid., Introduction XXV.

£5
of her men go to Spain, England, Germany, and Flanders. Riche-
lieu had this same idea, as will be shown later. He then advo-
cates the building up of agriculture and manufactures, so im-
portant to the strength of a nation. The whole tone of the book
is to "build up the power of the French nation with the rich re-
sources available,"—a true mercantilistic doctrine. He advises
the king to study the commercial systems of England and Holland
as accounting for their remarkable growth. Richelieu is con-
stantly referring to the development of Holland. Montchretien
continuously has the interests of France at heart and does not
consider outside interests as Henry IV did. The Cardinal again
conforms with his view in this respect. Montchretien recog-
nized both free trade and protection as combined and not separ-
ate. "Send your surplus abroad," he says, "but keep what you
need and protect it." To carry out this idea both external and
internal trade have important roles. However, it is with for-
eign commerce that he is chiefly concerned, as was also the case
with Richel ieu.
He constantly opposes the unfair commercial relations
with England. "The severe treatment of foreigners started by
England resulted in a commercial and industrial monetary crisis.
Montchretien knew this, and opposed any concession to that coun-
try except on the basis of reciprocity" "^In other words, both
Montchretien and Richelieu believed that England should be grant-
ed the same privileges in France as she allowed the French in
England. He believed in treating others as they treat you*
Montchretien takes notice of t.he importance of commerce.
LHontchre'tien, Introduction XXV-XXVI.
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"All society, generally speaking," he says, "seems to be composed
of government and commerce."^ Thus the merchants are an import-
ant class of people. The stress laid upon commerce by Richelieu
will be shown later. Both claim that gold and silver are impor-
tant, as they supply the necessities for all men; and it is inter-
esting to note that both men in their ideas concerning commerce,
industry, etc., constantly refer to the public good, whose inter-
ests they claim to follow.
Montchretien devotes especial attention to commercial
relations with England. That country he claims limits the use
of the products of French industries in England, for her own
benefit, while obtaining fair treatment for her own goods in
p
Prance. Everything possible is done to ruin French commerce
by extra taxes, etc. England desires to get control of naviga-
tion. One thus can see that the commercial rivalry between
France and England was coming to the front at this time, and it
was actually to be one of the first problems confronting the
Cardinal.
Montchretien, on the other hand, admires Holland and
desires France to be on good terms with her. The fact that
they are so near and have mutual interests makes it best to be
on friendly terms. Like Richelieu, he has a great admiration
for what the Hollanders have accomplished. Both of them wish
France to study her and imitate what she has done rather than
Montchretien, 137-146.
2 Ibid., 196-197.
3
Ibid., 207-208.
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actually compete with her.
As to Spain, one notes that Mont Chretien complains
about the failure to treat French traders in Spain as Spanish
traders are treated in France. He says, "French subjects are
not allowed or permitted in Spain except if they wish to enrich
the king of Spain. She is jealous of her colonies and taxes
French traders unfairly." As a result, he claims that it is
the duty of the French to see that they are treated justly by the
Spanish, as the Dutch have seen for their own citizens. "For
if Holland could do this, can we not?" It will lead to the aug-
mentation, the welfareJ and repose of France, and the employment
and use of its most courageous subjects, who would like nothing
better than to undertake long and difficult duties. By author-
izing and protecting the trade of France, this policy will in-
crease it. Spanish ships have orders to destroy all French ves-
sels found on the ocean, whether they are Huguenot or Catholic.
Thus it is the task of the king to restore the sea, which is com-
mon and free to all the world, and on which the French have a
natural and legitimate right. How well this part of his work
was carried out by Richelieu, who believed in these ideas, will
be brought out later on. It may be added that no better proof
for the early conscious rivalry between England, Spain, and
France can be obtained than in these chapters by Montchr etien,
an enlightened contemporary.
Turning to the Levant, he urges the development of
silk manufactures at home, instead of obtaining these articles
1
MontChretien, 208-209.
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from the Levant, a wasteful method because of the heavy duties
imposed by the Levantine countries and Italy. He refers to the
attempts of England to f orm a company in the Levant, and after
affirming the fact that Russia is a new outlet for trade, he
turns to a discussion of colonization. He was a strong advocate
of efforts along this line. He advised the formation of com-
panies like the Dutch East India company, (the one formed in
1595). "Such companies," he said, "would make France strong and
powerful.
His treatment of financial conditions in France was
based on the cardinal principle of preserving peace and quiet in
the land and being fair with the people. He said that there were
great riches in the land which would aid the true finances of the
country. They were wheat, salt, wine, cloth, and silk. "This
country is so flourishing and abundant in all that one can desire
that it is not necessary to borrow from one's neighbors." 2 It
is not at all the abundance of gold and silver, or the quantity
of pearls and diamonds which makes the state wealthy, It is the
resources of things necessary to maintain life* etc. In other
words Montchretien had absolute faith that the resources of
France were such as to solve all financial troubles if used prop-
erly. Both Richelieu and the economist had a sublime faith in
the ability of the French nation to overcome all commercial odds
by this means. Both desired to conserve the people and make
them happy. Just as the owner of a large plantation desires to
Montchretien, 248-255.
2 Ibid., 237-244.
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build it up to its greatest extent, both economically and physi-
cally, so these two great men desired to build up Prance commer-
cially and also to increase the happiness of the people, not only
by internal means but by external additions of colonies to be ob-
tained by the development of navigation.
Montchretien then begins to emphasize the importance of
navigation and a marine. He cites the success of Spain, Holland,
and Portugal by this means and also the growing strength of the
English on the sea. "It behooves France to begin at once and
develop colonies wherever she can. This would aid much in
strengthening the unity of that nation."*
Now in order to put down the rivals of France not only
a strong army but a strong navy was needed. Then like Richelieu,
he discusses the geographical position of France with its two
oceans, etc. He urges the development of the admiralty. Again,
like Richelieu, he cites the success of Holland on the sea. "If
Henry IV had used his money to build up harbors instead of the
useless canal de Braire, our commerce would be much greater
than it is at present." To build up commerce and a strong ma-
rine, and thereby make a strong state, was constantly in his
mind. At this point it may be added that both Montchretien and
Richelieu advised the king to encourage the building of boats by
financial support or to sell some vessels himself, to be used
for trade outside of the kingdom. The very fact that the Cardi-
nal as soon as he came into office turned his attention toward
1
Montchretien, 283.
2 Ibid., 306-308.
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colonization, the building up of a marine, and commerce in gen-
eral, indicates that he was strongly influenced by similar views,
perhaps obtained from Montchretien 's treatise.
The conclusion of the work deals with the duties of the
king. "He must possess the friendship of his people and work
for their good. All must bear the burden, rich and poor must
share it alike. "^ The poor must be aided and a census taken of
them to find out the condition of the people, and what number
could go to war, work on roads, or go to the colonies.^ By this
census one can find out who works and who does not work. The
latter can be banished and all thus will work for a common end.
"This," he says, "is a government according to justice and rea-
son." This plan seems to be rather advanced and the fact that
it is being adopted now would indicate that Montchretien 's views
do not all belong to the past.
The economist compliments the king for convening the
Estates General. He advised him to aid the people, appoint
good men to office, and reduce the pensions, whenever possible.
In other words the king should strive to strengthen France not
only externally but internally as well. The king must look
into the receipts and the expenditures of money. He must see
that it is spent wisely, that all unnecessary officials are de-
posed and good honest officials put in their places. The wise
and fair administration of the law is also asked. In other
words Montchretien closes his work by advising the king to
1
Montchretien, 336-34 9.
2
Ibid., 352-354.
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remove by reform the internal troubles wlaich confronted Richelieu,
difficulties
and which affairs he battled with in connection with external A
throughout his administration. Montchretien thus states to us
the economic problems which confronted the Cardinal, and the next
step is an investigation of the ideas and accomplishments of
Richelieu with regard to those problems. That he did not suc-
ceed in all respects, is to be expected. Montchretien, Riche-
lieu, and Colbert may have had intentions to bring about the en-
couragement of agriculture by lighter taxes for the farmers, and
to aid industry by the importation of raw materials. "But,"
says one writer, "these new ideas had not yet penetrated into
the mass of the nation. The clergy and the nobility were in-
different; tho me rcliants and artisans did not have a general con-
ception of the economic interests of France; the official class
were back in the sixteenth century of economic ideas.""'" This
in a large sense explains many of the apparent failures in the
realization of the economic ideas set forth by Montchretien.
Such was the importance of the work, however, that it seems un-
likely that it would fail to be read by Richelieu or to in-
fluence him in his administration.
The similarity of the ideas of the two men is striking.
Both claimed that they were actuated by the purpose of "the pub-
lic welfare", as being the greatest aim of the king. Both
realized the importance of the three estates. Richelieu empha-
sized that of the nobles, and Montchretien the third estate.
They both desired to increase the riches of the people by means
Pigeonneau, II, 363.
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of the development of the arts and manufactures, the increase of
navigation, and the re establishment of commerce, which was per-
ishing day by day in the kingdom.^ One cannot help but notice
the similarity between the introduction of Richelieu's Testa-
ment Politique and Montchretien' s work. Both bring out the dis-
orders of th9 time and the remedies to be undertaken in order to
enrich the crown and the state. "En I'estat aussi bien que en
la famille," says Montchretien, "c'est un heur mesle de grand
-
issimi que de mesnoyes bien les hommes selon leur propre et par-
ticuliere inclination." "Richelieu," says the editor, "repeats
2
these words in his Testament Politique . " There seems to be no
doubt in his mind that Richelieu did read the work. "Richelieu,"
he said, "was the deputy of the clergy at the Estates General
when Montchretien published his treatise, so not only the indus-
trial and commercial measures of the Cardinal, but also the max-
ims on commerce, the marine, and manufactures which one finds in
his TeBtament Politique
.
reflects the spirit of Montchretien."
Montchretien, 3, note. An interesting comparison might be
made of this quotation of Montchretien ' 8 with one of Richelieu's,
regarding the government. "Si la nature des disordres ou vous
vivons maintenant portait que vous fissiez deux reformati ons dif-
ferentes, l'une a l'appetit du commun, et 1' autre par les vrayes
maximes d'etat et de police que 1' usage des affaires vous ap-
prend je ne doute point que le semblable n'arrivast."
Richelieu: "II semble, fait dire. Richelieu av Louis XIII
dans le preamble de la declarations de 1641, que 1 'establissernent
des monarches estant fonde' par le government a un seul, cet or-
dre est comme l'ams que animev et que leur inspire autant de
force et de vigueur qu'a'st de perfection."
g -
Montchretien, Introduction LXXIX.
Ibid., Introduction XX.
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between the views of the two would indicate that the Cardinal
read the work. The letters and memoirs of Richelieu prove that
he was interested in these problems, and the fact that he favored
literary efforts of all kinds, and would be likely to read a trea-
tise dedicated to the Queen Mother and her son Louis XIII,
strengthens the probability of his having read the book. The
important deduction to be made is the existence of a general eco-
nomic tendency in France when Richelieu came to power. The mer-
cantilistic doctrine with the state as a center was the natural
commercial philosophy for a statesman to follow. And while this
statement might seem to detract from the originality of Richelieu's
beliefs, this is not so when one looks into the matter. ffor, al-
though a man may not conceive a view, it takes a certain amount
of genius and originality to make the practical application. To
do this for the ideas of Montchretien required economic states-
manship of a high grade. An inquiry may now be made whether
the Cardinal possessed that quality together with his political
capacity. In other words was Cardinal Richelieu not only a
political but also an economic statesman?
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Other writers have similar views on this issue, For
example, one maintains that Richelieu's theories concerning com-
merce and navigation were not original. "He borrowed or derived
them from documents of the reign of Henry IV. Of which the ca-
hiers of the assembly of notables of 1617, and 1627, and the Es-
tates General of 1614 were one source and MontChretien's Traite
d 'Economie Politique was another, from which the Cardinal obtained
many of his views. Another writer brings out the fact that
Montchretien provided the colonial formula for Richelieu to fol-
io?/. "As regards colonial companies," he says, "Montchretien re-
calls the methods followed by Holland and England, forestalling
Richelieu or rather giving him a formula." 2 (He refers to the
Cardinal's speech at the assembly of notables, to be taken up
later. ) Montchretien claimed that there was no better way to
carry on colonies than by societies such as Holland used, or a
council of many individuals instead of one individual effort. So
colonial exploitation by privileged companies is the means advised
by the economist. He is thus in that respect the inspirer of the
political economy of Richelieu. He has formulated all the eco-
nomic principles of the seventeenth century. He is the first and
the most penetrating of the seventeenth century economists. ®e
shall see how Picholieu took up many of his ideas and tried to
carry them into execution.
That the Cardinal ever read the book is not known be-
cause he has never, so far as can be ascertained, mentioned the
name of Montchretien in hi s writings. However the similarity
1
Pigeonneau, II, 381-382.
2 Leschamps, L. , Histoire de la Quest ion Coloniale en France ,
Paris. 1891, 61-&2. ~~
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Chapter V
THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF RICHELIEU'S RELATION
TO THE KING AND THE KING TO THE STATE
Richelieu from the first undertook the tasks confront-
ing both the king and himself with intense seriousness. Domi-
nated by his paternalistic conception of the king as the father
of the people, responsible only to God, he desired to do every-
thing he could to enable the king to build up the state of which
he was the sole earthly owner. Loyal to the individual who
could alone represent the French nation, which he loved so well,
the Cardinal at the beginning pledged his fidelity, saying, "I
will do all that will be possible, for, by following the good in-
clinations of the king, one receives an assured repose, the fruit
of the service which I render his majesty according to my duty."l
In his Testament Politique he recalls his first ambitions when
called to office* "As soon as your majesty was pleased to ad-
mit me into the management of your affairs, I resolved to use my
utmost efforts to facilitate your great designs, so useful to
the state and glorious to your person." One sees from the
start the constant strife to obtain all advantages possible for
the king and the state, and no better illustration can be given
1
D'Avene^, G.
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of the unselfish interest of the man apart from personal gain,
(even though he did leave a large estate) than his constant fi-
latter 1 s
delity to his ruler and the Awelfare. Of course a strong nation
would "benefit the Cardinal personally, yet his interest in the
future of the state is the best evidence as to the strength of the
loyal and patriotic element in his character. "If my spirit,"
he says, "which will appear in these memoirs after my death, can
contribute anything toward the regulation of this great state in
the management of which your majesty has been pleased to give to
me a greater share than I deserve, I will think myself infinitely
happy. In other words, he was a man who looked ahead, and un-
derneath his subtle flattery one can see his genuine desire that
the kingdom should prosper even after his death. His great
confidence in the future success of his policies is nowhere bet-
ter illustrated than in the above quotation.
Richelieu did, to be sure, look after his own personal
fortune. His "Will and Testament" proves that he left great
p
wealth. It also illustrates his own personal commercial abil-
ity. Most of his money, land, etc., was obtained by gifts from
the king. He refused however many attempts of the rulers to
and
bestow pensions on him, Aindeed maintained that at the court
the minister must not think of making a personal fortune but
must plan only for the development of the welfare of the state.
Testament Politi que I, Introduction, 4-5.
2 Memoirs
,
X, 122.
3 Letters, III, 204.
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It is clear that the Cardinal looked upon his office as meaning
something other than a mere money making proposition and a means
of obtaining high honor. He certainly possessed the idealistic
unselfish "beliefs of a true French patriot. Yet Richelieu was
too practical not to see the great gains in the larger sense
which a strong nation and a powerful government would bring to
him. He realized the value of money, and the wealth of his es-
tates indicates that. Furthermore, he was enough of a man of
the world to leave the bulk of his property to his relatives,
with the exception of a little left to the king and his personal
servants. This same practical method was followed by Richelieu
in his relations with the king.
When he came into power in 1624, he had worked out a
definite program which the king was to follow. 1 On the economic
side it was based on the mercantilistic system of a paternal gov-
ernment. External and internal reforms were to be based on
clear economic conceptions, similar to those of Mont Chretien.
But he realized that before he could do anything, he must be
supreme in the council of the king. 2 This was accomplished, as
is shown in the letter issued by the king granting him the title
of first minister. In other words, the Cardinal desired to be
the private secretary and adviser of this ruler, who in theory
alone guided and protected the destinies of his subjects.
In carrying out his office, Richelieu clearly recog-
nizes the tv/o elements which he must consider and whose welfare
Caillet, 27.
Testament Politique
,
I, 8-9.
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he must constantly promote, namely, the king and the people, or
the king and the state (including the people). "The greatest
obligation of a man is the saving of his soul," he says, "the
most important obligation of the king is the repose of his sub-
jects, the conservation of the state in its entirety, and the wel-
fare of his government; for which reason, it is necessary to put
down so severely the injuries done to the state, that the severity
of the vengeance will prevent a reoccurrence. The repose of the
state is the dominant thing." 1 The welfare of the state, polit-
ically and economically, is the main theme of all his writings.
Indeed, he says that the king has the right to do anything, even
2
though it is against religion, to save his state. No better
expression can be given of the political and economic conceptions
of Richelieu. 'The welfare of the state, a true mercantilistic
idea, predominates even to the exclusion of religious opposition.
Of course both economic and political means are to be used to ob-
tain this desire. "The Prince," he says, "must look out for the
welfare of the state and the public welfare as a whole." 3 In
other words he must look out for not only the political improve-
ment of the state, but for its economic and social development
also. One even finds a tinge of the conception of a larger
field than the mere state, when he says that the king must be
liberal but only at the right time. He must reward merit. For
Memoirs, XXII, 15.
2
Ibid., XI, 285.
3 Letters, III, 184-185.
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that not only does the public but the entire world a service of
which the reward to the state is only a part return of the huge
1
interest.
The works of Richelieu reveal a supposed fear of the in-
ability of the king to look out for the country. The reason for
this state of mind is clear when one remembers the political weak-
nesses which existed through the youth and ineffectiveness of the
king, as well as the unfortunate economic condition of France in
1624. The king's power was in a had way. "Indeed some people
even brought up the idea of electing a rul er. But the majority
with Hichelieu believed that the absolute power of the state was
best for the welfare of the country. He made the king the in-
carnation of public safety and interest." To bring this about
the political and economic affairs should be centralized in the
hands of a few, which meant the building up of a strong state on
the economic side, according to mercant ilistio means. The Cardi-
nal in his Testament Politique has clearly stated his position as
(
related to the king when he says that the king must act according
to reason and public interest. In this respect he should choose
men to carry out those things he could not do. By their working
|
together, he had no doubt that the greatest good for France would
result.^ "For," he says, "nothing ought to divert us from a
good enterprise. Y/e must do all we can to carry through those
Letters, III, 196.
Caillet, 6.
Testament Politique
,
I, 127-199.
I
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things we undertake with reason." 1 "But whatever the king does,
he must always have this in mind, that the great things are the
important things, and the little ones are unworthy of your cares
and thoughts. "^ Which is certainly economical advice in one
sense of the term.
In conclusion one can not fail to see the common,
though unconscious, economic conceptions of that time which domi-
nated Richelieu in his ideas concerning his duties as a minister,
and those of the king his master. It is a mercantilistic state
he pictures, with the king as its earthly owner. Therefore it
is the chief concern of those who govern this piece of property
to see that the people who work on it, namely the subjects, are
taken care of; that their welfare is aided, and also that the
state in a national sense is to be developed to its fullest ex-
tent. By doing so a strong state would be created, a credit
to its king and its ministers, whose constant aim must be the
welfare of France. 3 The means by which this was to be attained
can be well taken up after a brief discussion of the economic
status of the people as viewed by Richelieu.
Testament Politique
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Chapter VI
THE ECONOMIC BASIS OF RICHELIEU'S
CONCEPT I OH OF THE PEOPLE OF FRANCE
A. The Nobility
Richelieu, following the traditional French scheme, di-
vided the people of France into three classes and considered all
individuals as related to one of these orders.^ They were the
nobility, the clergy, and the third estate, which included all
the rest of the people. However one must understand that the
Cardinal looked upon all these classes as constituting one people^
and when he attacked any class or sect of individuals , such as the
Huguenots, he did so for the public good, that is, the benefit of
all. As a consequence it was said that while the general public
praised him, individuals hated him and tried to bring about his
fall. "Entire provinces praised him, while factions plotted
2
against him." In other words Richelieu constantly had in mind
the public interest and the general economical and political wel-
fare, as against the rights politically or commercially of cer-
tain individuals. His efforts to reform the finances and to
build up commerce and colonies were in general terms, the lines
Testament Politique
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along which he triad to aid the people as a whole, instead of par-
ticular classes, Contralization of the government was the only
efficient way by which the people comld be aided. His efforts
to bring this about illustrate only too well the economic and po-
litical purposes involved. Yet in treating the people as a whole
he had to consider their various classes and the rights due each.*
He recognized the system as being for the best and endeavored to
correct classes and strengthen the privileges of each class. But
in doing so he constantly had in view the welfare of the state as
a whole. The class in which he placed the highest hopes were
the nobles, who he believed were destined to play the leading
part in the destinies of France.
In his treatment of this section of the population of
his native land, the Cardinal had constantly in mind the welfare
of the state. This is shown by the fact that he confronted and
attempted to solve two problems with respect to them. Namely,
first to prevent them from being politically independent of the
central government, and secondly, to make them useful members of
society and the state. What he did with respect to depriving
the nobility of political rights will be taken up in the next
chapter. But one might add, that when Richelieu ordered in 1626
the razing of the castles and chateaus of the nobles, a measure
which was the outcome of his opposition to the separate political
power of the nobility, (which began as far back as 1617) 3 he
1 Testament Politique
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changed the entire economic policy of France, not only in the in-
crease of internal freedom of trade but in the changed position
of the noble class. ^ They were no longer independent of the
central government socially, politically, or economically. They
were subject to the will of the state. This was just a part of
the plan of Richelieu "to put down the turbulent nobles and ob-
tain by that means repose for the common people, prosperity for
2the king, and increased grandeur for the monarchy."
However, when Richelieu had deprived this class of peo-
ple of their independent powers, he did not oppress them and try
to push them down into the lower estate. On the contrary he
favored them. He looked at them not only from a political but
also from an economic point of view; and saw in them "one of the
principal sinev;a of the state, capable of contributing much to its
conservation and establishment."3 In fact he and the king shared
the same views, for the latter called them "the right arms of
4
the state."
,
Richelieu tried to make definite use of the nobles. He
saw that they could fit into certain positions, especially those
which were rewarded with many honors. "His ability to converse
with the world, etc. - - - - all adapt him to certain functions."
Rambaud, Civilisation Francais ,I,Vol. I, 574.
2 Memoirs, XI, 244-256.
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So that if Richelieu wanted to deprive them of their political
right to oppose the government, he also desired to find a method
by which they could live with dignity and serve their country both
in a political and economical sense.
However it was not only Richelieu but the nobles them-
selves who desired a part in building up France, In a statement
of their condition presented to the king by the assembly of no-
tables in 1627, one obtains a fair idea of their desires. The
exposition begins with an account of the distressing condition of
the nobles, who were without any power or purpose. They then
ask for the reestablishment of the nobility "as the greatest
power to upbuild France, and to remedy its miserable condition."
Mention is made of their former splendor and service. They are
now in poverty and without power and are oppressed. Unwarranted
abuses by some of their number (by many as a matter of fact) has
deprived them of the administration of justice, finance, and all
the councils of the king. "Aid us, and put us in our former
place, and the kingdom will gain thereby and your reign will be
more glorious and have a greater splendor."^" However they showed
their selfishness when they asked for control of governmental,
church, and army offices and other unreasonable favors. The
fundamental thing was that they desired a more active part in the
government. "Herein is where Richelieu erred," says one writer,
"in not giving them a more important part in the administration
of the government, as a way of safe-guarding the right and well
Mercure Franco-is
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being of the nobility." 1 Yet, judging from their demand it is
doubtful whether the noble ought to have been considered. As a
matter of fact Richelieu did make efforts to use the nobles for
the welfare of the state.
Richelieu devotes a section in his Testament Politique
to the different means to aid the nobility and melee them subsist
honorably. "They must be respected, " he says, "as one of the
principal sinews of the state, capable of contributing much to-
ward its preservation and settlement. They have been injured
by vast numbers of business men, who have been elevated at their
expense. It is my duty to protect them against any attempts of
such individuals. Yet the people under the nobility must be
protected from certain offices. It is a common fault in those
that are born in a certain order to exert violence against the
people to whom God seems rather to have given them arms with
which to get their livelihood rather than to defend themselves."^
In this statement one sees the entire attitude of Richelieu. He
did not oppose the nobility because he had any prejudice against
them, but he did stand against them in so far as they were a det-
riment to the whole state in that they interfered with the eco-
nomic contribution of the third estate, one part of the country.
Now Richelieu had a vital interest in the welfare of
the nobles and wanted some to have a part in the upbuilding of
the state. In order to do this he carried out several of the
demands of the assembly of notables. For example, he established
Pigeonneau, II, 376-377.
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a military school for young nobles, who were to "be trained to ad-
minister and develop the nation within and extend and protect it
abroad. * They were to have a part in the government, but were
to be trained for their work and could only keep their positions
2by great services and superiority of ideas. The very fact
that the nobility realized this made them ask for the military
school. It was an effort to stay the decadence of the class.
But efforts were made to aid the nobles in other ways.
Many nobles were given good positions and favors to keep them in
line with the government. For example, "Chateauneuf was given
a better governmental position in spite of his bad intentions
towards the government."^ "Indeed," Richelieu says, "common peo-
ple were replaced by nobles in the king's household because it
would increase the number of those who are to help the people
bear the burden of taxation, which they are overwhelmed with at
4
present." This is an economic way of looking at the problem.
The Cardinal was willing to do all he could to aid the poor peo-
ple, but he regarded the privileges of the nobles as something
necessary and a part of the natural order of events. His eco-
nomics at this point is rather weak.
Indeed, the fact that the Cardinal desired the nobles
to enter all phases of French life and thus influence it through
1 Isambert, XVI, 466-470.
2 Caillet, 1££.
3 Testament Politique
,
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their abilities, is best illustrated by his provision that the
nobles were to be allowed to engage in commerce without loss of
honor. ^ Moreover, individuals were ennobled because of their co-
lonial or commercial ventures. In other words, the Cardinal
strove to bring the exclusive order down to the everyday phases
of life, and while he recognized their privileges, he wanted them
to retain them only in so far as earned by economic or political
efforts. The ultimate goal of it all was to be of course the
building up of the state. He sums his entire attitude up when
he says that a noble must do nothing prejudicial to the state or
the king, and must undertake nothing against the repose of the
kingdom, but must exist in the terms of duty and in the true in-
terests of the state and its welfare. He really wanted to make
this class the brains and administration of the country. The
older men were to formulate the plans of government and the
younger men were to carry them out. ^ In other words he desired
to use these men as official agents in the development of France
politically and economically as well. The inefficient corrupt
character of the noble class prevented the success of the plan.
Failure on the part of the nobles to assume this point of view
brought on the French Revolution and their ruin.
But after all is said and done, the great thing Riche-
lieu did with respect to the nobles was to ruin their individual
political power and open to them opportunities to serve the
state politically or commercially, a course of action certainly
worthy of a statesman. That he weakened this class by adding
1
^
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to them by means of the creation of titles because of activities
in the field of literature or in the field of commerce, is very
true. But what better proof is there of the economic tendencies
of the man? He realized that the sale of offices to the nobles
was bad and tried to stop it, but he could not bring about a re-
form in one night, as he admitted. 1 But in opening to the no-
bility the chance to engage in political or commercial opportu-
nities whereby the state was to be strengthened, he was in keep-
ing with his economic and political views, and the fundamental
theory of mercantilism.
That he failed to accomplish all he desired is true;
a radical change is impossible, all at once. That he endeavored
to develop the nobility, the clergy, and the third estate, along
certain lines; to centralize the government and thus to act
against many of the individuals of the above classes, explains
one cause for his failure. Yet it was a part of his general
policy, and to be consistent, he had to try to carry it out.
B. The Clergy
"In conformity with his doctrine of the state, Riche-
lieu opposed ultramontanism and proclaims," says one writer,
"the absolute independence of civil power and the necessity of
a national clergy." In other words the Cardinal desired the
clergy to join their interests with those of the nation. In
Testament Politique
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fact the church had something more than a religious influence in
France at that time. "It was an age of hospitals and schools
which were conducted by the clergy. They were the leaders of
philanthropic work." 1 Richelieu as Bishop of Lu^on was well
aware of the importance of that class, and indeed tried to use
his position to diminish the oppression of the common people.
But he wanted them to use their powers for the interest of the
state and its economic and social welfare, Indeed, he said that
he preferred the interest of the king and the grandeur of the
state to the interest of Borne, even though he was of the clerical
order. That explains his attitude. He maintained that the
state was above the church and that the latter must conform to
the law of the former. In other words he wanted a national
clergy.
On the other hand the clergy as a whole recognized this
position taken by the Cardinal. They appreciated the fact that
the
he desired Aunity of all the people in France for their conser-
vation. "Your majesty," said some of their representatives,
"treats offensively and defensively, solely for the protection
of the altar of Prance from the enemy." They then joined the
king in his administration "whether it would be to keep up com-
merce or preserve the security of the state in common defense,
knowing that the sovereign law of political government is the
if
2
safety of the people." They promised to do all they could to
1 Caillet, 60-62.
2 Mercure Francois
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keep up the glory of the state. This indicates that at least
a part of the clergy appreciated the attitude Richelieu took to-
wards them, and wanted to "do their bit" towards developing the
state, even in keeping up commerce.
Richelieu considered the clergy as being capable of
serving in other capacities besides the religious side of affairs.
(Doubtless he was thinking of his own case.) For instance, he
says that the churchmen are best for public tasks because they
have less self-interest and other distracting influences such as
families.^ Economically speaking he desired to get out of them
the most possible for the aid of the central government. How-
ever he believed that their important function was on the relig-
ious side. Herein he admits that many reforms are needed such
as an effort to get good bishops, to change the system of ap-
peals and courts, unjust exemptions, etc. "In fact," he says
in a letter, "the king must be obeyed, by great and small, and
he must fill the bishoprics with wisely chosen and capable men." 3
While admitting the importance of learning and its propagation,
he desires to see the monasteries limited in number, as well as
other religious houses, because of the fact that there is a loss
in having too many of them. 4 So he forbade the establishment of
1 Testament Politique , I, 304.
^ Ibid., I, 32-83.
3 Letters, III, 181.
4
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any more without the consent of the king.^" In other words the
Cardinal wanted enough and no more of religious institutions than
to serve to build up the state. More than enough was an eco-
nomic waste and he recognized it as such.
In conformity with his plan to get all he could out of
the clergy, especially the upper strata, he tried to obtain as
much financial support from them as possible. For example in
1628, he asked for money for the upkeep of the army and navy. By
giving some, they would release the common people. So they
granted three millions of livres. Indeed he would have liked
to exclude them from exemptions of taxes. On other occasions
he demanded certain amounts of money from the clergy and they ob-
jected. Busy with his European wars he permitted the clergy to
have a council and decide what they would pay and he accepted
4it, as he had other matters which kept him busy.
As will be shown later, Eichelieu opposed the Huguenots
not on religious but on political and economic grounds. In fact
he encouraged their economic prosperity. This was just a part
of that central theory of state building which he carried out
so well.
Isambert XVI, 347.
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Indeed one might sum up his entire attitude towards
the clergy in the phrase: "what I can do to make you a part in
the growth of the nation, that will I do, whether it "be against
any outside forces whatsoever." The political and economic
forces when opposed to religious matters dominated this Cardinal
of the church, especially when the political, social, and eco-
nomic welfare of the state was at issue.
C. The Third Estate
Richelieu regarded the Third Estate from the point of
view of the nation, and for doing so he has been condemned. One
writer says that Richelieu always sacrificed the well "being of
the population to the grandeur of the nation without thinking
that there was no more true and solid grandeur than in the re-
union of these two factors, public prosperity and national glory.
In fact he accused the Cardinal of having no true love of the
people. And whereas the latter followed Henry IV in his at-
tempts to build up the state he does not follow him with respect
to the improvement of the welfare of the people, which was one
of the aims of his predecessor.^
Row it is quite correct to say that the Cardinal built
up everything for the interest of the state. That was the cen-
tral part of his political and economic philosophy. He recog-
nized the people as constituting a part of this great nation and
consequently they must be aided as a class. He looked at them
from the cold, calculating point of view of the statesman and
_/_-__-
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economist, who "believes that you must build up all the parts in
order to increase the grandeur of the whole, hut care must be
taken to have in view constantly the whole rather than weaken
common advancement by an undue emphasis placed upon some part.
This was his theory with respect to the relations of the people
to the state and even with respect to the relation of individuals
to the people as a whole. Indeed he says in his Testament to-
ward the end of his life that the public interest ought to be
the goal of those who govern the state, or at least the mass
should be preferred instead of individual people. He cites
Spain as an example, as having been made great through emphasis
on the people as a mass. "By means of reason and justice this
should be the method of councillors and kings of the future.""^"
In other words he asks the future government to consider the wel-
fare of its peoples. In doing so he says, "all classes should
stay in their proper boundaries, and thus trouble would not
2
arise.
"
In spite of the fact that Richelieu is considered to
have had no personal sympathy with the people, but instead, ap-
peared to base all his ideas upon problems concerning the wel-
fare of the state; nevertheless, he did have human sympathy for
them. He realized their difficulties and would have liked to
solve them. He tried to do so but he knew that the greatest
means to obtain aid for the people was through a strong state,
1
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and that is why he put the latter doctrine to the front, even
though the people had to suffer temporary oppressions* It was
done with the hope of "better conditions for the common people in
the future.
Richelieu was a farsighted man. He admitted the suf-
ferings of the people because of wars, hut he saw the benefits
to be derived in the future because of them, not only by the king
but by the people as a body. "War," he says, "is for the best
interests of the people as a whole in that it keeps the state
from ruin."^" Indeed, in another place he says that the inter-
est of France is the interest of its people, and the most im-
portant obligation of a king is the repose of his subjects and
p
the conservation of the state.
Richelieu admitted that war made the people suffer,
and he tried to prevent it when possible. However, he also rec-
ognized the fact that the average individual could not understand
the ultimate benefits to be derived by war and thus was apt to
oppose it at inopportune times. "The miseries and afflictions
of the people of France," he says about 1630, "who have suffered
under very great and almost incredible poverty, made peace a de-
sirable thing, and the king as their king and father was obliged
to urge it. The frequent disorders taking place in many towns
brought up the fear of a continuation of the war, because of the
need of more money to wage it. Only a few people could under-
stand the real purpose of war, for instance the welfare of the
1 Memoirs, XXVI, 87
2
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state and of the king toward other powers of Europe. On this
account people in general, especially merchants, blamed the gov-
ernment for heavy taxes
;
etc." In conclusion he says that the
king as their father was obliged to seek peace for them.-*-
It is quite evident that there was a strong peace party
in France, led by the merchants, who did not like to pay the bills
of war. The problem resulting seems to explain why Richelieu did
not take active steps to aid the people at this time. In fact he
could not. The political and economic status of France as re-
lated to other nations had to be settled first before he could
attend to the internal economic problems confronting him. In
other words, he had to develop his foreign commercial policy
first and then his internal commercial policy. He could only do
this when the general ' status of France in the world at large was
established. This task occupied the last ten years of his life.
Only a beginning could be made with respect to internal affairs.
One of the most important phases of Richelieu's life
,
was spent in Lu^.on as bishop of Lucon. The very fact that he
was a churchman and a conscientious one at that, would tend to
indicate that he must have known about the unhappy conditions
of the people. That he did was also shown by letters written
during his administration as bishop. In 1608 when he first be-
came bishop he wrote to the people that "time will show the af-
fection which I bear toward you, more than words can do. It is
for that reason that I wait for deeds to let you know that all my
attentions are for your welfare." 2 He follows this up a few
1 Memoirs, XXVI, 86-87.
2
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days later with a letter to the local tax collector, protesting
against the unfair assessment of taxes, bringing out the misery
and poverty of the inhabitants from the excessive tailleSjetc.
He closes with a plea for moderation of the taxes and equalization
among the different sections of Prance. ^ This letter is fol-
lowed by another the next year, (1609) to a high official, (prob-
ably Sully) asking him to aid the poor by a reduction of their
taxes
.
When he became secretary of war in 1617, he desired to
aid the poor people. Also in 16£7, at the assembly of notables
he again advocated the welfare of the common people. He says
there that the greatest thing a king can do is to protect public
faith, as it is an inalienable friend which is always to be found
present. He says that the people who now contribute more of
their blood than their sweat to the expenses of the state will
be aided. "In proportion as you help the people and better
4their condition, the more you can obtain from them." This cer-
i
tainly is a sound economic doctrine and shows that the Cardinal
appreciated the fact that improved labor conditions would bring
better results.
In other words in 1627 Richelieu was advocating the up-
lifting of the common people to a surprising extent. One writer
states "that he even said, that he was to do it all in six
x Letters, I, 18.
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years. "^ Unfortunately he was not able to carry it out before
his death. However that he believed it in theory to the very
last was shown in his Testament . "This does not excuse him,"
says d'Avenel, "why did he not aid them during the period 16£7
to 1642?"^ He did to a certain extent, as will be shown in the
chapter on finances. But one must remember that during that
time, France was involved in a great European war, to preserve
her economic and political status as a nation; that she was try-
ing to overcome internal political troubles; that a certain
amount of territory and centralization of government was neces-
sary before the finances could be improved; and lastly, that the
great Cardinal was hindered by numerous petty plots of individ-
uals which disturbed the nation during the entire period.
Just because he failed to do much to aid the people
does not indicate that he did not desire to do so. The very
fact that his Testament shows that he still planned to do so
proves clearly that he saw the necessity of arranging and set-
tling the other economic and political problems before he en-
countered this one. It was not lack of sympathy which made him
assume this attitude. It was the only means of carrying out
the mercantilistic doctrine which he unconsciously believed would
benefit all who partook of that which a strong state has to of-
fer. In 16£9 after he had taken La Rochelle, he pointed out the
two great problems of his administration. He says to the king
in a letter, "now that La Rochelle is taken, if the king wishes
1 Letters, Introduction, XCII-XCIII.
2
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to become the most powerful monarch and the most admired prince
of the world, he ought to confide in God, and talk carefully and
secretly with his faithful people, both as to what he had better
do in person, and what reform is needed for his estate. (Does
this seem absolutistic?) With respect to the state his inter-
ests are divided into two parts, namely internal and external
problems. With respect to the first, the razing of the fortress-
es seems necessary; with respect to the second, it seems neces-
sary to stop the progress of Spain, make oneself powerful on the
sea, make the borders secure against Germany and Italyjetc."^-
Surely that would explain why the people had to pay heavy taxes.
Indeed he concludes by saying that he plans to raze all fortress-
es except those on the frontiers, or on strategic points on the
river, and to suppress the paulette and all other internal for-
ces which weaken the state. This would seem to explain some of
his problems and why he was not able to do much for the common
people. It was a matter to be settled in the future when peace
should be established. The method to be followed then, he has
brought out in his Testament Politique
The center of difficulty in regard to the third estate
was of course the heavy taxes. Between 16£7 and 1632 he in-
tended to discharge the people of three millions of livres and
asked them in recognition of this desire on the part of the gov-
2
ernment to aid them, to keep the peace.
This same idea is brought out in his Testament . He
1
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says that the public interest should be the only end of those who
govern the state. "If private interest is preferred to public
good then harm is done. But if the public interest is the first
concern, then the state will be happy and escape miseries. The
particular interest of the king and the people go hand in hand.
"<Ve must therefore aid the public and prepare for their preser-
vation." 1 The means to do this was to be by the reform of the
finances, for he says, "If the finances are properly arranged,
the people will love him out of pure personal interest. This
love is very important to a king.
.
It is worth more than gold or
2
silver." In other words a king cannot do much with his money
without the love of his people,—a rather business like way of
beginning the problem. But nevertheless, he not only states it
but tries to solve it by proposing: to reduce the revenues demanded
of the people by three fourths. This will be taken up in a
later chapter.
Richelieu has been criticised for his economic con-
ception of the common people. He has brought this out in his
treatment of the question of the relation between the amount of
labor a man should do and his physical strength. "In regard to
this," he says, "all authorities agree that when the people are
too comfortable, or have too easy a time, it is impossible to
keep them within the bounds of duty, because they are more ig-
norant than the other classes, and to keep them within the bounds
of reason and within the law, they must be kept occupied. If
1 Testament Politique , X> 257-371.
2
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discharged from their duties or obligations, they would think
themselves released from obedience like mules used to burdens.
But like mules, their burdens must be moderate. The common peo-
ple need protection. Common sense must determine the proportion
between the burden and the strength of those who bear it. The
relation of the burden and the strength of the people must be re-
ligiously observed. A prince cannot be esteemed good if he ex-
acts from his subjects more than is necessary. Yet those people
are not the best who never raise more than is absolutely neces-
sary."''" This passage seems to indicate the economic turn of the
Cardinal's mind as no other part of his work does. It certainly
fits our modern labor situation, in which the fact is admitted
that a certain amount of work is good for all, but at the same
time, the physical, moral, intellectual, and religious sides pf
a man must be given an opportunity to develop. Richelieu de-
sired efficiency in France. He wanted them to produce a sur-
plus. His ideal was a strong nation built up of healthy, busy
people who would work and produce 30 that France could become a
great political and economic power. In fact to bring this about
he even went so far as to advocate extra taxation of the rich.
For he says, "Sovereigns must, if possible, make use of the abun-
2
dance of the rich before they bleed the poor." This remark has
a socialistic tinge which is rather out of place in the seven-
teenth century. No, it does not seem fair to say that Richelieu
was unsympathetic with the common people. He really tried to
1 Testament Politique
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aid them not only in a financial and political way but also in a
commercial way. For he built up commerce and as a result, the
commercial class, which was open to all.
The development of the economic side of France was one
of the most important phases of his administration, and, indeed,
affected the common people by bringing on what we might call a
social revolution. "Richelieu," says Pigeonneau, "has been,
without wishing it, one of the most powerful agents of that eco-
nomic evolution and social change, which tended little by little
to level the ranks and which left to the nobles no other super-
iority except that of privilege. The commercial man no longer
resembled the man of the past with his simple and rude manners,
who busied himself with his cloth, etc. and passed his life in
going from town to town with goods On the backs of his mules.
his
Now, often raised in Acalling, by the side of some magistrate's son
he was no longer a merchant but the head of a firm of speculators,
who had his departments and his correspondents at Cadiz, London,
Frankfort, etc." In other words, big business was beginning
at that time. Richelieu did all he could to - encourage it by
allowing the nobles to engage in it without losing their rank
and also by creating nobles from those of the third estate who
made a success of commerce; permitting them to join the royal
p
court. In other words efforts were made to reestablish com-
merce, to renew and amplify its privileges, and to bring it about
1 Pigeonneau, II, 456-457.
2 Isambert, XVI, 5£7.
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that the profession of trade should be honored by the people."'"
Mention might be made at this point of the fact that
this increase of commerce caused trouble between the nobility and
the common people, in that the nobles claimed that they were bet-
ter than the common man even if they engaged in commerce. Also,
the third estate did not want the privileged class to engage in
commerce and protested about it. Lastly the rise of many middle
class people to the ranks of the nobility can be noticed as a re-
sult of this economic and social change. 2
Another interesting development at this time was the
edicts against duelling and the carrying of weapons except by
soldiers or others duly authorized. These edicts were made with
the purpose of preserving order in the land and making all sub-
missive to the one central power. It was economic in that it
saved lives, (many worthless ones, to be sure) and it aided the
third estate by affording them some protection from the nobility.
"Kings, " says the Cardinal, "are established to preserve their
subjects and not to ruin them. They cannot expose their lives
without doinfr so for some public use or particular necessity."
In other words every man's life had a certain value to the state
and could only be risked for the security or welfare of the
latter.
Meroure Francois , XIII, 36-40.
2 levasseur, E. , Histoire du Commerce de la France
, Paris,
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The fact that Richel ieu recognized the importance of
the third estate and wanted their support, is best illustrated by
his influencing them in their ideas by means of the Mercure Fran-
cois , the first so-called French newspaper , although it was really
a yearly history published by certain individuals under the direct
control of the Cardinal. 1
In conclusion, it is clear that the Cardinal looked upon
the common people as worthy of the utmost attention of the king,
and those who aided him in governing. They were a part of the
state which he desired to make strong, and this idea must have
dominated his actions toward them. Nevertheless, this could not
have been the only cause which influenced him to try to care for
the lower classes. The religious side of his life must have
brought to the surface the personal sympathy of the man for the
suffering of others. Indeed, the very fact that he was inter-
ested enough in them to desire their happiness in the future,
indicates that the future of the state and of the third estate
must have been the two elements which were the objects of his po-
litical, economic, and social policies. No better phrase can il-
lustrate the Cardinal's deep and heartfelt interest in them, than
the close of that section of his Testament dealing with the third
estate, in which he pleads with the king to consider always their
interest, and affirms that nothing would give him greater pleas-
ure than to have the king try to carry out, after his death,
what he has tried to do when he was on earth; namely, to build up
a strong state and a happy people therein.
^ Deschamps, 129.
2 Testament Politique, I, ISO, etc.

Chapter VII
THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF RICHELIEU 'S POLICY OF CENTRALIZATION
Richelieu, when he came into office, realized that if he was to
make the King supreme and "build around hin. a great state, he had to take
steps which would lead to the centralization of all internal political, so-
cial; or economic forces, under direct or indirect control of the royal govern
ment. In other words, the Cardinal realized, that if he was to build up
the French nation along economic and political lines, he must do away with
all internal independent obstructive forces.
This was the first problem which confronted him, when he took
office. "The Huguenots shared the Kingdom with us," he said, "and the nobles
conducted themselves as if they were not subjects of the King, and the most
powerful governors of the provinces as if they had been sovereigns of the
Kingdom."^- All this, he claimed, diminished the authority of the King. 2
People looked after their own interests rather than the state, and in fact,
this neglect of the King's advisers caused great injury to the development
of France. In other words, to strengthen the power of the Royal House in
internal affairs was his first problem. It was the only way to develop the
nation. That Richelieu devoted his personal attention to this side of the
development, and left Father Joseph to carry on the major part of the politi-
cal questions of the Thirty Years' War, indicates the importance he placed
upon this phase of his administration.
Now to bring about a thorough internal change, he had to remove
•"•Testament Politique, 1, 6.
2Ibid., 1, 7.
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all troublesome obstacles, which involved naturally the accumulation of power
in the hands of the King and his Prime Minister, the destruction of the
political independence of the nobles and Huguenots, and the centralization
of all local forces under the direct or indirect control of the King.
Richelieu "believed that the King should be the head of everything
and thus the last source of appeal. Writing at the close of his life, he
advised the King to retain suoreme control of France in the future. He pre-
dicted an era of peace and as a result great internal gains in France. How-
ever, this can best be done by a centralized government. "The state," he
says, "which includes everything, is subject to your will and direction." 1
But in order to do well, the King must have a good and faithful adviser.
In other words, the King was supreme out he needed a helper, who was of course
to "be Richelieu.
Richelieu has left ample evidence as to the requirements of a
chief councillor of the King. He must have in mind constantly, his duty to
the King and state. There should be more than one councillor to advise the
ruler, but one should be above the others. "However," he says, "this man
should have public approbation, for if everybody likes him, he will be most
able to do good. "3 This adviser should be able to guide the King in all the
phases of government. That the King realised this, and allowed Richelieu
to assume this place, is best illustrated by the great number of offices,
fiefs, and honors of various sorts given to him by his master. 4 Louis XIII
understood the vast importance of the man.^ Indeed, he even permitted him
'Memoirs, XI, 349-350.
^Testament Politique, 1, 232-240.
*Ibid., 1, 244.
%ercure Francois
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to have a deliberative voice in the Parlement of Paris, just as he had
in the council of state. 1 As the King's chief adviser he had access to all
the parts of the French government. He was supreme, and all was centralized
in his hands, subject of course in theory to the final word of hi3 master.
However it is interesting and important to notice, that the office
upon which Kichelieu laid the most emphasis, was that of "grand master, chief,
and general superintendent of the navigation and commerce of France." His
obtaining this office during the early part of his administration brings
two important points to light, namely, the economic interest of the Cardinal,
and the means by which independent nobles, governors, and other powers were
removed in the interest of centralization. In other woris, it was the
first great step by which the Cardinal could carry out personally the politi-
cal and economic program which he had in mind.
Bad internal conditions made this necessary. "There existed in
France," says one writer, "two institutions incompatible with the unity of
ministerial power, as with the order of finance and administration. They
were, first, the jurisdiction of the high connetable of France and secondly,
the office of the admiralty."2 Both were suppressed. Eichelieu in his
Memoirs, mentions the abuses brought about by Montmorency, the last of the
connetable s . The office and its mate the admiralty, which had as much power
on the sea as the former on the land, were suppressed, "because," he said,
"they weakened the control of the King and were harmful to the finances,
which were the ordinary expense of war, together with that of the local
officials of that department. 1,3 The admiral had, likewise, large sums of
Isrcure Francois
,
XIII, 365.
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money to spend on the navy.
The question raised was as to whether they spent the money as it
should be spent. It was quite evident from the complaints of the soldiers
and others, that much of the money was wasted, and as a result, their finances
were in bad shape. Naturally, this led to the suppression of those offices
in the interest of the state. It happened that in 1627 the offices were
both made vacant by death, so that by abolishing them the people were to be
aided by the decreased expenditures.* This was the view Richelieu desired
the people to take. It is interesting to notice how he constantly appealed
to the effect upon their purses, in carrying out all his great acts. He de-
sired to get control of the armies on land and sea, but wanted the people to
look upon it as an economical change for their benefit. His aim was not
only along financial lines, however. He desired to build up the commerce
of France, and this office enabled him to do so without local hindrances.
In the edict which created Richelieu "grand master, chief and
general superintendent of navigation and commerce", which took the place of
the separate offices, mention is made, that Henry IV planned a commercial
company: "in order," says the edict, "that the means of navigation could be
available for our subjects, and its first fruits in money and goods which
are useful and are needed.'"6 In other words, trade was to be fostered by
this office, for the honor and giandeur of the state and the profit and in-
crease of public wealth. Commerce was to be developed not only for the
advantage of the people but in order "to increase the reputation and glory
of our affairs." 3 Richelieu was to have the new office, because he possessed
iMercure Francois
,
XIII, 354-358.
2lbid., XIII, 359.
3
Ibid., XIII, 359-36C; XIV, 4-46.
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the ability and the integrity, care and diligence, which such a position
required. "He is loyal to our service and to great affairs, and has the
required capacity for the establishment and direction in this Kingdom." In
the creation of this office, one sees the Cardinal taking the first step
toward building up the commercial status of France. The fact that a minister,
at the start of his administration, pledged himself to undertake the uplift
of the economic side of hi3 country, indicates that this phase of a nation's
development was coming to its own. The year 162? on this account, marks the
first great step taken in the economic development of France. The economic
duties of a ruler were at last given at least equal place beside the politi-
cal phases of his administration.
But just what were the duties of this office? A statement of what
the office required, gives a key to the economic policy of Richelieu. "In the
first place," says the edict, "he must treat with all kinds of persons. He
must look over propositions of our subjects relating to commerce, decide con-
cerning the merit, utility, etc., of all agreements, articles, contracts,
etc., concerning the sea and its enterprises He is to look after
commerce, which is so useful to France. Our navigation rights and sea enter-
prises are under his charge- All those embarking on sea trips, can now go
to him for permission. Before this, no one knew to whom to go. All the
evils of the marine are to be removed, etc"^ In other words, the Cardinal
was to have full charge of navigation, the advancement of commerce, and the
security of Frenchmen on the seas, in times of peace. In times of war, other
offices might be created. 2 The importance of this office can only be appre-
ciated, when one realizes that it put the control of commerce fully in the
^Mercure Francois
,
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hands of Richelieu, and it indicated that this part of his administration was
to be one of the dominating factors of his career. It was clearly a part
of his centralization policy. Indeed, says one writer, "Richelieu took the
control of the maritime provinces away from local governors, and concentrated
it in his hands, in order that it should grow at an astonishing rate."^ He
realized that centralization in time of need meant efficiency and quick re-
sults. This is what ha 'anted on the economic side of his administration.
This office was really that of a secretary of commerce, and it is an evidence
of Richelieu's unselfish motives that the first abuses which he remedied
were those by which he might have profited. He would take no pay for his
2duties in this office, nor would he take a share in the salvage.""'
It seems that the Cardinal's purpose was solely the idea of bene-
fiting France. It is rather significant, that the most patriotic side of
Richelieu's career is the economic phase. The rewards for his labor were to
be honors and not salaries. He was above the common salaried man. In that
sense, he was a trifle idealistic. But one must not praise him too much in
that respect. For he had enough economic shrewdness to know that he would
benefit financially by other means, of a more quiet nature. In this respect
one finds many Richelieua in our modern world.
However, this mercantilistic policy of centralization, which the
Cardinal used as the dominant keynote of his administration, is to be found
also elsewhere than in the changes in the royal government. The unity of the
King and the common people against the nobles is a feature which plays a part
in this program. The idea was not original with him, for one can see its
Gouraud, 193-194.
!Martin, II, 244.
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beginning in the reign of Louis XI, "whose sole aim was to constitute the
French nation by removing the incubus, without whose removal its existence
was impossible, namely feudal aristocracy. Thoroughly devoted to looking
on the frivolous etiquette of the nobles with undisguised scorn, assuming
the dress and society of commoners, Louis XI was the true precursor of
Richelieu." 1 Nevertheless, little was accomplished in the way of reducing
the power of the nobles until Richelieu's time.
When he undertook the administration of France, he saw the nobles
still at their attempts to strengthen feudal ism by means of various conspira-
cies. He feared the combination of internal and external troubles. "What
would happen if the nobles or Huguenots united with Spain," he asked? It is
quite evident that this great man saw the economic as well as the political
and religious consequences. For a Spanish victory might and probably would
have meant the victory of the nobles, and as a result, this would have per-
mitted the Spanish Catholic nation to overrun France. Thus the Thirty Years'
War would have had a far different result. What would have taken the place
of the political and religious equilibrium established?* Or from a more
practical point of view, what would have become of the great state and the
welfare of its people? No, one can see that the Cardinal realized that he
had to settle coth internal and external difficulties, if he was to carry
out his project of making France a great economic and political state with
a happy and united people. Therein lies the economic basis of his diplomacy.
As a result, the Cardinal decided that he had to weaken or destroy
the political power of the nobles. The destruction of most of the fortresses
^Bridges, 15-25.
2Letters, II, 82-84.
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and castles of the nobles, unnecessary to the defence of the kingdom, was the
most important step taken to attain this desire. 1 It was brought about
with the express purpose of considering needless expense and preventing
trouble, and of delivering the people from the inconvenience, both economic
and political, which they suffered from the existence of the local quasi-
independent powers. 2 As a result, it made the nobles, the courtiers, and the
common people more independent citizens. They could trade with more freedom,
and thus France received a direct economic stimulus through this act.
It cut down the expenses of government and made for peace and tran-
quillity in the land. Therefore, it was a very important economic measure.
One might well notice at this point the efforts made by the Cardinal to pro-
3
hibit the carrying of weapons except by permission. Also, he brought about
the edict against duels, on the ground that it was best for the conservation
and growth of the state. He said that the general welfare of the people was
ahead of the interests of particular individuals. 4 In other words, he did
all that he could to better social and economic conditions in France for all
the people, by depriving certain classes of unjust rights. This was done
with the express purpose of making France grow. It was of prime economic
importance, in that it gave the common people freedom to expand their internal
commerce and their industrial and agricultural growth. The blight of war
prevented the fulfillment of this part of the development of France. "To
constitute the French nation, to reach that ideal government where all the
force of the state should be directed to the common welfare - an ideal, toward
"Letters, 11, 320.
2Isambert, XVI, 192-194.
3 I?.ambert, XVI, 175; Me rcure Francois, XX, 656.
Memoirs, XXIII, 294-297.
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which the Revolution of 1789 made the greatest stride that has ever been
taken by man - it was necessary first to constitute the French monarchy,
and to that object he bent the powers of his unswerving and relentless will.
Between him and his ideal stood one great obstacle, the feudal nobility -
with their private duties - their exemption from taxes, their possession of
land and power over the common man. This was harmful not only to interior
but exterior commerce. Such a feudalism was different from that of the
middle ages, for it was not influenced by the higher power - the clergy - and
it was corrupt - a feudalism, without the necessities, and without the
duties, which, from the sixth to the thirteenth century had justified and
ennobled its existence." 1
In other words, Richelieu was the forerunner of the French Revolu-
tion, which was finished after 1789. He left the nobles mere courtiers, and
the French Revolution deprived them of all their privileges. Richelieu de-
sired the nobles to earn their privileges. They failed to respond, and this
caused their fall.
Richelieu was not radical in his changes. His was a conservative
type of mind. In his reform of the government, in his replacement of officials
and removals of nobles in office, he was very slow and exact in the steps he
took. "The disorders," he said, "which have been established by public neces-
sities and strengthened by reasons of state, cannot be reformed without time.
It must be done by degrees without passing from one extreme into another."
He then admits that care must be taken in the removal of officials. Efforts
Bridges, 27-30.
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must be made to keep then, within the bounds of their duty, for the public
welfare.* In other words, Richelieu was willing to give in to some nobles
or provinces in various proportions, if he saw that it was for the interest
of the state to do so. Numerous examples can be given, as where he refused
to abolish certain taxes because all the provinces would not agree to it,
and where he exiled the ruler or governor of Rouen and later allowed him to
return. 3 "Les messieurs de Saint-Malo" refused to allow the King to construct
some vessels in their port. The Cardinal showed them that it was for their
interest in the protection of their commerce to do so, and promised in return
to increase their franchises. 4- In other words, Richelieu added to or took
away the privileges of individuals, with the sole purpose of the public
welfare as he saw it.
Richelieu did take away from the poor people the actual living
menac? of the nobles. They were still a drag upon the hands of the public,
but they were no longer dangerous. Corrupt officials were removed as being
against the interest of the public welfare. "All things which were wrong
should be made right," he said. "The existence of a state, which is like a
body full of pus and badly deseased, can not exist unless cleansed. "5 To do
this he removed nobles and officials who were acting against the welfare of
the state and replacedthem with officials whom he believed cacable of serving
the state. ^ Toe nobility were now given a chance to become worthy of their
7 P,privileges. They were above all encouraged to enter the field of comrr.erce,
* Testament Politique
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a sure indication of the growing importance of that occupation. But the
nobles did not measure up to his confidence in them.
No better indication of the fact that Richelieu wanted to be
considered the benefactor of the people can be found, than in the dispute
over the Cardinal's administration between Richelieu and Gaston, brother of
the King. The latter accused the Cardinal of working for his own ends and
causing the great misery of the people. In reply Richelieu says that the
unfortunate state of the people hurts him. However, he points out the fact,
that it is due largely to the uprisings caused by Gaston, which had retarded
him in his efforts to aid them. 1 Richelieu constantly asserts, that as soon
as the political disturbance inside France should be put down and Spain be
defeated on the outside, he would turn his attention toward the aid of the
2
people, "which I so much desire." "The King," he says, "has no other aim
than the grandeur and welfare of the kingdom."
Another way by which Richelieu weakened the nobles and aided the
people was in the appointment of irtendants. These newly created government
officials were charged with the management of financial and judicial affairs
in the local provinces, but were responsible to the central government. Thi
power had been in the hands of various nobles, who had used their authority
for their own personal financial benefit, so that the appointment of these
new officials has a distinct economic aspect. For example, they were to
see that there should not be imposed on the subjects any greater sums than
those which were contained in the commissions (of the government).^ As a re
suit the Intendants undermined the political power of the nobles in the
Mercure Francois
,
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provinces. One writer says that these officials, "under the color of finance,
and not belonging to any branch of the administration, represented in the
province the executive power and drew together in its name, all the forces
of public life." 1 Another writer notes that while the intendants aided the
central government in that they broke up the power of the nobles, yet they
recognized the privileges and the franchises of different provinces or cities.
"However, it was by making an appeal to the franchises and local liberties,
and not by destroying them, that the great Cardinal built up the marine,
founded great commercial companies, etc."2 This would indicate that Riche-
lieu gave in to them only in order to establish other phases of his administra-
tion, which were necessary to build up his great object. As was said before,
he had to go slowly. One mist notice at this point, that the formation of
colonies and the promotion of commerce went ahead of even part of the internal
political centralization scheme.
The reduction of the power of the Parlements, especially that of
Paris, has an economic interest besides its part in the general centraliza-
tion idea of Richelieu. He desired them to attend to their judicial affairs,
and leave the government alone. He did not ask either the Estates General
or the Parlements to aid him in getting control of the nobility, because both
of these bodies supported the party he struggled against, namely, the great
landowners. 4 Therefore, the destruction of the political power of the
Parlements as well as of the nobles was necessary for the centralization
of the government, and the aid of the people thereby. According to Richelieu'
s
Bonnefon, Intro. IV.
^.ontchre'tien, Intro. XCI.
<%ole>Mathiew, Memo ires , 4 vols. Pari3, 1855, I, 478-482; II, 3.
bridges, 3C-31
.
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scheme it was not to be a government of the poor by the rich. It was to be
a government by a central hereditary monarchy over both classes. "In other
words," says Bridges, " feudalism in the hands of Richelieu, was concentrated
into a single institution, hereditary monarchy." By thi3 he hoped to do away
with most internal and external evils and build up a strong state. No wonder
he put down all conspiracies so severely. Indeed, his efforts to end the
disorders of the court of justice, by having the King appoint men of merit
2
and integrity, only serves to illustrate the fact that he tried in theory
at least, to reform all the parts of the royal and local governments, in order
to build up a strongly centralized kingdom in which the people should enjoy
a happier social and economic life. Practically, Richelieu was apt to favor
certain classes in his appointments, as when for example he made the Arch-
bishop of Bordeaux Admiral of one of his fleets. The latter was not es-
pecially strong in this new calling. In 1641 his fleet was defeated by a
Spanish squadron near Tarragona, and Richelieu admitted that he had made a
mistake in his appointment, by removing the Archbishop from command of the
French fleet. 3
There was one political element in France, which attracted the
attention of Richelieu, more than any other single factor, on account of its
independence and opposition to the interests of the state. It was the or-
ganization of the Huguenots. In his Political Testament he says that at the
beginning of his administration, he promised the King to employ all the
industry and authority given to him, to rain the Huguenots, etc. 4' It was one
of his first problems. Of course, it was a part of the great scheme of
1Bridges, 31.
^Te stament Politique, I, 168.
3Perkins, J.B., Richelieu and the Grow th of French Power . N.Y. 1904, 179.
4Te stamen
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sent ralizat ion, which was to result in the grandeur of France. "It is cer-
tain,'1 he said, "that the end of La Rochslle, (politically speaking), is the
end of the miseries of France and the beginning of its repose and good for-
tune. "* It was the idea of attaining a future peace and the development
of France thereby, which caused Bichelieu to take a severe attitude toward
these people from the start. "As long as the Huguenots have a foothold in
France," he writes, "the King will never rule within and can take no glorious
action within or without. "^ In other words, the destruction of the political
power of the Huguenots was a necessary preliminary for the welfare of the
ideal centralized state. As Bishop of Lu^on, Eichelieu lived near the Hugue-
nots and thus was well aware of their religious, political and economic power.
Nevertheless, in bringing about this change the Cardinal did not
desire to injure the Huguenots personally. "If they stay quiet," he said,
"they will be treated as citizens, with the due protection of laws, etc."^
They had a place and value as citizens of France, and he recognized that fact.
One writer suggests that he rather favored those Huguenots who devoted them-
selves to agriculture, industry, and commerce. "He opened to their enter-
4
prise, all the French colonies except Canada." In other words, the Cardinal
appreciated their economic importance a3 individuals, but deprecated their
political strength a3 a body. To preserve the former and ruin the latter
was necessary in order to develop France along either political or economic
betters, III, 161.
%emoirs, XXII, 430.
3Isambert, XVI, 143.
4Rambaud, Civil isation F ran^ ais., I, 572.
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line3. "There is no King, Prince, sovereign, nor any state so well policed,
that it approves a rebellion of its subjects; for it is fatal to the existence
of the state." 1
The agitation against the Huguenots was temporarily settled, by
a peace concluded and signed February 5, 1526, between the King and La Eochelle.
One of the provisions of this treaty related to the use of boats suitable for
commerce, and the fact that the Rochellais should receive no trouble or hin-
drance in the security and liberty of commerce which they carried on according
to the laws and customs of the Kingdom.-' This is significant as revealing
an important local commercial or economic interest. Earlier evidence of this
can be found.
In 1615, MontchretieiJs work on economies placed great emphasis on the
value of the salt industry in France. "I would remark to your majesty," he
3ay3, "that all the trade not only of Frenchmen but of foreigners, depends
upon the salt of the Kingdom." This can be a great source of revenue for
France, he points out, as it is a public necessity for all. In fact the
English, Dutch, Italians, etc., should pay the same revenues as the French,
(which evidently had not been the case previously).** In another place, he
advocates the transfer of salt to other parts of France by Frenchmen, instead
of by foreigners, as had been the case.4 Thus we see another indication of the
development of French labor and transportation to be fostered by Eichelieu.
It is interesting to note that at the time when Montchretien was
Mercurs Francois , XIV, 104.
Memoirs, XXIII, 1-15.
"V.ontchre t ien , 235-236
.
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advocating retaliation against foreign countries which injured French commerce.
England resented this (as will be shown later), and brought about an industrial
monetary crisis. * At the same time began also the revolt of the Huguenots,
who were more and more addicted to the pursuits of trade and industry, and
sought to profit by popular discontent, and recover their lost prestige. In
other words, a commercial rivalry between England and France, and a political
struggle between France and the Huguenots was to make it a three cornered fight,
with the English in alliance with the Huguenots.
The struggle centered around the capture of the islands of Oleron
and Re, which of course would result in the fall of La Eochelle. Eichelieu
said, that the island of Oleron was of great importance in that it controlled
the outlet of the Clarente and the Sendre rivers, and could be of inconvenience
to the traffic on the Garonne river, and thus injure the King's taxes and
commerce. 3 It thus becomes clear that Eichelieu had a commercial motive
for the conquest of these islands. Furthermore, he goes on 'to maintain that
in these two islands the English found enough salt for all England and even
for the Flemish people, which was depriving the French King of the advantages
he had in the sale of the salt to the northern countries. Glory and safety
requires France to keep them from England. Thus one sees that these islands
were the object of a commercial rivalry between France and England for con-
trol of the salt trade. 4 He points out in another place that they would
l-Montchretien, 129-130, Editor's note.
2 Ibii., 129-130.
Memoirs, XXIII, 343-344.
4The Venetian ambassador to England was well aware of the economic impor-
tance of La Eochelle, etc. In 1527, he tells how after the capture of the is-
land of Be' the English would attempt to take Oleron, which was also very impor-
tant on account of the salt pans, and both islands are very convenient as they
command the mouths of both the Garonne and the Loire, the chief rivers of
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"be useful for a military base and control of the neighboring coast; he would
have the advantages obtained from the wines, wheat, and salt of those islands.
Thus these islands were to be a great military and commercial basis to build
up France along the coast. "Great efforts," he said, "should be made to keep
the islands of fie and Oleron from the English, who cannot be trusted." 1
Of course Richelieu's views were bitterly opposed by the people
of La Rochelle and the English. The former made the claim that the French
had constantly tried to hinder the commerce of that place, by which it existed.
In reply, the King and Richelieu accused the people of La Rochelle of doing
injury to the commerce of other towns, as Orleans for example. "They do not
pkeep their promises," the King sail. He told them on another occasion that
the commercial growth of La Rochelle made them try to imitate the Parlement
of Paris and oppose the government. "Now the word is «;iven by their master
and it is to be enacted according to his pleasure, otherwise, it is contrary
to the laws of his subjects, the divine law and other rights of the people. 3
In other words, the commercial as well as the political laws of the central
government were to dominate over any province or town. Any special commercial
privileges of La Rochelle were subject to the will of this central body.
It is certainly interesting to note, that the Huguenots claimed
that they revolted for commercial rights. They bemoaned the unfairness of
France, enabling their possessors to take toll sufficient to pay the cost of
the garrison and fleet, with something over. "Indeed, some say that already
certain Dutch ships which went to lade salt evaded a duty claimed by the English
by main force and flight."
See Calendar of State papers (Venetian) , XX , 341
.
Memoirs, XXIII, 362-363.
^/fercure Francois , XIV, 94.
3Ibii., XIV, 90-94.
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Francs in attacking La Rochelle, confiscating its goods, etc., and forcing
it to seek English aid. In reply, the royal government has the following to
say, "0 unfortunate fort so fatal to France. infidelity, so dearly pur-
chased. Since in your substance is found the force of our misfortunes, your
ruin will be the true remedy, ""ho will believe the fact, that they were capa-
ble of hazarding the honor of France and the loss of the islands and the
fort of Re, and our liberty thereby."* It is clear that the French feared
above all the conquest of this territory by the English.
The chief explanation for this antipathy towards English victory
may be found in the matter of control of the salt mines, which were abundant
2
in this region. "One knows well enough," says the Mercure Francois
,
"that
the best revenue of the Kingdom consists of three sources, salt, external and
internal revenues, and tailles. The fall of La Rochelle would render the
first two useless, and as for the tailles, they would he diminished in the
confusion of the civil war."
lieu's desire to put down internal rebellion was probably partly due to this loss
of revenue, which must have contributed to the unfortunate financial conditions
of France and really would partly account for them.^
Furthermore, "the activity of commerce, which renders the Kingdom
flourishing, would be interrupted, as a result of the Huguenot trouble," says
the Mercure Francois . 5 So that commercial gain and financial loss were the
economic factors behind the opposition to the Huguenot and English control
2Salt from the La Rochelle region was one of the important English im-
ports. See Calendars (Domestic), X, 533-534.
^Mercure Francois, XII, 102.
4D'Avenel, Monarchle Absolue, 11, 275.
At this point it may be observed that the economic basis of Riche
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in France
•
On the other hand, the Huguenots pointed out the fact that a treaty
of peace had been made between England and France with their aid. But they
had found little to warrant their carrying out the articles of that treaty.
They had been promised free disposition of the salt, which they had on the
islands, and of their other products, yet all the salt on the island of Ee/
had been taken away from then; since the treaty. By the same agreement liberty
of commerce was promised, the retention of privileges, and the reestablishment
of the island of He as a retreat for the naval forces, but none of these had
been carried out.* In fact the Huguenots were emphatic in their claims that
economic injustice caused them to revolt. Later on, in 1627, they asked why
commerce is hindered. They hinted that something must be behind it all.
A plain exposition of the importance of trade and salt is given and then they
declared that England wanted the islands. 2 However, the government in reply
claimed that the Huguenots had fostered the English alliance and that the
commercial complaint is a mere false mask. They were accused of starting the
whole trouble. However, the central authorities did not explain why the
Huguenots did this-
On turning to the French version of the English side of the case,
one sees that the English claimed that they aided the Huguenots in order to
defend their common religious views, and also because they felt that their
commerce was in danger.^ But the French asserted that England's ambitions
were to recover the old territorial foothold in France. Religion was just a
pretext. The commercial aspect of the matter cannot be excluded, because one
1Mercure Francois
,
XIV, 89-90.
2 lb id., XIV, 100-103.
3 Ibid., XIV, 13-14.
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finds record of a complaint on England's part of attempts made "by France to
deprive La Rochelle of her commerce with England by means of alliances. This,
together with the stopping of English vessels at Blye, unjustly, while in the midsi
of peace, were reasons which all go to account for the alliance of England
with the Huguenots. 1 Indeed one finds the fear Richelieu had of economic rela-
tion between La Rochelle and the English, to be shown in a letter he wrote
asking that a report be made concerning the vessels laden with salt, wine, and
other goods, which went from La Rochelle to England. This was forbidden, so
he asked for information in order that judgment could be given. 2 Thus one sees
that the Cardinal feared the economic relations of these two parties and
wanted to keep them apart.
In other words, while the struggle with the Huguenots and the English
at this time was of religious significance and also was brought about in order
to destroy an internal political power, so as to build up the great state,
yet it had also a direct economic basis, in that it encountered the efforts
of the government to dominate local cities and overrule local commercial privi-
leges. Furthermore, it showed the desire of France, the Huguenots, and the
English, to obtain the salt rights and other commercial opportunities afforded
by the location of this place. It also served to bring out a phase of commer-
cial rivalry existing between England and France at that time. The episode
proves unmistakably, that the economic element did actually enter into events
of that period. The fact that it ended as it did illustrates the importance
Richelieu placed upon this matter. He must have thought not only of the
religious and the political advantages when he entered La Rochelle after its
xMercure Francois
,
XIII, 319.
2Letters, 11, 499.
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capture, "but of the economic triumph also.
However, there was at least one individual who believed that Richelieu
had personal motives in his capture of La Rochelle. "For," says Gaston, "by
his control of that place he could monopolize the salt sent to England and
France as a whole." 1 (Evidently the importance of the salt trade as applied
to La Rochelle, justified the ardent efforts of all parties to retain control
of it.) Indeed, Gaston claims that if Richelieu should fortify properly the
islands around La Rochelle, he could render France tributary for the salt
trade, and possess the principal revenue of the kingdom.
This was to be one of the steps in Richelieu's efforts tc centralize
all the trade of France. His assuming the office of superintendent and grand
master of commerce and navigation was another. In Richelieu's Memo ires
,
one finds a similar statement attributed to Gaston, in which he says that the
Cardinal wished to "build up the revenues by control of the salt industry of
La Rochelle. ^ However, the important deduction from it all, is that the
British, the French, and the Huguenots all desired to control the salt supply,
which being near La Rochelle, became the logical economic bone of contention
for all parties. As a matter of fact, one finds that in 1629, Richelieu was
appointed Lieutenant General of the islands of Re' and Oleron together with
several other places. He actually controlled Oleron, and perhaps Gaston was
not wholly in the wrong. At least one can be assured that the Cardinal
realized the importance of that region, though to what extent he was influenced
by patriotic or personal reasons is a question which it is difficult to settle.
1Mercure Francois, XVII, 216-218.
^emoirai". XXIII, 261-262.
^ol/, 11, 2.
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Bichelieu was not satisfied with mere destructive policies. This
is illustrated "by the fact that he not only planned to centralize the
state by means of the suppression of local independent powers, hut he also
took steps to concentrate the power of the state in the hands of efficient
officials of the royal government. His ideas did not stop there. He has even
left to posterity a clear conception of the kind of man he desired to find, who
should take up the work of the great nation, which he, alas, was not able to
carry into execution.
Of course the Cardinal was theoretically next to the King in impor-
tance. Yet he saw to it that the Council of State was divided into four
councils, each with its individual duties, which was a necessity brought about
"by this increase of central authority. Starting with the central body, the
affairs of the nation were divided among comr.;issions, according to carefully
regulated royal law.^ Taxes were collected by royal officials. The state was
indeed centralized.
Richelieu had certain ideas as to the kind of man he desired for
the King's household and other official positions. Although he desired the
positions to be filled from the nobility, yet every man appointed tc office
in the King's household should be qualified for his position. i"'hile he be-
lieved the class system was host for France, yet even here he considered the
interests of the common people. For, by limiting these positions to the
nobility, he would leave more people liable to taxes and in that respect would
aid the people. He then openly advises the King to appoint men on the merit
system, and not sell the offices. "Thus virtue will be the reward for office,
not money. He even outlines the requirements as to what constitutes a
kaillet, 18-21.
^Te stament Politique
. 1, 207
•
3Ibid., 1, 208-216.
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good councillor. 1 Above all he must be faithful to God and the state. He
can attend to his own business and the state's also, but in a conflict of
interests, the welfare of the state comes first. 2 Indeed, when Eichelieu
says that a minister must be chosen according to his capacity, and his reward as
a faithful public servant is that of fame which is the greatest, he seems like
some of our modem idealists with socialistic impulses. In fact "state
socialism" seems to be an underlying premise. A happy state, a happy people
wouli make a great King and a magnificent France; this sums up his philosophy.
However, fame should not be the only reward of a minister of the
King's household. "He shouli be given enough to live on in comfort and be
able to labor for the grandeur and benefit of the kingdom."*5 In other words,
if a man has the honesty, ability, and foresight to merit a governmental
position of this sort and to work for the welfare of the state, the government
should provide for his economic existence. Eichelieu has a practical way of
examining political matters, which indicates that he 3aw their economic im-
portance as well as their political or social value. Good officials were
necessary to build up a strong state not only politically, but economically
as well. The welfare of the latter was the important thing. "A person's
interest is not to be compared with that of the public interest."4
It seems that this idea of obtaining men for offices by the
merit system, is entirely in harmony with the mercantilists conception of the
^Testament Politique, 1, 217-218.
2Tes tament Pol itique
, 1, 225-226.
3Ibid., 195-196. D'Avenel has pointed out that the officers of the King's
household, as chambellan, grand ecuver . and grand ma^tre of the King, were
charged with various domestic duties of the royal house, but had no political
functions. Richelieu evidently wanted to make these officials of more political
and economic value to the state. See D'Avenal, Monarchie Absolue . I, 55.
4Testament Politique , I, 282.
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strong state. Kichelieu admits this, when he claims that one of the greatest
advantages that can be procured for a state, is to give every one a position
suitable to his genius and capacity. 1 A man who is capable of serving the
public in certain functions may rain it in others. What would have been the
history of France, if Richelieu had been able to carry out these views? They
were conclusions reached as a result of his years of work for the nation, and
which he desired to be carried out by those who followed him. Failure to do so
was one of the contributing factors in the events which followed in French
history. What a difference it would have made if this advice had been followed
"Princes must be careful of their given promises. A Prince does harm to
appoint a friend to a position for which he is incompetent. A personal friend-
ship should not come before the interests of the state." 2
However, when one examines his administration as a whole, it will
be seen that the Cardinal did not carry out all his ideas to the letter. He
knew that to change a custom takes time. Therefore, in such matters as the
sale of offices versus the merit system, he admits at the last that a man
must submit to certain weak conditions, and prefer a moderate regulation to
a more austere settlement, which would probably be net so successful. In
other words, "he who brings justice in by the lump, nay sell it at retail, but
On the other hand, a man who buys an office may conduct it aright, so as not
to lose what he put into it."'* He believed in not rushing into radical changes
He admits that he would be more popular with the common people if he advocated
the suppression of the sale of offices. However, he believed that the welfare
Testament Polit ique
,
I, 296.
jib id., I, 299-301.
Ibid., I, 156-158.
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of the state is beat if maintained as it is now.^- In other words, the state
was not strong enough as yet to bring about the required change, which could
better take place at a later time, while bad effects might result if he
abolished it at this time. Evidently he judged all changes on the basis of
the present and future welfare of the state. Again he said repeatedly that
merit should rule the Prince and his appointments, but admits that he has not
followed out this rule. "The reason for it," he says, "is due to the fact
that while disorders were in vogue, without any possibility of a remedy,
reason required that order should be extracted, out of it. Which was my inten-
tion in preserving or keeping offices in my care to people whom I could oblige
to follow strictly my intentions and plans. If it had been possible during
the troubles of a reign agitated by different storms to settle the regula-
tion I propose, I would have been a very religious observer of it."^ fiichelieu
believed that an idea in theory and in practice becomes two different things,
which can both exist only if the welfare of the state permits. However, in
the case of the merit system, he did hope to see that succeed in the end.
Before he could carry out many of his ideas along these lines, he
had to restore peace in France. He hoped to do so by means of a large army
centralized in the hands of the royal government. "For," he said, "a Prince
must be powerful by the strength of his frontiers and the strength of his
army. The welfare and repose of the state depends on the fidelity and repose
of its defenders." 1' In other words, the army was another means by which
Testament Politique, I, 163-165.
'Testament Politique, I, 188-191-
'Testament Politique, II
,
1-3; Isambert, XVI, 386.
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France was to be made ready for the great economic change which would take
place when peace arrived. Alas, the great Cardinal had departed before that
eventful day occurred.
It is interesting to notice, however, that in spite of the many
distractions of war, Richelieu tried to use the centralistic policies of the
government to bring about great social improvements. For example , "lettres
patents'1 were granted a certain individual who offered to aid in the founda-
tion of an institution for the incurable. "There are, 11 said the edict, "many
hospitals and monasteries for curable troubles. Therefore, the government
considered such an institution needed for the welfare of its people and al-
lowed its establishment according to fixed rules. It was to bs exempt from
taxes, and to be favored in all ways by the government. 11 ^- The letter, published
in 1637, shows that the government was interested in and fostered all schemes
which couli be of benefit to the general public welfare. It even went so
far as to investigate the hospitals and their bad admini stration, which pre-
vented the poor frou being received. This was to be remedied; the Mayors and
Bishops were to look after their interests. The poor were to be aided by new
laws; public employment was to be provided. "By not working, 11 Richelieu said,
"they deprive the public of the services which it could receive by their work."*
This indicates solicitude for the interests of the poor and the state as well,
rather surprising but entirely in harmony with the general plan of government
.
A
Isambert, XVI, 474-477.
betters, 11, 180.
f
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He seemed to be interested also in the physical welfare of the people. The
establishment of a Boyal Garden at Paris for the culture of medicinal plants,
would indicate a general governmental plan to preserve and conserve the
health of the people and thus make France strong. For the government knew
that the health of the man is the most desired and precious of things. "To
aid the universities in their research along this line and to help the people
in their collection of medical plants, we desire to establish this garden,
etj."l
All this formed part of the one political economic, and social con
ception of Eichelieu, namely, to build up a great state along all these
lines. To reduce the nobles, to put down the political, and economic power
of the Huguenots, and to unify the governmental organization as a whole were
elements of one scheme whicn was essentially central istic not only on the
political, but also on the economic side.
Isarcbert, XVI, 161-162.
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Chapter VIII
RICHSLISU
,
AND THE FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION OF FRANCE
The financial phase of Richelieu's administration is the most
difficult of all his accomplishments to treat. It has been, in itself, fairly
well developed in financial works dealing with the time. But as a part of a
general economic scheme, the weak phases of his activities in this line take
on a new meaning, and thus require treatment from a new point of view.
In the light of a broader interpretation of the elements entering
into the financial administration, it does not seem possible to accept the
comrron conception of this part of the great Cardinal's work. That the weakest
phase of Richelieu's ministry was his administration of the finances, is
probably true; but considering all conditions involved, one cannot say it
was a failure. The accusation that he made no effort to relieve the burdens
of the people, or that he failed completely in his efforts to reform the
abuses of the financial administration, is false A It is an unjust inter-
pretation of the man's career, which necessitates a vindication, although, in
one sense, other writers have done so more or less successfully
.
2
Richelieu in developing the financial side of his administration
was guided by his one general purpose, namely, to build the great state.
The financial system was a necessary part of this. But it could be improved
only in times of peace and thus appears the real explanation for what failures
there were in the Cardinal's policy - namely, a long period of war which was
likewise a necessity in the preliminary development of the great state.
^Lodge, R . Richelieu, London, 1896, 174.
2Caillet, Chapter IX, 254, etc.
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Richelieu realized that he could carry out a general financial reform only in
times of peace. He points out in his Testament Politique , that he ruined the
Huguenots, put down the nobles, and undertook a great war against powerful
external enemies, in order to assure a good peace and repose for the future.
^
V'hy? He goes on to say that the tolerance of these abuses has prevented
any attempts to carry out his aims, of which the reform of the finances is
one. In other words, Richelieu fully intended to rebuild France on the finan-
cial side as soon as peace conditions permitted. His untimely death prevented
the fulfilment of hi 9 intentions.
However, even though the Cardinal's main interest was in carrying
out the duties of "superintendent of navigation of commerce, etc.", and
though he entrusted the principal care of the finances to the superintendent
of finances, vet he gave attention to financial matters throughout his life,
and left in his Testament Politique , a clear and concise solution of the
whole problem, to be worked out later.
This subject will be treated in two parts, first the accomplishments
and problems of Richelieu and his financial superintendents during his ad-
ministration, and secondly, the general theoretical solution of the problems
as expounded by the Cardinal in his last great work. In considering his
accomplishments or intentions, one must bear constantly in mind the main pur-
pose behind all of his ideas, namely the grandeur of the state and the elements
entering into the attainment of that ideal.
Testament Politique
,
11, 85
.
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A. Finances during the Administration of Richelieu.
It was in 1615 that Richelieu first took an active public interest
in the finances of the country. He spoke then as a representative of the
clergy against the sale of offices, which increased the "burden upon the poor
people, who were not able to bear much more. "Finances," he said, "are the
true nerves of the state and should be administered with economy and with
the redaction of expenses, such as pensions, etc."* Also he maintained that
the number of people who were exempt frorr paying taxes should be decreased,
all in the interest of justice and the welfare of the poor. However, internal
dissension prevented any actual accomplishment except the temporary estab-
2lishment of a chamber of justice to study the question of Finances.""
Nevertheless, this meeting marks the beginning of the reaction
against the heavy taxes and the unfair exemptions of certain classes. The as-
sembly had heard the demands of the third estate for the establishment of
a .real taille borne by all owners of "immovable property".'-* From now on that
wa3 one of the goals of their ambition.
No one appreciated better than Richelieu the immense waste of funds
which had been going on since the death of Henry IV. Huge amounts had been
spent on pensions for various nobles. Indeed he said, that "the economy
of Henry IV and what he has left has alone preserved France. But it will not
last, and the very fact that the nobles who have obtained most of the money
Memoirs, X, 203, 321-322, 340, 358.
^"Phis chamber was created in 1624 and revoked in 1625. So little was
done."-Isambert, XVI, 147.
Memoirs, XI, 240-243.
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claim that it was given to foreign statesmen, makes an -understanding necessary
at once."*
Now Richelieu took two steps in 1625 to remedy the situation. He
advocated publicity in the disposition of the money obtained in taxes, and
a reduction of the expenses of government. To carry out the above purposes
he brought about the temporary establishment of the chamber of justice, 3
and the replacement of corrupt officials by honest ones.4 "A change of offi-
cials," he said, "is not a good thing, but there are times when a nation is
saved by means of such changes." Richelieu carried out this idea by replacing
several financial officials who were connected with various instances of cor-
ruption. In other words, one of the first things Richelieu did upon taking
office in 1624, was to try to put an end to the disorder of the finances.
However, nothing was really accomplished except the stirring up
of a little excitement among the nobles, until 1626, when the two inefficient
individuals by the names of Chamt>igny and Mar11lac were replaced by the
Marquis D'Effiat, in the office of superintendent of finances. "His administra-
tion," said Caillet, "can be placed beside that of Solly and Colbert in merit
and importance."7
The position of superintendent of the finances was, next to that
of chancellor, the most important. He had charge not onl:/ of the finances but
"Memoirs, XI, 240-243.
^Letters, 11, 177-179.
3See p. 93, note 2.
^olefl, 337.
^Letters, II. 25-26.
6Letters, II, 26, 209-211, 330; Memoirs, XIII, 354-356.
7Caillet, 26S.
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also of all of the internal administration. In fact, next to Richelieu,
D'Effiat took precedence.
^hen D'Effiat took charge of the finances, the assembly of notables
was called. At this meeting, he presented to the deputies a valuable state-
ment of the financial condition of France. He indicated the lack of money
for everyday expenses. Money had been collected ahead of time^ and bad manage-
ment of the finances had been endured ever since the age of Henry IV. Just
as Spain had suffered because of heavy war expenditures and no peace, so France
was on the verge of ruin because of the state of her finances. Efforts had
been made to aid the finances by selling the domain of the King, by the crea-
tion of offices and increase of taille, but to no avail. "However, when peace
is declared," he says, "the King desires to aid his people, put down the in-
ternal disorders, and increase the rights and wages of sovereign companies,
etc. This meeting is to offer solutions of the present problem. The King
especially desires a decrease of the tailles for the benefit of the people,
because of their terrible condition. Also, the supremacy for France abroad
needs good home finances. In other words, expenses and receipts must be made
at least to balance."** "One of the means," he said, "of bringing this about
is to supervise more strictly the amount of money collected and spent. In
other words, tc do away with the many offices which have absolute control over
the finances, and are responsible only to the King."4 That there was too much
chance for "graft" was the keynote of his discourse. He intended to put the
finances of France back to where they had been in the times of Sully, and the
methods used were fundamentally those of the latter.
^ercure Francois, XII, 804.
flbid., XII, 790-794.
flbid., XII, 6C2-809.4Ibid., XII, 794.
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His remarks indicate the unfortunate condition of the finances
and the problems confronting D'Effiat if he was to improve then.. However,
the great expenditures "brought about by unforeseen external and internal
troubles, prevented hire from accomplishing much, except to keep down the
public debt, which was a great work in itself. For example, one way by which
rate
he reduced the expenses of the government was by reducing the interest
A
on
money advanced to the government from 16 or 20$ to 10$.* Strict economy
and increased credit would have worked wonders in spite of the ever-existing
disturbances.
Richelieu also delivered a sp -ech at the assembly of notables,
in which he tried to justify the heavy expenditures irade so far in his ad-
ministration. "Everyone knows that in matters of state great results are not
often accomplished at little expense. The great number of soldiers necessary
inside and outside of France explains it clearly and so we can doubt the
necessity. The integrity of the administration guarantees the honesty of the
expenditures; and the oppression of the outside powers and internal rebellions
o
threatening the ruin of the Kingdom, explain the noed of these expenditures.
He tried to point out that the great expenditures were for the welfare of
France, and so far as he went he was right. In advocating a state of prepared
ness in the future for the preservation of France,"5 he strikes a chord which
is more or less modern. In fact Richelieu here justified his manner of
expenditures, and of course it was for the superintendent of finance to obtain
the money in the best way available, even though the people had to suffer
^lercure Francois, XIV, 589-59C.
Slbid.
,
XII, 756-760.
3Ibid., XII, 760-761.
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as a consequence. Yet Richelieu believed that the present inconvenience was
to be preferred in order to attain future grandeur and welfare.
The Cardinal cecame so infatuated with his external plans of
building up a great commerce, a lar^-e navy, and making France strong by means
of a great army, to be used against her ever-present enemies, that he seemed
to have forgotten all his financial schemes for improvements. Of course the
death of D'Effiat in 1632, followed by the appointment of two weak superinten-
dents, both theoretically working at the same task, accounts for the weakness
of the financial policy to a certain extent. Richelieu realized that in the
death of his great financial minister D'Effiat he had suffered an immense
loss, and both he and the King were greatly affected by his death. ^ Yet he
should have done better in replacing him.
The two men, Bouth.il ier and Bullion, who divided the duties of this
office, were not strong men. This contributed largely to the unfortunate
financial condition of France in 1642, which will be taken up later.
Furthermore , from 1632 to 1642 was the period in which Richelieu
was engaged in the important diplomatic, economic, and military activities
of the Thirty Years' war. Expenses, on this account, together with part of
the former costs of the large marine, were contributing factors toward the
unfortunate financial condition of France at his death.
From the very first, Richelieu believed that the financial burdens
of the people were for the best, and that a future peace would remove them.
As late as 1634, in a speech before the Parlement of Paris, he very ably
discussed his policies, especially with reference to the finances. He cited
Letters, IV, 337.
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the successes of the arables of France as an explanation of the bad finances,
and promised a future reforrr.. Quoting from the philosophers the saying,
"that which is first in intention is the last in execution, " he promises
reforms in the name of the King, for the people, (l) by the decrease of the
tailles, (2) by revoking undue exemption privileges, (3) by abolishing luxury
and waste, and (4) by the increase of commerce. * This is an excellent example
of the clear economic viewpoint of the man. He had a definite economic policy
even if conditions were such as to prevent him from carrying it to completion.
He even had the interests of the people in mind, while confronted
with financial problems involved in raising great armies and navies. From
the first, he had tried to raise troops in various provinces in order to
protect their commerce and ships, and to secure freedom of the sea for them. 2
One must not be too hasty in condemning the man when one considers the inde-
pendent ideas of the various classes and individuals in France. How to raise
money and also respect individual privileges was certainly a problem. For he
knew the time was not ripe tc do away with all special privileges.
In 163C Richelieu used his own personal money to pay the army in
Italy, the government having failed to send them the required amount. He even
went so far as to borrow money for the army from individuals. In 1634, he ad-
mitted that war had cost a great deal and was a burden upon the poor, but it
was a necessity in order tc save those men and the state. 4 Fhy condemn a
man for doing just what is being done at present? He really believed^and he
was right, that the destiny of France was dependent on those wars. 5 a great
"•"Beaurepaire ch. de, Cahiers des Ftats da Normandie, 3 vols. Rouen, 1877.
Ill, 205.
2Memoirs, XXIII, 125.
betters, III, 694.
^Memoirs, XXVIII. 4.
betters, II, 297-296.

drain on the finances was inevitable. It was one of the unfortunate results
of his consistant economic and political policy, namely, the permanent
grandeur of the state.
^
Yet, even at this time he claims that he has not forgotten the in-
terests of the people. For even though the war was a necessity, he points
out the fact that the King had eased the burdens of the people, had relieved
them of ^ of their tailles, and had revoked the privileges of many persons,
etc. 2 However, inability on the part of the Cardinal to devote his personal
attention to this matter, and the demands for financing militarism, hindered
the successful completion of his financial reforms.
Richelieu tried to aid the people by decreasing the pay of the
troops, who were then the best paid in the world. 4 He was deeply affected
by the financial side of affairs and in a letter to Bouthilier, he said that
the latter should decide financial matters, but if brought before the King
Richelieu would give his opinion cf the course to follow. 5 In other words,
he wanted his superintendents really to use their own judgment so far as
possible, but in case of doubt he was willing to give advice.
By 1638, the finances were in a very bad shape because of the fact
that Richelieu, in a letter to M. De Buillion, complained of the non-payment
of the troops. Money was asked for the marine, the army, fortifications, etc.
6
In fact, Richelieu bad finally realized that he was involved in a death
betters, II, 297-304, etc.
Memoirs, XVIII, 4.
^Cahiers de Normandie
T
III, 1-3.
betters, IV, 523-525.
5Ibid., IV, 647.
6 Ibid., VI, 245-247.
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struggle, and victory was the only salvation for France. As late as 1641 he says
in a letter, that the King must provide for a great navy even if he has to "bor-
row the money, for power on the sea is necessary. 1 Eichelieu admitted that
France had to face a great crisis and that he had to win out regardless of momen-
tary consequences. If the Cardinal could have had personal charge of the
financial end of things, it might have "been different. However, it was a
physical impossibility to handle all the affairs at the same time, as an inten-
sive study of the problems involved will prove. Yet he did try to bring about
some constructive financial legislation.
The assembly of notables had succeeded in bringing into the fore-
ground the need of retrenchment in governmental expense, the need of decreasing
the taille and making other financial reforms, and lastly, the need of doing
away with corrupt officials. People in France realized that it was these
things which had "brought about the ruin of Spain, and they wished to avoid
similar disasters, in order to save the state.
^
Eichelieu understood at the "beginning of his ministry, that the
great problem before him was the financial question. His representative, M. le
Garde, said in the assembly, that "the King desires the love of his people.
He wishes to lighten their "burdens by retrenchment even in his own house.
He desires to suppress all those who trouble the nation. A state of peace
is to be followed by a destruction of the results of past difficulties, includ-
ing wars brought about in order to keep Spain out of Italy, etc. In spite
Letters, VI, 806-607.
!Mercure Francois, XII, 774-783.
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of the great expenses the King has not increased tallies. He has retrenched
on his own home expenses and has in fact cut down the tallies 600,000 livres
for 1627. He has suppressed the office of Connetable and Admiral with their
wages and expense, thus making a saving and removing inconveniences, which
their offices "bring to the Kingdom.! In other words, the government in the
years 1626 and 1627 planned to reform the finances and make radical changes
in time of peace.
Itichelieu displayed a certain amount of economic caution and ability
when he urged the need of making the best of conditions at that time. "Sirce
God is the only being who, will do something for nothing, in order to an ivs at
his good ends, it is necessary either to diminish the ordinary expense or
increase our receipts or do both. However, it is impossible5 to retrench on
the necessary expenses of the state. To think of such a thing would be a
crime. That is why the King prefers the public to his own individual interest,
and retrenches on his own household expenses in preference. You can thus
judge the necessity of ever:/ other mans doing the same thing even when he
retrenches on some things involving his own person. Each should aid according
to his means, and the small efforts of the poor should have a place with the
larger aids of the rich. The most austere rules are and seem mild, when they
have no other end than the public safety and well-being." 2 Could anything
be more modem than this statement? fiichelieu admits that war is necessary
fcr the good of the state. Therefore it is necessary for all to do their "bit"
toward meeting the inevitable heavy expenditures. But just as now many
Mercure Franc ois, XII, 759.
'Ibid.
,
759-761.

102
for various reasons fail to respond to similar exhortations, 30 it was in
Richelieu's time, and therein lies the failure of his policy. The nobles
and clergy did not fulfil their part of the "bargain, though he had a sublime
faith in the patriotic feeling of the uprer classes of the people. His
belief that educated individuals would all work for the public welfare was
his greatest mi stake.
1
The Cardinal did all he could to carry out this idea by punishing
corrupt officials. "Wo official who looks after only his individual interests
should retain office." 2 Yet he was lenient because of the King, who desired his
favorites kept in offices. 3 Again, one sees that the faith of the Cardinal
in every man's interest in the state, and his conservative attitude toward
violent changes in offices, as causing him to leave inefficient men in various
positions, resulted unsatisfactorily for the nation.
The most interesting phase of Richelieu's efforts to meet the
financial situation in 1626, was his attitude toward the common people. He
admitted that in wartime the people contributed not only labor but their blood.
Therefore, he advocated making the people pay only enough to keep them from
losing the habit of paying taxes, and they were to be heavily taxed only when
foreign enterprises or internal rebellion necessitated extraordinary means,
for the welfare of the state. 4 In other words, Richelieu was entirely con-
sistent in drawing off the money of the people as far as possible in times of
emergency. He only carried out what he had said in 1626. His great mistake
•"•Mercure Francois , 7 60
.
2Memoirs, XXII, 256.
3lbid.
,
XXII, 345-346, 357.
betters, II, 302-303.
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is to be found of course in his attitude toward the exemption of the privileged
classes, which he permitted.
The assembly of notables in 1626 was called not only to decide upon
the financial measures needed in orier that Eichelieu might carry out his
plans against Austria and the Huguenots; but also that he might obtain recogni-
tion at this time of his official position as superintendent of navigation
and commerce.* This shows that the financial disorders, with their remedies
of decreased tailles, decreased pensions, appointment of honest officials,
repurchase of fioyal Domain, etc., had an equal interest with the beginning
of the Cardinal's external political and commercial policy. At a glance one
sees the origin of a great plan to regenerate France, internally and exter-
nally, along social, political, and economic lines. The important single
factor which prevented the successful outcome of the plan was the premature
death of the great statesman.
In 1630, a special council for the consideration of the finances was
formed. The superintendent of course was the head of it, and their reports
were usually accepted by the council of state. This was accomplished through
the Cardinal's efforts and indicates his interest in that department. Its
work was not limited only to the provinces, but it also overlooked natters
of the roads, bridges, and other public works. It is interesting to note at
this time that Eichelieu tried to appoint nobles to positions in these councils
and thus interest them in affairs of state.
Another interesting and important improvement in the matter of
Memoirs, X, Intro. 51-56; Mole, 1, 419-420.
2Caillet, 23.
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finances, was the development between 1633 and 163? of the system of Intendants
of justice, colice^and finances. 1 This is one of the most important accom-
plishments of Richelieu, because it took away from Pari ement , the nobles, local
governments, etc., all rights to a monopoly of the collection of governmental
taxes. They carried out the decrees and reported to the central governmental
councils. They had supervision of all affairs which concerned the taxes and
administration of public funds. The main purpose in appointing them was to
centralize the administration of the finances, in accordance with Richelieu's
general plan of centralization. However, this aided the people, who in many
cases suffered from corrupt local governors and nobles charged with the col-
lection of taxes. 2 It was the special duty of the Intendant to look after the
interests of the common people. Generally soeaking, the Intendants were es-
tablished in order to bring about local unity in all the parts of the adminis-
tration, namely, the police, justice, and finances, and to see that these were
controlled by the central government. Yet Richelieu permitted the Intendants
in the performance of their duties, to irake certain allowances for the
franchises and local lioerties of provinces or cities. He did this in order
• 3
that they should build up commercial industry. In other words, Richelieu
desired the suprsmacy in a political sense of France, but he was willing to
grant political or economic privileges to those who would use them for the
interest of France, by developing their commercial or industrial resources.
Exceptions were valid only when they resulted in increased grandeur for the
entire state.
1 Isambert, XVI, 442-450; Caillet, 45-54.
2 In 1626, careful instructions were laid on the "tax commissioners to
avoid corruption. "-Isambert, XVI, 165-174.
^4ontchretien, XVI.
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Richelieu was conservative in his plans for reform in that he
advocated no general retrenchments on the ground that they would not pay for
the reason that the expense of bringing them about would make them failures.
For example, he did not put much faith in the selling of so-called "bonds",
because the King never received more than a third of their amount, while much
time was consumed in examining the securities upon which they were based.
*
However, he did favor greater returns by means of increased commerce
and a strong marine. "By means of both," he said, "France could make herself
more powerful in money than any King of the Christian world. " One of the most
important ways by which the taxes were to be increased was by means of the
gabelle on salt, which both ths French and foreigners obtained near La Rochelle.
This was evidently one of his chief designs in obtaining control of that city. 2
All the provinces of France were tc pay this gabelle, and any parts exempt
before should have their privileges transferred to the collection of the
tailles. In other words, all France should pay the salt gabelle which was to
be the great means by which the state was tc be aided. This would indicate
that Richelieu desired and obtained one fundamental tax which should rest
upon all the people. 3 Fhile it never assumed the importance he desired, this
principle of tax collection illustrates his wish to equalize the taxes, even
though they were heavy, and thus to aid the common people.
There was one way in which Richelieu showed lack of insight in the
collection of revenue, namely, in the matter of commerce. This was to be
^•Memoirs, XXIII, 264. Bonds were sold during tha age of Richelieu, with
the tailles, the aids, gabelles, and other taxes as security. Very often it
was difficult to find out whether^certain tax could be accounted good security,
since it might have been spent in advance.
2Memoirs, XXIII, 262.
3Caillet, 270.
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stimulated in order to obtain more money for France. 1 The French were to pay
slight duties on the export of goods, hut a limited number of imports paid
duties, light at first but heavy later on. Thus, "while Richelieu obtained
more money for taxes, he did not see as Colbert did, that by decreasing the
duties instead of increasing them, he would increase the receipts because of
the growth of commerce."^
Many examples can be found wherein the Cardinal tried to settle
conflicts between local provinces and the central government over questions
of finance in the interest of both and for the state as a whole. 3 Indeed,
one can obtain a general idea of his fundamental desires, in his statement of
the financial side of the case to the Province of Brittany. In 1628, he admits
that the wars against the Huguenots, etc., have been costly, but they have
conserved the state and have prevented the English from invading Brittany.
To do this, a strong army and navy has been necessary and strong forts along
the coasts. Thus for their own interest as a part of the state, he asked them
for money.4 But the misery and poverty of the people even at that time was a
strong obstacle to extensive gifts of money to the government. The fact that
Richelieu had to go many times to the local Parlements of the various provinces
for money indicates wherein the terrible financial condition of the poor was
bound to come, and it is surprising that it was not worse.
Gaston, the brother of the King, glad of a chance to injure Richelieu,
i Isambert, XVI, 514-515.
^Deschamps, 138.
^Mercure Francois
,
XIII, 533-534; XIV, 113-119.
^lercure Francois
,
XIV, 139-140.
I
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accused him of causing this poverty through his personal ambitions and lavish
expenditures. 1 In reply, Richelieu frankly admitted that he desired to
aggrandize France, but as a good servant he regretted to see the Kingdom
afflicted with these passing misfortunes, which would continue if men like
Gaston were to have their way."" Richelieu, desiring to make the nation great,
regarded the unfortunate conditions as temporary and to be remedied in the end.
There was one way in which the central government as a whole took
a definite stand. It was in suppressing the corruption of the tax collectors.
In 1631, one year before D'Effiat died, it was decided that "no impositions
should be raised except in virtue of letters patent sent and sealed in regular
form, which should be registered by the controller-general of finances. Fur-
thermore, the royal judges were ordered to consult the people on Sundays or
Festival days and to make clear the causes of the imposition which were pro-
posed, naming the amount of taxes, and obtaining the consent of the majority
of the people, etc." 3 In other words, the finances were to be administered
according to the amount called for. Officials were to obey the laws, there
was to be an absence of "graft" in that they had to report the amount to be
collected to the people and get their consent, and also, send in a report con-
cerning the amounts collects! to the central government. Local and external
conditions prevented this plan from being actually carried out, but it is
significant in that it aimed to place the collection of the finances on a
more democratic basis then ever before. The fact that the people were to be
xMercure Francois
,
XVII, 255-256.
2Ibii., XVI l/301.
3Ibid., XVII, 337-345.
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oonsulted gives to them an economic and political importance strangely out
of place in a true conception of an absolute centralized monarchy, unless one
considers the mercantilistic point of view, that they were a part of the
state, and thus their interests would tend to influence the strength or
weakness of the nation.
The greatest blow, however, to the financial plans of Richelieu
and France as a whole, was the death of D'Effiat in 1532, at a time when the
Thirty Years' ?"ar really needed the money and men, and above all the services
of a man who could work in harmony with Richelieu's plans. "During the
times of trouble and confusion," says Forbonnais, "he kept order in the
finances and treated them on a basis of economy. He even procured more credit
for the nation than at any time before, and at 10$ instead of 20 or 25$, as had
been the past rate."l In fact, the Cardinal lost the one man who could have
met the problems that the financial superintendents were confronted with after
that period, and could have put France on a sound monetary basis.
After the death of D'Effiat, Louis XIII, upon the advice of the
Cardinal, divided the office of superintendent of finances between Bullion
and Bouthilier, "whose administration, " says Caillet, "was not marked by any
measures of finances worth citing. Yet in 1634, in an effort to aid the
people," the taille was cut down by one fourth and they were exempt from,
the extraordinary increase of burdens for the year 1634. Also, the increased
payment made by the people in the past was largely due to the "graft" of
the tax collectors. To avoid this, officials were to go into parishes and
districts, examine the rolls of the tailles of those exempted, and see that
10uoted in Caillet, 271.

109
each one should bear his just portion, according to his ability or means,
etc. 1 This would indicate a determined effort to improve the financial
condition of France, even at that critical time.
The same edict goes on not only to deprive the rich of their
"increasing rights" and exemptions, but also, only the hereditary nobles are
to retain their privileges. All those ennobled in the last twenty years ex-
cept twelve associates cf the company of New France (notice the indirect
importance placed upon colonization by this act), were to lose their privileges
In the future nobles were tc be created only for important considerations,
etc. Also, no one could be exempt from the taille by the simple consent of
the inhabitants of the parish, but all were to pay their regular share. 2
In other words, none but exemptions of long standing were to be recognized.
This would seem to be a very important edict, even though as Caillet says,
"It was not well observed." 4' It illustrates the efforts of the government
to aid France and its people in obtaining a more just and fair basis of taxa-
tion. Even though it failed, it is evidence of the efforts of Richelieu to
reform the finances in a constructive way, even at that critical epoch of
French history.
In 1635, another edict was issued to supplement that of 1634. It
appears that many rich people had fled to other towns tc avoid paying taxes,
thus making the burden heavier for the poor. nhis was to be avoided in the
future, by making theu liable to taxation in their old home, until they had
ilsambert, XVI, 389-391; Mercure Francois . XX, 661-662, 697.
2Ibid.
,
XVI, 391-406; Cahiers* de Normandie, III, 307-212.
30mer Talon, Memo ires , Petitct 2e Seris vols. 60-63, I, 84.
^Caillet, 265.
**
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been three months in the new one.* There was indeed a strong tendency
on the part of the government to aid the poor, in fact it even went so far
in an edict abolishing the sou for the registration of deaths, carriages,
or birth, as to say that "the strong should bear the burdens of the weak."2
Indeed one can almost believe that they meant it, since any measure, which
would aid the state as a whole, was correct according to the mercantilists
philosophy of the time.
By 1637, the financial condition of France had become critical.
Eichelieu, in a letter to the Zing, warned him against overtaxing the border
cities, in that their security was necessary for that of the state. 3 In 1639,
Richelieu on account of the increasing expenses had to cut down the financial
A
aid given Holland.
Finally the Cardinal in a letter of 1639 came out directly against
the increase of the gabelle, against unfair taxation in general, and corrup-
tion, as having caused the financial troubles of France. "I know," he says,
"that the superintendents will say that they can do nothing, and are obliged
to do many things which they would condemn at another time. I will say that
all have' given their hearts and lands to the enemy and are condemned at all
times. Hichelieu, by this letter and others, came out directly against
the policy of the superintendent and the financial council, which caused
so much suffering. 6 It was unfortunate that he had not the opportunity
""Isambert, XVI, 455-457.
2Ibid., XVI, 460-461.
betters, VI, 96; Memoirs XXX, 317-318.
betters, VI, 613-614.
5Ibid., VI, 496-497; 5C0-501 . Isambert, XVI, 497-499.
6Ibid., VI, 858-859.
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to carry out his own reforms along that line. In fact, the last letters
of Richelieu to the superintendent of finances not only asked for more money,
which was needed, but also recommended the passage of a general aid of a
"sou per livre", which the people were willing to endure. 1 Thus, even though
France was in an unfortunate financial state, he admitted that the people
were, after all, the deciding factor in the solution of this problem. "The
consent of the people in a time like this," he says, "is better than all the
force which one can use in any other way." 2
It was clearly not lack of ability which caused Richelieu to permit
this state of the finances, which existed at his death. The whole truth
of the matter is that he left the financial side of his administration to his
capable minister D'Effiat, who was carrying France through very successfully
when he died. Then two incapable men took charge of affairs, and Richelieu
was just beginning tc take an active hand in financial matters, when an early
death prevented the completion of his plan.
A few things may be noticed in his favor. The debt which in 1535
was 300 millions of livres had been reduced to 250 millions by Solly, and was
only 300 millions at Richelieu's death. Thus, although the Cardinal increased
the burdens for his generation, the coming generation would have had an excel-
lent chance to develop France on the financial side according to the ideas
left in his last great work.^
Finally, when one considers the new and powerful impulse he gave
to maritime and commercial enterprises, and his efforts to favor general
betters, VI, 900-901.
2Ibid., VI, 901-902.
Another evidence of the Cardinal's interest in the finances 'is found
in the budget system which he attempted to introiuce. This required a yearly
statement of the finances, which would have been very valuable if it had been
carried out
.
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prosperity and future welfare, it cannot be said that his own personal finan-
cial policy was a failure. In the larger sense of the term it was not.
That his financial policy was incomplete cannot be denied. Constant references
by himself and others, leave no doubt as to his future plans. 1 These as ap-
pearing in his Testament Politique will be considered next, and will be seen
largely to justify his financial administration.
B. The Views of Richelieu Concerning the Administration
of Finances. •
Richelieu has left us in his Testament Politique , a complete state-
ment of his final ideas with reference to the solution of the financial prob-
lems confronting France. 2 That he expected the future generation to carry
them out cannot be doubted. Indeed, it is to his credit that in his finan-
cial schemes as well as his entire policy, he looked into the future as well
a3 the present. Admitting that the expenses for war were great, he maintained
that it would benefit posterity forever and repay them for the pain and
labor undergone.
The graft and corruption connected with the collection of taxes in
the past, had filled him with disgust. He had been in favor of sending
officials to overlook these collectors and also the nobility, and prevent any
oppression of the weak and poor by the strong and rich. However, he shows his
caution and farsightedness by indicating the necessity of going slow and not
overturning the entire system of collection. "The state should see," he said,
"that those who serve the nation to the best of their ability should be
1Cahiers de Normandie, II, 188-189; 175, 176, 177, etc.; Ill, 1-3, 69.
Memoiresde Nicoulas Goulas , 2 vols., Paris, 1879, I, 19-20.
2The basis of this discussion is Richelieu's treatment of the finances
in his Testament Politique , 11, 80-105. French Edition. II, 105-132. English
Edition. Both II, Ch. IX, Section VII.
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properly rewarded." To punish the really bad, and reward the faithful, was
the true method of reform. -In fact his entire plan for the reform of the
financial officials was based on the solid principle of allowing fswer men
to do the work, and rewarding them adequately for their efforts. Centraliza-
tion in the hands of a few men of merit, expresses the idea of one who was
always looking for the greatest economic, political, and social returns, for
every measure along these lines.
Nevertheless, one must turn to the second part of Richelieu's
Testament Politique
, in order to appreciate his final ideas concerning the
finances of France, and his plans for the future solution of the difficulties
confronting this part of the administration. "It shows that he was not a
stranger tc this important part of his administration," says Caillet. 1
Eichelieu makes clear the power of money in developing the power
of the state. "Finances," he says, "ars the nerves of the state." In other
words, in order for a nation to be able to compete with other countries, she
must have the financial foundation upon which to build her power. He points
the
out that foundation must be solid. There is a danger of asking too much of
the people, and also of asking too little. A happy medium must be struck.
All necessary expenses must be met. However, the less one gets from the
people the better. Now to obtain the happy result of the best welfare of the
people, strict economy in the use of money must be the motto of the govern-
ment. This of course means a reform in the means of collection of the
finances and reform in the payment of expenses. He maintains that the finan-
cial accounts of France, both receipts and expenses, must be open and above
Call let, 260.
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"board. "Secrecy is conducive to corruption," he says.
He then goes on to defend his policy of the suppression of the
Huguenots and his attitude toward wars in general, in order to obtain a
peace in which all other abuses would he done away with. The finances could
not he reformed very much until an internal and external peace should be
secured.
He then takes up the matter of the internal revenue taxes, as a
means of raising revenue. He admits that they bring money, but also realizes
that they raise prices, which in turn makes the expense of maintaining sol-
diers higher, as well as causing worse conditions for workmen. They result
in a great loss to individuals, with only a slight gain fcr the Prince. "The
poor landowner will not gain by the levy of such a tax. His land will re-
main the same in value and its products the same, and even if they increase
in price, the excess of price will cause the market for the products to be
limited." In other words, Richelieu seems to have a faint conception of a
law of supply and demand as affected by price. He go^s on to state that there
will be not only an increase of revenue tax for the producer, but he will
also have to pay more for other goods. Thus he will tend to become self-
sufficing as far as possible. In other words, increased internal revenue taxes
increase the price of commodities and decrease their sale. Certainly this
is a remarkable economic idea to come from a "Political Statesman" of the
17th Century. He even goes so far as to say definitely, that if the taxes
are increased, the loss in foreign trade will more than offset the gain.
Also, if the internal revenue taxes are increased it will reduce a number
of subjects to idleness, and the amount realized will decrease, due to de-
creased production.
*r i
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The discourse of the Cardinal is interesting in that it shows
that he was weighing his actions on an economic basis. He admits that he
deviates from the subject when he undertakes to show the bad features of
the above tax. Yet it is sure evidence that he was of an economic turn
of mind, and that most of his activities, whether political, religious, or
social, had an element of the economic in them.
Going back to the matter of taxes, he makes the point that there
should be an arithmetical proportion between taxes and the necessities of the
state. He goes on to explain by saying, that no more must be imposed on the
peopla in taxes than is necessary for the subsistence of the Kingdom in its
grandeur and glory. Nevertheless, he points out that the King is responsible
only to God in his judgment as to the amount of taxes. Yet he must consider
the interests of his people in that their love and fidelity are necessary
for the subsistence of the state and the preservation of his person. In other
words, even though the King wa3 theoretically responsible only to God, yet
practically, Richelieu admits here and in many other places that the interests
of the people must be considered. "Taxes" , he says, "must be in proportion
to the wealth of the country, for if this rule is not followed, his subjects
will have no funds with which to pay the regular duties which they owe to
their rulers, or to build up commerce." A reasonable decrease of the taxes,
especially the taille, and a careful use of the money obtained so as to attain
the greatest results is advice worthy of a first class financier. He says also
that the interests which look to the future must be even more considered than
those of the present, in spite of the arguments of numerous men to the
contrary. These statesmanlike words justify to a large extent the administra-
tion of Eichelieu.
ft
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The views of the Cardinal were not so wise with regard to foreign
commerce, on the side of imports. Ho still believed that the principal
riches of a country depended upon toe ability to sell much and buy little.
He forgot chat a balance of trade as a whole, was the most sure way of
stopping all the attempts at home in the direction of production and industry.
^
However, that he did see the value of buying commodities in return to a cer-
2tain extent, will be shown later.
The Cardinal emphasized the economical use of the money obtained
by taxation. He compared the waste of French money with the use of the
taxes in Venice. As a promoter of state economy, he advised the removal of
the corrupt "comptons", to whom the taxes were farmed. This would mean a
money saving of a million livres. He concludes this particular topic by
pointing out that it was an art to be able to know how to collect only the
necessary amount and also how to spend just the amount needed. "The inability
to do either, is a detriment and injury to the state." It is clear that
Richelieu comprehended the importance of these two sides of the financial
problem, and that he proceeded to treat it in a practical as well as
theoretical way, is shown by what follows.
In taking up the method of reforming the finances, he considers
first the amount of revenue, then the expenses of the government, and lastly,
to what degrees the people may be eased by changes in the above two phases.
No part of the work better illustrates the clear, methodical, logical working
1Caillet, 261.
2See Chapter XII.
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of this great statesman's mind.
In the first place, in his detailed analysis of the revenues and
expenses of the Kingdom, he points out that the amounts and methods of
taxation and expenses in times of war and peace were different.
Also, he says that the revenues could he 79 millions and the expenses
44 millions of livres. Thus over 30 millions could be saved. In this 79
millions the tallies amounted to 44 millions, the aids 4 millions, the gabelles
19 millions, and other taxes 12 millions. The expenses are interest on "bonds,
wages, taxes and rights of offices, etc. To increase the taxes, Richelieu
wished to raise the salt tax and make everyone pay it. He also wanted the
sou per livre tax on commodities in France. Likewise, he desired to diminish
the tailles by one fourth. But he strongly recommends the sou per livre tax
as an aid to the support of the war for the grandeur of the state, although
at heart he did not think much of the tax. He then goes on to list the
expenses that are absolutely necessary, i.e., buildings and fortifications
must be built, and as for pensions, while they cannot be abolished, a happy
medium ought to be struck, in that they should be reduced about one half.
"Pensions," he claimed, "were for those who were doing something for the
state, like serving in the war for example."
Now by cutting down the expenses, the taille could be decreased, and
thus the people would be aided. "This should be the chief end. For the
true way to enrich the state is to aid the people and discharge them of their
burdens. However, in doing so, we should constantly have in mind the future
as well as the present."
Richelieu had resolved also to put an end to the great amount of
interest which was paid on bonds, and at the same time diminish the taxes on
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the people. 1 He planned to do this by a reduction of the tallies to about
22 millions; by a considerable increase of the revenue from salt. (This is
especially interesting considering the value he put on this product back
in 1627 when attacking the Huguenots.) Also, by a suppression of the thirty
millions above 44 millions.
Richelieu intended to make the salt gabelle the important tax and
one of the valuable resources of the state, by making the trade in that cOBomodi-
ty free to everybody. Thus they would get rid of the numerous officials whose
wages absorbed a large share of the money received.
The 30 millions of interest charges, which he desired to eliminate,
he planned to reimburse within 7 years. He was well aware of the decrease
in the value of the capital which the interest represented and saw the ad-
vantage to the government of repurchasing the debt while its value was low.
"Then," he says, "the revenues ought to be 57 millions of which the tailles
furnish 22 millions, aids 4 millions, gabelles 19 millions, and all the other
forma 12 millions. Laying asiie the 17 million to be put in the exchequer,
the rest must be looked upon as considerable. No nation lays up half so
much after paying expenses."
He notes that many more individuals are to be made liable to the
tailles and this will aid the people. The reduction of the number of offi-
cials will ease them, in that they will become soldiers, merchants, or laborers.
Decrease of the exemptions will discharge the people of more than one half
ICaillet, 262.
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of their tallies, it "being certain that the richest, who are liable to the
greatest taxes, are those who get exempted by means of money. In other
words, a general reform of the exemptions and the number of corrupt officials
would result in more people paying the tailles and the burden of the lower
classes would be lightened.
Upon what foundation was this entire financial scheme laid? The
benefit of the state, and of the people as the strongest factor in the state t
This scheme of Richelieu's illustrates not only the economic genius of the
man on the financial side of his administration, but also the interest that
he had in the welfare of the common people, present and also future. "I am
sensible," he says, "that it will be urged that it is easy to make such pro-
jects, like unto those of Plato's Commonwealth, which though fine in its ideas,
is a real chimera. But I dare to affirm that the design is not only so
reasonable, but so easy to execute, that if God pleases to grant your majesty
a speedy peace and preserve you for the Kingdom, together with your servants,
of which I esteem myself one of the meanest, instead of leaving this advice
by ray Testament , I hope to accomplish it myself."
He had indeed an excellent plan for the financial reform of France.
It certainly was a misfortune for the French nation, that he did not live
long enough to carry the scheme to a successful completion. Even though
his actual financial administration was somewhat weak, nevertheless this final
plan when viewed in connection with his general economic and political policy,
makes his financial policy largely justified.
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Chapter IX
THE ECONOMIC RELATION OF RICHELIEU TO AGRICULTURE , INDUSTRY .
AM) INTERNAL CJDMMERCE
When Richelieu received the office of "grand master and chief of
commerce and navigation", it was natural that he should be more interested
in the external side of the national development. He left internal affairs
in the hands of others. For example, he left the guidance of industry to the
secretary of state, Sublet des Noyers, "ordonnateur generale" of the build-
ings and manufactures of the King.* So that, although the Cardinal entirely
neglected no phase of the administration, yet he left the internal aspect
of it mostly in the hands of others.
From another point of view, it is clear that this part of French
development would have to wait while Richelieu carried out great accomplish-
ments on the exterior. Only matters of direct importance, in that for example
they were concerned with the wars, engaged his attention. For example, the
Cardinal constantly tried to curb waste and extravagance in the kingdom. He
realized that industry and production in general should be made to aid the
nation in carrying its wars to a successful completion. Therefore he asked
Grand Itfarechal de Eassompierre to form a committee to investigate and seek
2
ways to do away with the needless waste and luxuries of the people of France.
Furthermore, abundance was to be produced in the Kingdom by increased commerce,
and the vagabonds, disbanded soldiers, etc., were to be made to work.'^ Thus
ipigeonneau, II, 389-390.
2Bassompierre , Marechal de, Memo ires , 4 vols. Paris, 1875; III, 435.
^ercure Francois
,
XX, 34; XX, 34; XX, 7C4-711 ; XXIV, 1-2.
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the Cardinal seems to have at temoted a rather efficient conservation scheme,
which he carried almost to economic extremes, when he advocated trade schools
as being far more important to France than the schools of Liberal Arts.*
The economic efficiency of the man would be of great benefit to France at the
present time.
In the larger sense of the tenr. Eichelieu did not fail entirely
with regard to internal affairs. "He had too great a desire for the welfare
of the public to fail -utterly in attempting to continue the internal adminis-
tration of Henry IV."2 "Yet, even though Eichelieu did not neglect the in-
terior of France and its demands; even though all parts of the administration
felt his power, nevertheless, they did not feel the same influence. And
furthermore, one locks in vain for a single institution which established a
lsstirg principle and was capable of guaranteeing some security to the country
Eichelieu, while he did not pay as much attention to the interior
as he did to external affairs, yet followed the same unconscious economic
policy with reference to the former as the latter; namely, the mercantil istic
or the great stats idea." He desired to centralize industry and commerce,
and take away local noble powers from agriculture. Whatever he did was done
for the good of France. However, the many local franchises, the heavy
wars, etc., all prevented him from accomplishing very much in such matters
as agriculture and industry. These phases of his administration were left
until the future peace, when they were to be settled in the interest of
•'•Testament Politique, 1, 125-1 34
•
2Gouraud, I, 169.
3D»Avenel, Letters, I, LXXXV-LXXXVI
.
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the public welfare.
With regard to agriculture, the administration of the Cardinal
was rather weak. Of course this is natural when one considers the torn-up
condition of the country at that time. Yet efforts were made to drain
marshes, and various companies were granted the privileges of doing this
with suitable exemptions, 1 This would have had an important effect on France
under different circumstances.
However, one must not forget the indirect methods by which the
Cardinal aided the common people and thereby promoted agriculture. Weakening
the power of the nobles and centralizing control in the hands of the govern-
ment was bound to aid the farmers and give them a better chance to pursue
their life's work.
"Also," says Caillet, "the numerous ordinances which were made
relating to the matter of raising and alloting the taille, and the matter of
the discipline of the soldiers, not only resulted in decreasing the bad
finances and developing the army, but also relieved many of the country estates
by repressing the selfishness of collectors and the ravages of men of war."2
M. Henri Donial in his Histoire des classes rural es en France , has
brought up the point that the administration, contrary to general belief,
did consider the interests of the individual and their freedom and rights.
He has cited several extracts from the famous code '.'ichaud of 1629, which
would indicate this.'* In the first place, the farmer has been relieved from
the entail. Also, by means of the destruction of the fortresses of the lords,
i Isambert, XVI, 500-503, 537.
2Caillet, 251.
3
Ibid., 2S1-2S2.
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an additional security has been obtained which has done much to relieve the
hard life of the population. 1 The prospect of peace produced an incentive
to work, because of sure profits. Furthermore, laws relating to exportation
and importation, of which the decrease of the taille, and the efforts to make
the import more equal, together with the reduction of the interest, all tended
to better the condition of the farmers. 2
However, there are several other measures in the "grand ordcrmance"
of January, 1629, which indicates the solicitude of the government for the
people. Article 206 forbids lords tc subject their tenants and inhabitants
to corvees in their own interest, or to iirpose on the villages in any way.
Article 207 forbids lords from making their tenants patronize their mills or
presses on penalty of losing their mills and all other rights. Article 209
forbids the lords to interfere with the collection of taxes and the appoint-
ment of collectors."^ In other words, a direct effort was made to deprive
the lords of any unlawful control over the peasants, and to permit the latter
to make the most of their own few privileges. Of course conditions in France
were such that this code was never actually carried out.
But one can see that although very little was done tc aid agricul-
ture, yet in an indirect way, a path was prepared whereby this part of the
economic development of France was to be controlled and influenced by the
central power. The farmers at the start were given more individual rights,
and what Richelieu would have accomplished if he had lived is of course a
iCode M^chaud, see Isambert, XVI, 225.
2Caillet, 282; :te retire Francois , XX, 697.
3Isambert, XVI, 225, etc; Caillet, 282.
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natter of conjecture.
Turning to the subject of industry, one can find more evidence of
activity along that line of French development, so far as the government
was concerned. Starting with the Estates-General of 1514, efforts were made
to open industry to all. "At that time, the cahiers of the third estate
had demanded that the free exercise of the trades be open to all the poor
subjects of the King*! Richelieu, hov;ever, did not respond to the desire
of depriving the so-called corporations of their monopolies. The only
exception he made was in the case of colonists who were in the colonies six
years. They could become "rrasters" when they returned to France. This part
of his economic policy was rather weak.
"/lany industries were at that time the object of some regulations.
For instance, the beer industry was regulated, and the wine growers and dis-
tillers were recognized as two separate industries. Certain regulations were
passed also with respect to the iron industry. The soft and hard varieties
of iron were designated to be used for different purposes, and steps were
2
to be taken to develop the mines of France. Such an industry as the manu-
facture of glass in Picardy received its first impetus under Richelieu. 3
The manufacture of rugs and tapestry attracted more of the attention
of the government. During the administration of Richelieu a man by the name
of Pierre du Pont and a partner were given the right to weave and manufacture
rugs in gold, silver, silk, etc., for IS years. They were to accept appren-
tices, train them, and as a reward for their services were to be ennobled. 4
1Caillet, 275-276.
2Isambert, XVI, 183, 191.
3
Ibii., XVI, 196.
4Caillet, 276.

125
In other words, the government made especial efforts to develop this industry
and thus cut down the imports from the East.
The manufacture of silk, an eastern product, was also fostered by
Richelieu as well as Henry IV. It increased to a renarkable extent under
Richelieu, who realized its importance. Indeed, he believed in making France
able to manufacture such things for herself and advocated the development of
the cloth industry because of this policy.^- All luxuries obtainsd from
abroad were not to be encouraged, but should be made at home.^ This was a
part of the mercantilists doctrine. "If industry was developed and foreign
importations hindered by intelligent laws, France could live on its own
manufactures as well as agriculture," said Richelieu.^
One means by which the Cardinal hoped to aid industry was by the
development of technical schools along industrial lines.4 This was a plan
which he was not able to carry out before he died.
It is clear that the interest taken by the government in the develop
ment of industry was from the point of view of the welfare of the state as
a whole. It fostered those industries which would compete with foreign
manufactures, especially in the East. In other words, what little attention
industry did receive was on the basis of making France a strong independent
state. The destruction of internal political obstacles had an indirect
influence on industry in France. Doubtless this field of Richelieu's ad-
ministration would have received marked attention after the Cardinal had
'•Testament politique, II, 67-68.
2Cahiers de Normandie , III, 270-277. Indicates the rivalry between
France and England in the cloth trade in 1639.
3Testament Politique , I, 64-80.
4Ibid., I, 126-127.
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finished the external part of his program and peace had enabled him to turn
his attention to other things.
Peace, indeed, was the dominant factor in the development of all
internal affairs in France. This statement might be applied to the matter of
internal commerce as well as industry or agriculture. Important problems
confronted the government in its attempts to solve the situation, and a cer-
tain amount of success was attained by their efforts. However, the maximum
results in this field had to be left until after the wars, when Richelieu
wouli have the time and money to accomplish the internal reforms which he knew
were so much needed. ^ Yet there were problems which demanded immediate
solutions
.
"At the beginninc- of the l?th Century," says one writer, "two obsta-
cles opposed the development of interior commerce: (l) the lack of good roads
and navigable rivers, (3) legislation which laid heavy duties upon the
2
products of the soil." The first problem was mentioned by the Cardinal
in a letter to his superintendent of finances in 1638, in which he brought
out the inconvenience suffered by the public, because of the corruption and
on the part of those who were
waste of money supposed to attend to the paving of the streets of cities like
Paris, which were neglected as a consequence At another time he mentions
the plan of joining the ocean and the Mediterranean Sea by means of the rivers
d'Ouche and d'^rmaneon. "But," he says, "this enterprise was too costly for
the times. No person would furnish the money, so it was neglected.
"
4 In
other words, he admitted that such schemes must rely on individual efforts
1 Couraud, 1, 190.
2Caillet, 264.
^Letters, VI, 247.
%emoires, II, 321.
i
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as the government was not financially able to carry them out. However, in
1632 a law was passed with the purpose of making the rivers of Vettes, Char-
tres, Dreux anidfEtarapes, etc., navigable. 1 So that evidently Richelieu's
interest in this part of his administration obtained some res-alts.
Bichelieu tried to carry on the work of Hemy IV in developing
navigation by means of canals. The famous canal of Braire, begun in 1604,
was finished in 1640. The government had tried to pay all the expenses in-
volved in its construction but failed to do so. Therefore, it finally had
to call in the aid of certain individuals to complete the task in return for
certain concessions- They were to unite the ocean and the sea by this canal
in 4 years or lose the rights connected with it. 2 The owners were to be
ennobled and might induce other persons of quality, such as churchmen, nobles,
and j-odges, to contribute toward the undertaking. In return, "considering
the
the services which said Guyon and partner render to public, if they succeed
in an enterprise 30 useful to Paris and many provinces of the Kingdom, we
will give to them the title of nobility, etc." 3 In this case the government
wished to centralize everything in its hands, but lading money, permitted
private parties to undertake some phases of the work. However, this was
done with the welfare of the entire state constantly in mind. The economic
benefits of canals were evident to all at that time,
Many other attempts were nade to develop other canals, but the
unfortunate state of the treasury and general political conditions prevented
their execution. "However," says one writer, "the system adopted by Kichelieu
had at least the advantage of not engaging the financial responsibilities of
Isambert, XVI, 369.
2Eichelieu took a personal interest in the plan for the uniting of the
two seas by a canal. See Saillet, 2S5; also Mercure Francois , XXIII, 338, etc.
3Isambert, XVI, 4-8-496.
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the state, ani. leaving to the companies who undertook the task, the costs
as well as the "benefits. 1 In this one way, Richelieu seems a little in
advance of the a.ercantil ist ic belief. However, the general doctrine of state
development was "behind it all.
With regard to the condition of the roads and "brides during the
period of Richelieu's rule, Pigeonneau has taken great pains to prove that
the Cardinal centralized their control in the hands of the financial superin-
tendent, and finally in the hands of the Intendants. Richelieu made out the
budget of "bridges and roads, looked over the changes ordered, regulated the
corvees instead of leaving their regulation to officials, and was responsible
only to the King and his council. 2 In other words, the control of the roads
and bridges was put into the hands of government officials and thus made a
part of the great systs-. of centralization. This unity of oversight was
not long in bearing fruit. Although tne roads were far from being as well
kept up as they were in the 16th centrtry, they passed in the second part of
the 17th century for the best and the safest roads in Europe.
^
The service of transportation tended more and more, like the co -itrol
of bridges and roait;. to be monopolized in the hands of the state. Before
Richelieu's time, the convents, the universities, the Kings, etc., all had
their separate postal ani parcel post system. No royal relays or messengers
took private business, unless permitted to do so by the chiefs in charge.
The transport of goods in wagons was the exception, merchandise being candied
i?igeonnsau, II, 391-392.
2 Ibid., II, 392-393.
3Ibid., II, 394.
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as far as possible.
Richelieu wanted the government to take charge of this part of the
French affairs, and centralize the postal service in its hands. He continued
this development (which had been started by Charles IX) by creating in 1624,
the office of director and "Intendant Generale" of the post9, and gave it to
one of his devoted servants. ^ Also, at this time the royal relays were given
the monopoly over the roads they covered. The messengers of the universities
were limited to university letters, parcels, etc. In 1625 an edict was issued
which established relays on various roads. That is, the government was to rent
horses to individuals who were to convey goods to various places, /n effort
was made to render the distribution of goods even and fair by preventing the
holding back of food, through storing it in boats which were kept in secret
places, etc. Warning was given that merchants in the future could not hold
up laden boats or keep merchandise in warehouses along the rivers for future
use. This was fraudulent and to the prejudice of the public. ^ Thus, efforts
were made to prevent speculations in high prices of food and merchandise,
in a manner very similar to the present. One sees that the government of that
time did not fail to regulate any industry or organization if it saw fit,
when the latter tried to interfere with the public welfare. Finally, all
goods except grains, wines, etc., were to be transported by royal carriers,
so a monopoly was at last reached- ^ However, this privilege of government
monopoly of the post and express was never enforced, and the traders remained
ll»evasseur, I, 249.
^Isambert, XVI, 158-161.
3lbid., XVI, 353-355.
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free to choose their carriers for packages weighing more than 50 poiands.*
Richelieu finally was able to establish regular routes from various
cities on certain days, and in 1630, France was divided into 20 postal dist-
ricts and 7 foreign offices were added, in Spain, Flanders, England, Holland,
Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. 2 Carriers left the "central bureaus" of
Paris, twice a week, and travelled at the rate of 4 leagues per hour in summer
and lg per hour in winter.' However, the government did not make any money
off the postal system. It was farmed out to individuals and they received
the profits.^ Yet there was a gain in that the letters went from one part
of the country to another with a regularity, quickness, and security unknown
in preceding centuries. The creation of relays at this time was a great aid
for increasing the speed of the trips. "Indeed," says one writer, "travel
by coaches became more regular, and transportation as a whole became cheaper
e
both on land and water." Evidently during the administration of Eichelieu
transportation received an important impetus, with increased security, faster
time, and decreased costs. All this was accomplished by the state and de-
pendent on it, in spite of the desires of individuals to the contrary. Created
in the interest of the public, it was successful in attaining its object.
Among the important means of aiding commerce was the newspaper, which
traces its origin to the days of Eichelieu. "It was," said Pigeonneau, "to-
gether with the opening of the canals, the creation of letter posts, of relays,
Pigeonneau, II, 399.
2Isambert, XVI, 351.
Pigeonneau, II, 399-402.
4Isambert, XVI, 450-455.
^Pigeonneau, II, 402.
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messengers and carriages, the crowning event which inaugurated modern times. n *
Richelieu not only used the newspaper for governmental purposes "out the
so-called journal was a powerful aid to commerce, by giving knowledge and
publicity. Wher on-3 considers that through it the King notified the nobles
that they would not lose their rank if they engaged in commerce and announced
that certain merchants or traders had become nobles, one can see the effect
it would have on commerce. Richelieu's constant concern for the welfare of
commerce is displayed also in the reduction of the interest rate from the usual
rate of 24;b plus to 18$. There was a danger to commerce in that men neglected
it for speculation. Therefore this more moderate rate was established to
aid commerce and industry and also to assure a sufficient profit to investors.
^
Everything possible at that time was done to aid commerce. The
government tried to make the frontier the only tariff boundary, but the local
provinces refused to consent on account of local privileges, rivalries, etc.'*
No matter how heavy the taxes were upon goods in France, similar goods im-
ported from abroad paid at least as much. For example, a tax was laid on iron
in 1632, but foreign iron paid more than the French iron. This privilege
accorded to national industry, 4 was a part of the protective aspect
of the mercantilists theories.
The question of money was a problem confronting the government in
its efforts to aid commerce. The Mercure Francois brought up, in 1531, the
necessity of trade and the injury done to it by counterfeit money. A chamber
of moneys was established to deal with the matter, on the ground that other-
wise the ruin of France would result.
•Pigeonneau, II, 461-463.
2Isambert, XVI, 406. Memoirs, XXIII, 259-26C
3Caillet, 267.
Serc\SfFrancoi S ;
1
XVII,713-72C; Isambert, XVI ,365 ;Mole'; II , 52-63 , 195-196
.
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Also the increase of money as a result of the discovery of the New
World had caused trouble for French commerce. In 1636, the relations of 38
different foreign coins were established in an arbitrary way. Of course this
plan did not work and in 1639 the relation of coins by weight was tried.
Finally in 1540 all the lighter French gold coins were retired and refunded
into the Louis d'or and smaller coins, with definite relative weights. In
addition to the sinrpl ification of the monetary system the cost of mining was
decreased which was a gain for both the government and commerce, even though
not all the monetary questions were solved.^
In conclusion, it would seem that the efforts made by the government
to improve the agricultural
, industrial and internal commercial condition
though rather meager in results, were nevertheless important, when one considers
the situation at that period. The general purpose to build up the state and
center control in its hands was the common policy behind the government in
whatever it accomplished in these particular phases of its administration.
The coming peace would doubtless have seen the attempt to complete this
policy as applied to internal affairs. It was not Richelieu's lack of ability
or of the knowledge of conditions, but his lack of time, which accounts for his
inactivity in regard to these particular phases of his administration.
Pigeonneau, II, 415-432; Levasseur, I, 255-258.
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Chapter X
THE IDEAS AND ACCO?.TPLISEMENTS OF RICHFLIEU AS REGARDS A MARINE
The keynote of Richelieu's position in regard to a war marine for
France is found in the following quotation taken from his Testament Politique
"The sea is an object of dispute among all sovereigns, for they all claim
that they inherit the right to control it. Therefore, the factor which
does so is force and not reason. It is necessary to he powerful in order to
have a recognized claim in the heritage."* The Cardinal then takes up the
maritime organization of England, Spain, and the Barbary states, compares the
naval forces of these, and shows briefly how he wishes to make the French
strong and active enough to be able, in times of war, to contend with advan-
tage against the fleets of their enemies, and in times of peace, to defend
their commerce, ships, and shores, from the aggression of pirates. In other
words, Richelieu saw the need of a strong marine as a means of attaining
a powerful state, and so was anxious to exert his efforts toward that phase
of his administration.
In order to gain the opportunity to carry out his ideas along this
line, in 1627, he saw to it that he was offered the position of "grand master,
chief, and general superintendent of the navigation and commerce of France."
The duties of this office had been carried on by several officials in the
past, and were now put under the control of the Cardinal, as a further move
toward the centralization of power which he was bringing about at that time.
"God be praised," says the M e rcure F rar.c o i s , "that lacking in power because
Testament Politique, II, 48-50.
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of the weakness of France on the sea, the King has concit ted to the care and
administration of the greatest person of the century and most worthy pilot
of the state, who has appeased the storrr.s of civil war and the foreign
tempests near and far
,
the police and administration of the sea, and
as a result will build up commerce by means of power upon the ocean and
immunity from the attacks of other nations thereby."*
Up until Richelieu's time each of the former Admirals and Conne ta-
bles had unlimited personal power, and they were bound to come into conflict
with other officials. 2 But when Richelieu took charge, all the duties were
centralized in his hands. Gome of these duties were as follows: "to give
and furnish all orders which will be useful and necessary for navigation,
in conservation of the rights of France, the advancement and establishment
of the commerce and security of her subjects, at sea, in the ports, harbors
and nearby islands." Thus one perceives that the powers 'which Richelieu
was to possess were very extended; indeed the appointment placed under his
control the me reliant as well as the war marine. The duties of the Cardinal
were defined more definitely than were those of his predecessors, and fur-
thermore, they were broader in so far as they concerned the necessary field,
so that he was able to decide as a sovereign raler, all questions relating
to the sea, even to disputes arising over the capture and disposal of the
contents of wrecked vessels. That he took his office seriously, and tried
to realize vast plans for the maritime and commercial development of France,
is the final conclusion of most students of his life.
1Mercure Francois, XIII, 257-258.
2Isambert, XVI, 198.
3Ibid., XVI, 194.
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The way in which Richelieu carried on the duties of his office will
illustrate "both his impartiality and his honesty. Numerous passages in his
letters show that he looked upon the position as a sort of sacred trust.
Indeed, the Cardinal considered the appointment as "being one whi^h was not
conferred upon him as a regular part of his official position, but was given
to him with the idea that its great importance to the welfare of the nation
and the Xing, required every loyal Frenchman not only to obey its precepts,
hut aid in carrying out it3 functions, if he was ordered to do so.^- This
explains why the Cardinal refused to accept money for his work in this par-
ticular office.^ One of his letters illustrates very well the spirit in
which he took up his duties and some of the problems he had to face at the
outset. He says, "that the King, knowing for some time how his vessels were
preyed upon, was determined to put a stop to it. So he sent out escorts with
the various merchant vessels and fortified all the ports. Also, his majesty
ordered me to take charge of commerce and navigation, and has sent forward
a general order that clearance was to be taken from me rather than from Mont-
morency (his predecessor) 11 He then goes on to cite cases in which
his authority was not recognized. There existed at that time provinces,
where local governments exerted almost unrestricted rights in maritime matters,
and thus conflicted with the central authority, which was at that time the
"superintendent of navigation and commerce." In regard to Brittany, one of
the more or less independent provinces, he says that he does not seek to make
innovations there, but only tries to give aid and the means to all those who
Memoirs, XXIII, 257-258.
betters, II, 346; Memoirs, XXIV, 275-276.
3lbid., II, 350-352.
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wish to trade, and to do so in pleasing and favorable ways. Many other
letters indicate his great interest in the office. 1 And so one finds that
after this, he begins to introduce important plans in regard to forming
a war marine, which was to be of great importance to France in the future.
But first of all a few words in respect to the past history of this new war
marine
.
Francis I and Henry II had attempted to build up the navy but since
then it had dwindled to nothing. In 1603, Sully was obliged to be carried
to England in an English vessel. On the way over he was escorted by some
snail French ships, which were forced to salute the Fnglish flag when they
passed one of the vessels of that country. 2 This was an insult which affected
Richelieu deeply, as it indicated the fact that England was master over
France, in so far as the sea was concerned.
Henry IV had realized the necessity of a strong marine, but his
sudden death prevented any efforts in that direction. So that when the
Cardinal went into office, France had practically no power on the sea. "Trade,"
he says, "was almost totally ruined and the King did not have one ship."
Richelieu as far back as 1616 had realized the weakness of the
had
marine, and in his brief entrance into the "conseil" .urged all villages to
encourage the development of a marine as far as they were able. Now as has
been pointed out, Richelieu's theories with regard to the marine have been
borrowed from the ideas of men like Henry IV, Issac de Laffemas, from the
^Letters, II, 346, 349-350, 409-4-12, 415.
2Caillet, 267-286.
3Testament Politique , 1,190.
4Gouraui, I, 176.

13?
cahiers of 1614, 1617, and 1626 as well as the writings of Montchretien. 1
But yet one must give him credit for having the ability to weld all these
ideas together in spite of almost superhuman difficulties, and develop an
exceedingly cacable marine policy, which was largely put into execution before
his death.
One of the most interesting things about this policy was the fact
that he consulted and informed the people of France concerning it. He seems
to have especially desired their approval . For instance, the assembly of
notables was made aware of his economic and political reforms through the
speech of one of his representatives. They were unanimously approved by that
2body. The nobles felt that a strong marine was the sure uneans whereby
France could develop and regain her former splendor. 3 Richelieu also used
the Mercure Francois , in reality a government controlled newspaper, and
proceeded to inform the people concerning the state of the marine. In it
the former glory of France is brought out, especially under Charlemangne
,
Charles VI, and Francis I, particularly with regard tc relations in the
Levant. Then it shows how the religious wars had led to the fall of the
fleet, which Henry IV had not been able to build up. "He who is master of
the sea is master of the land."^ France had existed without sea control,
while England, Spain, Denmark, and Sweden had increased in power by that means
Control of the sea meant power for the nations, and was necessary for
France.
Pigeonneau, II, 3cl-362.
flbid., II, 364.
Memoirs, XXIII, 256-257.
^v:ercure Franc o i
s
,
XIII, 214-229.
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However, the Cardinal did not have tc use many arguments to con-
vince the people as to t ;e naed of a marine. France had many direct and indirec
enemies at this time, and the critical state in which the nation was placed
because of lack of sea control caused him tc take immediate efforts to re-
form the marine, with the full consent of the people. Of course, there was
a certain amount of opposition from local governors and other officials
affected by a centralization of the control of the marine. Furthermore, the
Huguenots were not enthusiastic for a national navy. But it was just this
local opposition which caused the Cardinal to go ahead. However, Richelieu
knew that the importance of the marine was based mostly on its influence on
foreign relations, and this was the primary cause for his determined and far-
sighted stand with regard to this proble:' .
In the first place, one discovers that relations between France and
the Barbary pirates were not very pleasant. The inhabitants of northern
.Africa had for many generations followed piracy as a profession, and at that
time dominated the Mediterranean sea. They had been so strong that it was
impossible for a French vessel tc venture out of a Mediterranean port without
running the risk of being captured and its crew taken to Africa as slaves.^-
Indeed, no part of the French coast was immune from attacks of pirates of
various nationalities. The "Barb are s que s" penetrated from ten to twenty
leagues into the interior of Provence and were a source of constant terror
to the people there, who constantly petitioned for aid, calling Richelieu's
attention to the fine harbors upon which to base his sea control, and build
%ercure Francois , XVI, 56-65; 75-79.
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up an intense trade. 1 Furthermore, the Spaniards and English committed
piracies near French soil. 2 Add to all this the fact that the nobles in
France had no scruples about taking part in these depredations, and one can
readily understand why the people of France demanded as a unit, the creation
of a strong marine.
On account of these raids and this unanimous demand of the people,
Richelieu, in the second year of his ministry, made a "Heglement pour la
mer", in which he brought out the necessity of a strong war marine for
France. "In order to guarantee to our subjects who trade in the East, safety
from the losses which they have received from the pirates, and to maintain
the regulation and dignity of our crown among foreigners, we wish that in the
future there will always be in our ports forty galleys prepared to go out
quickly and scour our coasts.'"3 As a result, Eichelieu did all he could
by means of treaties with the pirates, as well a3 the force of a great navy,
to make the pirates respect the flag of France on the high seas. 4 He suc-
ceeded in accomplishing these aims to a remarkable extent, but his successor
.Mazarin, through neglect, permitted the pirates to become strong again and
continue their depredations. However, there were other influences beside
that arising from the acts of the pirates, which caused him to take such an
active stand with regard to the marine.
Diplomatic relations with such countries as England and Spain,
-^/lercure Francois, XII, 65-73.
2
C-ouraud, I, 190-191.
betters, II, 153- 156 .
^lasson, Hi3toire du commerc e Francajs dans le Levant , 28.
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which affected "both the political and economic growth of his country, caused
the Cardinal to consider a strong marine as the most important weapon
with which to meet these nations. "On the power of the sea," he says, "de-
pends the lowering of the pride of England, Holland, etc., against
us, and the ruin of the Huguenots" 1 In other words, Eichelieu knew that in
order to carry out his great policy of state building, a strong navy was needed
to cope with both political and economic problems. "It is necessary for the
to
King," he says, "to choose either
A
cede everything to the English and Dutch,
who are powerful on the sea, or that his majesty make himself in a short time
so powerful that they can undertake nothing against him 1.'2 The Cardinal did
fear the sea power of these lands especially England, for he saw in that country
the future rival of France upon the sea, an i it is indeed unfortunate for his
country that those who came after him did not see this also and act accord-
ingly. "England being situated as she is," said the Cardinal, "could, if the
French were not powerful on the sea, undertake without risk anything she felt
like doing, without fear of revenge from the latter. She could injure or
ruin our fishing trade, hinder our conferee, and nake us, (by guarding the
mouths of our great rivers) pay such duties as seemed good to her. She couli
descend on our islands and even on our coasts, in fact the sit'oation of this
naval country, forces one tc fear her in all places, as being the most
powerful enemy we have.""5 Indeed, Eichelieu admitted the need of opposition
to England on the sea, but political considerations prevented him from oppos-
ing that country too orach on water; in 1635 one finds him conceding to the
Memoirs, XXIII, 256.
2Letters, II, 561.
3Sue, E. Corjre_sp_ondence de Sourdis, 3 vols. Paris, 183?, I, Introduction,
IZ-ZII.
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English control of the channels, 1 which probably was brought aboat because
the demands of the Thirty Years' i"ar made an alliance with the English highly
desirable. Nevertheless, he did foresee the future power of Great Britain,
and saw in her an enemy in the way of any commercial and colonial growth
of France
.
The Cardinal also realized that sea control was an important part
of Spanish policies, and that if France could weaken her southern neighbor
in that respect, she could decrease her political control over her dependen-
cies and colonies as well.2 Yet Hichelieu knew that the sea power of Spain
was on the decline after the reign of Philip II, and that the two great
enemies in that respect were Holland and England, especially the latter. He
tried to prepare to meet this great enemy but did not live long enough. After
his death the policy of a strong navy dwindled away, was revived again during
the age of Loui3 XIY, and at various periods since then. It was being strongly
agitated before the present war, and the great crisis on at present has
plainly indicated the farsightedness of Hichelieu 1 s marine policy.
The best source of his ideas on this particular subject is found
in his Testament Politique, where, after discussing the advantage of certain
types of ships on the ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, he goes on to say that
a great state should never be in such a position that it had to receive an
injury, without taking a just revenge. He points out the supremacy of the
English over the French. "This," he says, "works as an injury to the commerce
of France, especially to her fisheries." He then comments on the fact, that
"Memoirs, XXVIII, S6C.
2Corresp. de Souriis, I Introduction; III-VII; Memoirs, XXIII, 257-258.
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England and not France can fix the duties on commodities because of her strength
at sea. The latter in her state of weakness could do nothing. He goes on to
relate an incident in which the British flag had been saluted in preference
to the French standard, because of the naval inferiority of the latter. In
conclusion, he says that only force will make England recognize France.
He then takes up the naval strength of France, pointing out the fact
that the utility of the Indies to Spain compelled her to have a large sea
force. "We should be able," he says, "to oppose and put a stop to any of these
enterprises against us. If your majesty is powerful at sea, you will be able
to attack Spain on her lengthy coast, and they will conserve most of their
revenues in an effort to guard their territory. This will keep them from
troubling their neighbors, as they have lone up to the present. For they will
need all the power they have to protect themselves "^ He closes this
section by describing the excellent location of France in respect to harbors,
emphasizing the fact that 3he has ports on the ocean and the sea as well.
This is an immense advantage. Then he comments in more detail on her excellent
ports. "Brittany alone," he says, "contains the best harbors on the ocean,
and Provence has better ones than England and Italy together. Spain has to
have a large navy in order to keep her many separate ports under control. Just
as the sea divides Spain from Italy, so France serarate3 her from the rest of
her territories"" Thus one sees that kichelieu realized very clearly the
importance of a war irarine to France, because of her weakness on the political
and commercial side in her relations with foreign nations, One must also
admit that his desire for a fleet almost implies aggression against Spain
for commercial and territorial rights. These quotations taken from his last
Testament Politique , II, 49-52; Memoirs, XXIII, 257-258; Merc-ore Francois ,
XIII, 20S-213. .
„
2The S™.niah Nath^rlands. L^mberg. and tne Franche Comte were the
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work, written as the result of twenty odd years of service in the employ
of his country, certainly indicate his final ideas on this subject, and are
thus very valuable as throwing light on his aims at that time.
There was yet another cause which influenced Eichelieu to build up
a war marine. This was the rising colonial trade of France and her growing
commerce as a consequence of it. Richelieu realized that in order to develop
and protect colonies and commerce, a strong navy was a necessity. Now, as
he wanted Francs to be a powerful colonizing nation, it was natural that he
should turn toward the development of a navy as one of the first steps in the
promotion of this idea. "A force on the sea is necessary to keep it clear of
pirates, to protect commerce and increase the grandeur of the state. The King
takes to heart all the affairs of commerce and trade in as much as he cannot
separate individual interests and his own. All are involved in the question
of power on the sea and against those who would exclude them, thus to the
detriment of their trade etc."* In other words, the question of
commerce was a national affair, and affected all. And the very fact, that
Gaston, the hated enemy of Richelieu supported him in his efforts to secure
a marine, indicates the importance placed on this part of his administration. 2
The Cardinal seeir.s also to have felt that the entire commercial development
of the nation depended on the increase of her war marine. "If the King,"
he says, "endures the injuries, violence, and depredations which are every
day committed upon his subjects by foreigners, and if we continue to have the
important territories separated from Spain by the French nation.
^•Mersure Franco is, XIII, 229-233.
^Memoirs, XXIII, 261-262.
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fleet in the condition in which it is at present; if it is necessary to en-
dure the heavy duties which foreigners place upon the merchandise which we ship
their), and that which they ship us, the actual power of France will he ruined." 1
As a remedy, he recommends that a strong marine be built up for the perpetual
protection of comr.erce. "Power in trade and commerce depends on sea power,"
says the Mercure Francois, "For example, the naval power of England and also of
Holland all have increased trade by that means, as well as the Portuguese
and Venetians. The Hanseatic cities of Germany also having failed to protect
themselves have sought the protection of some powerful Binces of the sea.
French commerce shows a decrease and thus the absolute need of a fleet. France
to of peace
needs to be projected in war on the sea, and be strong in commerce in times .
A A
through protection. Thus not only for political, but for commercial reasons,
it is desirable that the French nation be a strong sea power. "^ This quota-
tion from Richelieu's paper surrs up his entire attitude toward that problem.
One must be convinced that he saw both the political and economic side of the
question, and acted accordingly. He appreciated the natural advantages which
France had in regard to commerce, and the development of a strong marine, and
was farsighted enough to desire to build up for the future. At no other
in
place is his economic statesmanship better illustrated than^his efforts to
create a war and commercial marine, in spite of the numerous obstacles in the
way. "There is no Kingdom so well situated as France and so rich in all that
is needed for it to become a power on the sea. To dc this we must see how
our neighbors govern themselves in that work, we must make great companies,
and oblige the merchants to enter them. Small merchants can not meet the
betters, II, 331-332.
^Mercure Francois
,
XIII, 233-23?
.
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difficulties on the sea etc." 1 In other words a combination between
the merchants and the government to furnish mutual aid on the seas, was the
plan of Richelieu, which would have doubtless produced great results if he had
lived long enough to carry them to their logical conclusion, namely, a great
merchant and war marine.
Turning to the actual accompl ishments of Eichelieu with regard to
the marine, one finds that it was during the years 1629 to 1635 that he
began seriously to consider this phase of his administration. 3 One can find
plenty of evidence that he contemplated actions along this line from the
vsr?' start. 2 But financial troubles, 4 and disturbances as with the Huguenots
for instance, prevented his doing much until later. But he admitted the
weakness of the French on the sea, and the injury done to their commerce by
other powers. "Our neighbors," he 3aid, "buy our goods and sell theirs at
their price, Fow this state of affairs should cease. Therefore, his majesty
is resolved to have 30 good vessels of war to protect cur soasts and inspire
respect for us on the part of our neighbors. "^ In other words, from the
very start the Cardinal had a definite policy outlined and stood ready to
carry it out even to the smallest detail.
The first thing the Cardinal did with reference to the marine was to
place the situation before the assembly of notables in 1626. As a result
cf this meeting the grand edict of reformation of 162S, or the Code Mjchaud ,
Memoirs, XXIII, 258-259.
2Caillet, 292.
betters, II, 163-166; 290-292; 295-296.
Memoirs, XXIII, 126.
•^Letters, II, 366, see note.
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was passed. This edict,written by officials cf the Cardinal's, but expressing
his views, advocated the free exportation of wheat and wine except in times
of famine, authorization for gentlemen to exercise the duties of merchants
and colonists; forbade French sailors tc serve under foreign banners; and
established the convoy of merchant ships by war vessels; action against the
pirates was contemplated; exportation of merchandise in foreign boats was for-
bidden if French vessels were available; there was prohibition of the importa-
tion of foreign cloth; jurisdiction in maritime matters was reserved to
tribunals of the admiralty, etc. This is called the Code Michaud
,
but as was
it
said before, represents the ideas of Kichelieu and was the basis of his
administration.^ If these provisions had been carried out France would have
developed a great commercial and war marine based on rather remarkable modern
protective ideas, part of which endure at the present time. This code is a
striking example of the emphasis that was being placed on the economic side
of foreign relations at that time. It is a pity that internal opposition
and external problems prevented its entire execution.
Finally, in 1629, the Cardinal was free enough from other administra-
tive troubles to take .up the question of the marine. He decided that condi-
tions in the land in so far as they affected the creation of a war marine,
should be investigated. Accordingly in 162° and 1633, he ordered two of the
best trained men in the Kingdom, Messrs. Leroux D ' Infreville , commissioner of
the marine, and Henri De Seguioran, Seigneur de Bone, Knight and Councillor
of the King, to carry out this project. The former was tc inspect the coast
^Isambert, XVI, 329, etc.; Levasseur, 243.
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bordering on the Mediterranean Sea. They were to report on everything which
concerned the marine and were also to reestablish the riarht of anchorage,
which Henry IV had yielded to foreign vessels. 1 "These duties^ executed with
rare intelligence, cast a rather depressing light -upon the deplorable situation
in which they found all forms cf sea activities. A situation rendered still
worse, by the conflicts of jurisdiction which were being continually brought
up by the governors of provinces or the admirals or the nobles whose feudal
estates bordered on the oceans and rivers. "^ These men reported that the
ports were without garrisons, that the coast of the ocean was harried by the
pirates from Africa and Spain, and that the harbors and the castles built
around then-;, both on the Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, were in a
very unfortunate state of neglect. In addition tc all this, there were
"river rulers", who exacted tolls from travsllers who went up and down the
rivers which passed through their territories. They reported in detailed
fashion as to the condition of the coasts ofFrance, the duties collected,
armaments, boats, the means cf defence in the ports, the spirit of the in-
habitants of the ccast towns, the number of ships engaged in navigation, and
the number of their sailors, carpenters, pilots, and captains. Finally, they
gave an exact analysis of t e different claims of the dukedoms, syndicates,
and corporations in France, and recom: ended as a result, that his majesty
provide war vessels to protect the commercial ships as well as the ports.
^
As a result of these reports, Hichelieu became aware of the fact
^Richelieu reestablished the old anchorage charge of "3 sous cer tonneau,"
on foreign vessels -unloading their freight in France. See Corresp. de France,
III, 173-175.
SCorresu. de Sourdis, III, 173-225, etc.
sIbid.. I. Introduction, XXXI-XXXII.
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that trade was at its lowest ebb; that other nations because of the weak marine
of France could do what they wanted so far as concerned their relations with
France; and that the position of France both in the East and the Vest was be-
coming worse. He cair.e to the conclusion that something must be done to build
up her weak and almost rotten fortifications, and her small and almost useless
navy, if France was to command the respect of foreign nations and even of the
pirates
.
One cannot help but admire the immense activity of the great man,
who, in the midst of many physical ills and petty troubles, together with
important foreign wars, was able to suppress numerous abuses, to overcome count
less differences of opinion, and to rebuili the fighting and merchant marine
of his country.* How he went about the task can best be explained at this
point
.
The work of Richelieu in regard to a war marine might be broadly
classified in the following manner: (l) laws relating to maritime authority
and accountability (the bureau of accounts); (2) the formation of a "personal
rarine"; (3) the restoration of dilapidated coast fortifications and the crea-
tion of new ones; (4) the creation of a war marine and of naval equipment.
A brief consideration of the above seems justifiable.
Richelieu in taking up that part of his work which was concerned
Richelieu was hindered in his worl< by many opponents, even with regard
to the marine, which had more national support perhaps than any other measure.
Some even said that he hid behind the claims of benefit ir? commerce, to obtain
control of the sea and thus to uake hiaself supreme. This hel^s to indicate
the problems before him. S29 Memoirs, XXIII, 324-225.
2Caillet, 3C1-302.
OS *
14S
with the passing of laws governing affairs on the sea, displayed not only
his fairness to all other sea powers, but his knowledge of matters pertaining
to the rrarine. He soon placed the control and conduct of all acts relating
to it in the hands of definitely assigned officials. The latter formed
what is called his "personal rrarine", and they conducted and managed affairs
relating to the sea according to fixed rules and regulations imposed by him,
In other words, he tried to put an end to the conflict of authority existing
in France, in respect to the control of military affairs. Seven Bureaus of
Admiralty were established, to be composed of officials already appointed
by certain individuals, and in the future to be nominated by the Cardinal him-
self and his successors, who were "grand masters of France". They were to
have under their control all criminal and civil affairs, and all acts connected
with the state government and navigation on the high seas. Also, they were
to have charge of the proper disposal of wreckage. 1
In carrying out his scheme relating to the formation of a marine,
Richelieu even went so far into details, as to change the method of getting
sailors, which had hitherto been one of the great causes of the weakness
of the French on the sea. He had a census taken of the number and addresses
of sailors and carpenters in every harbor in France. He ascertained the num-
ber of vessels and their eq.uipn.ent, and the number and size of the harbors,
and from that info nation as a basis, he determined the number of sailors
to be furnished by each province, and the amount of money that might be levied
for ships and their equipment. 2 In addition to all this, he established
Perjure Francois , XVIII, 847-866.
2Richelieu al'so issue i orders in 1635, that all vagabonds, beggars, etc.,
should De inducted into narine service to fill up the huge gap in the number
of men available for service. See Mercure Francois, XX, 923.
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schools for pilots, put the coast in a state of defense, created new ports,
enlarged others, and finally established three arsenals. "He spent over
359,000 livres in 1635 for the fortifications of Brocage d' Orleans and the
island of Re. He wanted to make the former the center of maritime power upon
the ocean. He strengthened the ports on the Mediterranean in a similar
fashion, especially Toulor, which he desired tc make the war center of the
nation of the coast. 1 However, the crux of his efforts in building up the
power of France lay in the increase of the number of war vessels and the
enlarged equipment.
Henry IV had realized the necessity of a fleet, but it was left to
Pdchelieu tc carry this idea into execution. "He resolved," says Caillet,
"to endow France with a military marine, that is to say a military force
truly belonging to the state, and not furnished by cities, as had previously
been the case." 2 TJp to this time, there had existed the custom of allowing
particular individuals and certain interests to build vessels and rent
them tc merchants for their protection. But Richelieu saw that this was not
a good thing, so that after he had triumphed over the Huguenots, he took
great care to hold all ports accountable tc himself, to make himself master
of all the magazines, all the cannons, and other war materials. Lastly, he
foroade all vessels tc bear arms, unless tbey had royal permission.
Under the orders of the council of notables in 1626, which had
really been called and conducted under the direction of Richelieu, the fleets
Corresu. de .^ourdis, III, 359, etc
2Caillet, 310.
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of war vessel 8 were greatly increased. But it took time before the maritime
service was really wei: organized. 1 /s late as 1625, when France wished tc put
an end tc the ravages which were being made by the Barbary pirates on the ocean,
they could not find enough vessels to carry out the task and had to get twenty
froir. Holland. It was particularly during the siege of La Rochelle, as has
been said before, that Eishelieu felt the inferiority of the French war marine.
After that he set aside a certain sued each year for the creation of a navy.
From 1630 to 1634, the naval power of France gradually increased,
and finally consisted of three large squadrons. As a result, the pirates
were suppressed for the time being, and Spain was thrust aside, so far as her
claims on the sea were concerned. "It was to be for France and for the
great minister, who had increased hi3 country's reputation so much, a just
subject of pride when their fleet of eighty-five V3=}33l3 passed triumphantly
had
across the sea, where some ye^rs before .ih^ possessed a fleet less powerful
than that of the smallest city of Italy. He must have realized that he had
now in his possession the implement by which he could carry out many of his
political and economic plans tc the glorious ends which his fertile brain
had assigned to them. Up to the very last, he was occupied with this prob-
lem, although hindered by financial difficulties. 3
Thus the Cardinal saw his plans reach what seemed to be a successful
conclusion. But death took him away just at the time when he was most needed.
The splsniid fleet, like a flower nipped by an unexpected frost, dwindled
away almost tc nothing after his departure. The good fruits of his work along
this line were mostly temporary. No one took up this task, which he had
so well begun, until the age of Colbert, and then it was too late.
1Caillet, 314.
Sfettere^Hll, 292, 3C3.
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But before reaching a conclusion, it seems best to consider briefly
the importance of his work 90 far as it concerns the navy of France. L. P.
Forinier in the preface of his great work entitled "Richelieu" , writes with
much enthusiasm concerning the progress of sea power under Louis XIII. "Fa-
vored with the admiration of the world," he says to Louis XIII, to whom he ded-
icated the book, "France now finds herself famous through your victories.
She now sees the great navy and the harbors open to; receive and fortified to
protect them, "'ell supplied magazines are established on both coasts. All of
which is equally useful in the promotion of commerce, as well as warfare
Your majesty's fleets have controlled tilings on the Mediterranean. Indeed,
Spain has been forced to asknowledge the power of the French fleet, a.ni thus
future glory must be approaching." 1
M. "./lasson in his Hlatoire du Commerce Fraacaia eh X7IIe Steele dans
le Levant
,
continually emphasizes the point that it was the development
of a navy under the Cardinal that kept up the Eastern trade of France with
the Levant, which was on the decrease at that time, because of the lack of
protection. ^ M. Sue also suns up the work of Richelieu very appropriately
when he points out. the fact, that when the Cardinal built up the navy, he laid
the foundations of a great and splendid system of military marine, which would
serve as an offensive arm to combat the enemies of France, and as a shield
or protection to aid her commerce, and thus by making transportation of goods
safer he made them cheaper, which in turn aided in keeping up the cost of
the war marine. 3 The Cardinal's economic turn of mind is very well illustrated
1Caillet, 315.
%lasson, Eistoire du Commerce Francais.. dans le Levant, 117.
3Corresp. de Sourdis, I, Introduction, 7II-VIII.
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by the above passage. He evidently intended to pay for the marine by an
increase of taxes on the objects whose prices were lowered "because of cheaper
transportation. These taxes were, as a rule, borne by the merchants them-
selves. "His system," says Sue, "was a marvelous exposition of thought, force,
and solidarity J' 1 It was carried to extremes by those who came after him,
so that, not being sufficiently supported by maritime commerce, the sea power
of France died from lack of sailors, finances, defenses, and good harbors.
Indeed, France just before the present war adopted an active policy of building
up her war marine, and in dbing so has been influenced by the same motive
which compelled Richelieu centuries ago to do likewise. 2
After all, this phase of his administration is fundamentally econ-
omic. "He," as Sue says, "wished, to give also a large development to com-
merce, merchant navigation, and colonial enterprises. Interests upon which he
intended to base the development of a military marine, preparing himself
thus for the eventualities of a war during the intervals of peace. 3 The
Cardinal knew that if be was to obtain the great state he desired, that France
must be strong in trade, colonies, and in political influence. A war and mer-
chant marine was the means by which thi3 was to be attained. It is certainly
a pity that Colbert was not able to carry to a successful completion the
^"Richelieu's ability with regard to the marine is nowhere better illus-
trated than in the complete statement which he has left of all receipts and
expenses connected with that phase of his administration, during the years
1631 to 1639. It is a striking commentary upon the efficient financial ad-
ministrative abilities of the man. See Corresp. de Sourdis, III, 359, etc.
2See Bracq, L.C., Franc e _unde r the Republic, N.Y., 1910, 34. M. Sracq
points out the efforts of France to strengthen her fleet before the war, so as
to be able to meet her rivals on equal terms, and also to be strong economi-
cally, and thus protect her commerce and colonies from the possible insults
of rival powers.
3Corresp. de Sourdis, I, Introduction, aXIX.
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future plans of the marine as set down in Richelieu's marina code. 1 If the
Cardinal's ideas in regard to this phase of his administration had been
carried out, the chances are that the subsequent colonial and commercial
history of France would have beer, entirely different. Richelieu was constantly
favoring those engaged in commerce. 2 Ee realized that it would benefit
every individual in France. "France," he says, "will add in a short time
to her natural aoundance what coar;.erce brings to the most sterile nation."
He even went so far as to point out the fact that cheapness of food for work-
men would be brought about through increased transportation facilities on
rivers, etc. 4 There can be no doubt that he was preparing the marine, not
only to oppose his great political rivals on the sea and protedt for the time
being French traffic on the water, but also that he was looking fonvard to
the time of peace, when he would be able tc found the great mercantile nation
of which the marine would be the strong arm for defense, and possibly, for
economic if not political aggression.
^Pigeonneau, II, -rll-412 . In 1642, de la Porte, Intendant of commerce
and navigation, was ordered to wfrite a general statistical account of the
marine. (Richelieu was fond of statesmen.) Ke gave therein the laws and
ordinances concerning the marine. It was really the sketch of a maritime
code of which Richelieu's death prevented the achievement. See Corresp. de
Sourdis, III, 321, etc.
23ouraud, II, 195.
^Tes tament Politique , II, 78-79.
4
Ibii., II, 78.
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Chapter XI
THE IDEAS AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF RICHELIEU IN REGARD TO
COLONIZATION
Before the age of Richelieu, France had accomplished very little
along the lines of colonial development. Indeed the period in which he came
into power was really the time when the settlement of North America, for
example, was in its infancy, so that France had really not considered very
seriously, -up to that time, the opportunity of carrying on colonial projects
in the new continents. Outside of the beginning made by Champlain in 1608,
very little had been accomplished. Furthermore, internal troubles, reli-
gious wars, and unfriendly foreign relations all tended to prevent the pre-
decessors of Henry IV from sending any expeditions of importance outside of
the vicinity of France and Italy. On the other hand, other nations grew
stronger on the seas and in colonial enterprises. Spain and Portugal rose
for nearly a century, but fell about the time of the Armada in 1568. And then
came the age when England and Holland gained rapidly on the sea. England
took from France the cloth industry in the Hundred Years' Tar, and built
up her state on a strong protective basis. The Banseatic league decayed and
in its --dace rose Holland. Colonies in America, Africa, and Asia resulted
from the growth in sea power of these nations, and they acquired wealth in
consequence
.
In the Seventeenth Century came for France, the age of Henry IV,
Levasseur, I, 275-277.
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Richelieu, and Colbert, and as a result colonial commerce underwent unprecedent-
ed growth. What little colonial activity had occurred before the age of
Henry IV was based on the motive of discovery and exploration, rather than
of industry and settlement. But when Henry IV came to power, ir.ercantilistic
ideas were just beginning to take a definite form, and the value of Colonies
on
based
A
econo.i;ic motives entirely, began to be recognized by French statesmen.
In other words, Henry IV and Richelieu simply applied in France the system
inaugurated by England and Holland, namely, a plan of colonization founded
upon the general interests and permanent needs of the country, and not upon such
dreams as a search for the north-west passage, or some other particular
interest, such as the religious basis of the colonization of Coligny.^
Inspired by the Colonial activities of England and Holland, both
Henry IV and Richelieu tried to instil ideas in regard to the foundation of
great colonization companies, which were more or less new to the French people.
This was done "in order to make ourselves masters of the sea, and to form
great companies, to encourage merchants to enter, and give great privileges
to these companies as tfr37 ca^e into existence, just as foreigners have done."^
However, lacking money as was the case with England and Holland, the French
government could not back the companies, but simply encouraged, guided and
protected them, leaving in the hands of individuals the financial risks and
the details of administration.
Not much in a colonial way was accomplished by Henry IV. "Colonial
enterprises lacked experience and national character," says one writer, "they
were too local, weak in capital, and narrow in viewpoint to use tbeir privileg-
es to the utmost. 3 As a matter of fact Henry IV did not live long enough to
J-Pigeonneau, II, 322- ttt _
2D'Avenel, ^.onarohie Absolue , III, 20°-210.
3? igeo nneau7~ll, ^45. ~
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form any definite colonial policy, so that it fell to Richelieu rather than
to Henry IV to initiate definitely the true colonial expeditions of France.
When the Cardinal came into power, he started immediately to build
up the French nation into a strong political and economic state. Aided by the.
accomplishments of Henry IV, and such ideas as are found in the work of
Mont Chretien, 1 he made colonization apolitical and economic question, involv-
ing the growth of France. 2 Thus this problem was treated with diplomatic
reserve, ana as a consequence little was written concerning it by contemporary
writers. However, it is known that Champlain and other well known advocates
of colonization projects recognized in the Cardinal the true leader of this
and
movement, and many memoirs, pro jects,
A
plans addressed to him concerning the
marine indicate the interest shown by the people in this phase of his adminis-
tration, and the recognition of his leadership in the undertakings to be
carried out. Richelieu saw the advantages and difficulties in the way of
colonial expansion on the part of France. He knew that he would have to face
the opposition of England, Spain, and Holland on the sea. But that did not
stop him, for as soon as he assumed the office cf the head of navigation and
commerce, he began to plan a war and merchant marine and commie rcial companies,
which were to settle and build up economically and politically new territorial
possessions for France in America, Africa, and Asia.
French works of jurisprudence distinguished in the 16th and 17th
century, two kinds of companies of commerce. One kind formed by the associa-
tion of many persons who unite in order to undertake a sort of commerce, in-
cludes the association established by "lettres patente", or other public acts,
i?igeonneau, II, 360-363.
fjDes champs, 82-83.
°E escharps, 87.

158
with exclusive privileges to undertake cor.ir.erce in distant colonies. These
are "les grandee compagnies de conferee", the companies whose form Richelieu
followed during his administ ration. This was the plan in vogue at that time,
the same that was carried out by England and Holland. "In order to become
masters of the seas," Richelieu said, "it is necessary to see how our neigh-
bors govern themselves, make great companies, and. oblige the merchants to enter
them. Indeed the past failure of our companies is lack of great companies,
and too many individual concerns with snail vessels, badly equipped, which
are the prey of our allies etc." 1 It must be admitted that the Cardinal
merely imitated the colonial policy of his opponents, in his efforts to build
up France along that line.
His principal aims in forming colonies were: (l) to establish and
multiply colonies, to people them with French colonists, and maintain there
the catholic religion to the exclusion of all others; (2) to enliven commerce
and promote a war marine for protection, etc. It is interesting to note that
Colbert borrowed this policy from him and completed it. "Indeed," says one
writer, "people have not realized the important part played by Richelieu in
colonial development, or have mixed his achievements and initative with that
of Colbert. In the thoughts of Richelieu, the maritime and colonial supremacy
of France holds a place eqval zo the idea that the Hapsbur^s must be ruined.
These were the two threads, which were really connected and were to unite
tc form the grandeur of France.
""hen Richelieu came into power, he first turned his attention toward
^Memoirs, XXIII, 258.
^Eonassieux, 5.
•^Des champs, 74-76.
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the problems of the sea and colonization. For example, in 1625 he addressed
to Louis XIII a law for the sea, and a mamoir, which contained his new ideas,
namely, to build up the marine as a preparatory measure of which colonization
was to be the end. 1 "In 1626," says Deschamps, "Richelieu received five
memoirs or letters on the state of comiiierce and the marine . He was himself
the author or the source of inspiration of a great number of contracts, letter
reports, and statistics having the same object. * Among the memoirs, two are
of special interest, one by a Chevalier Isaac de Eazilly, and an anonymous
memoir of November 26, 1626. De Eazilly pointed out the need of navigation
in spite of opinions to the contrary. He advocated clearly the advantages
of the exchange of goods, and the adaptability of the French for carrying
on long voyages. (Evidently there was opposition to any commercial policy
France might engage in at this time.) Then he outlined a plan of reform con-
cerning navigation and colonies, exactly similar to that which Richelieu and
Colbert followed.
In the first place, France was to regain her sea power and make
conquests ani establish trade all over the world. Also, men were to be en-
couraged to undertake navigation, nobles who participatedwe re to retain their
rank, and merchants were to be ennobled because of their accomplishments in
this particular field. Companies were to be founded in which the King, the
ministers, the princes of the blood, and great seigneurs should be interested,
as well as individual cities and the clergy as a class. With an enlarged
betters, II, 16:3-167.
^Deschamps, 88.
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fleet, France was to establish friendly relations with Morocco, and commerce
should be fostered with Africa, in the Levant, and on the Baltic Sea, as well
as with England, Asia, and the East Indies, by means of a powerful company.
Colonies were to be established in the Americas, and according to the anonymous
memoir, in the Fast Indies as well. 1 These two memoirs, which were in har-
mony with the policy of Richelieu and Colbert, looked forward to the fall
of Spain and Portugal, and the rise of France in commerce and navigation in
the Orient, the Mediterranean, and Asia. In other words, the downfall of the
Fapsburgs was to be a necessary prelude to the rise of France as a comnercial
power. This likely wa3 one of the guiding forces behind the rivalry of the
Bourbon and Hapsburg houses at this tine. Colonization was an important phase
of governmental administration, and the fact that the King in 1626 gave a
great masquerade ball tc which the fur-trading companies sent representatives
dressed in the native costumes of the people of the various colonies and
trading stations of France
. indicates, in a way, the intense interest dis-
played by French society in the economic affairs of their country.* There was
a little opposition tc Richelieu's comnercial policy, but it was spoken,
not written.
^
The Cardinal outlined his program from the very start. "Indeed,"
says Mathieu Mole', a contemporary in one of his memoirs, "the Cardinal Wished
to present to the assembly of notables in 1627 some new edicts concerning the
state of the marine, trade, and navigation, in order to justify his position
as head of the Kingdom. He established by means of an edict, a perpetual
^Deschamps, 90-93.
3Mercure Francais , XII, 187-190.
^De3champs, 131.
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navy of forty-five vessels, which he said would return the French wer marine
to its former state of splendor. He al90 wished tc create some important
companies tc which he would grant privileges. He then appointed me tc examine
the first proposition which was made by Nicholas "'itte, Jean du Meurier,
esquire, and other French and Flemish merchants, who have formed a company
called, 'La Nacelle de Saint Pierre Fleurdelisse
'
, with the purpose of estab-
lishing in France an immense trade in all merchandise which enters into com-
merce, of introducing fisheries, of building vessels, and other uncommon duties,
and finally of increasing in value many lands and colonies which have not
returned much profit hitherto." 1 This company was to build up not only French
colonies, but France itself.
The text of the agreement adopted by the Cardinal with respect to
this company is found in the notes or memoirs of Mathiew Mole. Since it gives
a correct idea of all that relates to the external or internal commerce and of
the great industries, it 3eems best tc give the principal articles of the
contract, especially since all the companies formed by Richelieu conforrr.ed
more or less rigidly to this type.
I. The heads of the company were to take over 40G families within
a month of the day of negotiating the agreement. These families were tc be
composed of persons suitable fcr commerce, fishing, manufacturing, and agricul-
ture. Besides this, there were to be sent no less than twelve vessels com-
pletely equipped for the expedition. By so doing, the aforesaid conpany would
XMole' Mathiew, Memo ires, 4 vols., Paris, 1855, I, 422-448.
Mole', I, 422-448.
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be allowed tc trade both by seas, rivers, and the land, to establish
fisheries upon the sea, and manufacturing concerns of all sorts, to plant
sugar cane and refine sugar, to work mines, tc make porcelain vessels and
crockery by the methodsof the Indies and of Italy, and finally, to use all
other resources and manufactures which they recognize.
II. All Flemings, Hollanders, and others who went over to the
colonies were to be regarded as Frenchmen and enjoy all their rights.
III. Rewards were offered to those who invested money in the company
or worked on behalf of it. The crown intended to honor those who took up the
work, more than ever before, in order to attract persons who were capable of
ailing the proposition in any way. People of every condition, clergy, nobles,
and officials, could enter and put their money into the company without injur-
ing their position or endangering their privileges. Indeed, in order to aid
industry and colonization, His Majesty was to ennoble thirty-two persons,
whether they were Frenchmen or foreigners, who would enter the company during
the first year of its establishment, and iout at least 5000 pounds into its
funds without having the power to withdraw the money for six years, and also
those who did not put any capital into the enterprise, but who ievoted all
their ability and energy to the advancement of the aforesaid company.
IV. His Majesty wa3 to give the company two sites not occupied as
yet, one on the ocean, the other on the I'/Iediterraman. They were to have the
power to build houses of business in those places. In each of these a market
place wa3 to be established with fairs (two yearly fairs of eight days each)
,
etc. All inhabitants should be exempt from the payment of the aides, tailles,
etc., which fell upon other ports.
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Articles V and VI provided for the government and the working of
the mines in those territories, in which the colonies were to have supreme
rights, subject only to the final decision of the "grand master of conmercew
,
who was Richelieu.
VII. All vagabonds, beggars, petty criminals, etc., were to be taken
by His Majesty's orders into the employ of the company.
VIII. Hi3 Majesty was to allow the company to undertake voyages
abroad, to establish colonies at advisable places, even in Canada and New France
to conquer lands beyond those which were under the control of His Majesty,
to use them for the profits of the aforesaid company, to which full and entire
possession was given, on condition that they should be faithful and swear
homage to His Majesty. The latter permitted there to trade with all companies
which were not declared enemies of the Kingdom, and even countries like Eussia,
Norway, Sweden, and Hamburg The articles of agreement which were made
with the latter nations, were to be communicated to Richelieu as superintendent
of commerce and navigation. Finally, "if the directors of the company should
discover new lands, they could enjoy the fruits of then: separate from the
other colonies .
"
The principal articles of this agreement have been given, because
they indicate the main ideas of the Cardinal's policy toward colonization.
It shows first that he desired to develop the colonies. It illustrates the
fact that he desired to found possessions, which were to be almost self-govern-
ing, with this one exception,- they were to be responsible to the chief of
commerce and navigation in France. In fact, Richelieu put himself at the head
of almost all commercial companies founded at that time. Masson criticizes
Mchelieu because he made the colonial companies too centralized, and forced
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them all to depend on the government of France as a final authority. Yet the
agr.eeir.ent cited above seems to give the colonies plenty of leeway in which to
develop without the interference of the home power.
But, before generalizing concerning Richelieu's colonial policies, it
is well to look into the actual accomplishments of the Cardinal in that
particular field of his administrative duties.
The company whose charter has just been quoted failed simply because
of the lack of credit and funis to maintain it. Furthermore, the directors
did not carry out their promises and sought only to profit by the monopoly whi^l
they poseessed and from which the?/ derived temporary gains. They kept up the
project with one purpose in view, namely, to sell to the colonists who had been
sent over, goods at a high price, and to buy furs from them as cheaply as pos-
sible. Champlain never ceased to protest against the attitude of the directors
toward the 2olonist3.2 He himself desired to found a colony which would take
up the thrsefold. purpose of colonization, namely, agriculture, conversion
of the natives, and commerce. The only result of his plans was the establish-
ment of new fur-trading stations in North America. But there is another
explanation for the failure of the company. It was too extreme in its scope
and plans . It proposed a thousand things to do and a thousand ends to achieve.
It wished to establish fisheries, exploit nines, drain marshes, develop both
foreign and domestic commerce, colonize the v'e3t Indies, etc. It was a uni-
versal company, but fell before it got really started. It was a society which
wished to embrace all, but it could not organize itself. It was perhaps too
^-Masson, Histoire du comaierce Francais dans le Levant , 174.
2Caillet, 337; Zeller, Eishelieu, 184.
Bonassieux, 363.
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u.od9rn in its purpose.
The company of Morbihan was the next to be formed in 1626. It got
its name from a port in Brittany, in which its counting offices were estab-
lished. A group of men called "the Hundred Associates" signed the agreement,
so that it was often called "The Hundred Associates" company. Its articles
provided for a fort at Morbihan, 100 vessels, a capital of 1,600,000 livres and
the monopoly of the commerce of the East and the .Levant by land and by sea.
Indeed, such was the magnitude of its designs that Kichelieu says that the
English and Dv.tch were alarmed, fearing that the King by that means would soon
make himself master of the sea. 2 Spain had no less fear for her Inlies and
well might have, when one reads in Pdchelieu's Testament Politique the state-
ment, that the only way to obtain a footing in the "'est Indies, is by driving
the Spanish out by means of a war. 3 However, this company came to naught,
because of the failure of the local Parlement to register the edict creating
it, arising fraii a conflict between it and the local estates general of the
orovince in which Morbihan was located.^ Yet the formation of this company
hai important results in that herein one finds de Razilly's idea realized;
namely, that colonial enterprises should be participated in by all. Herein
is apparent the disinterested stand taken by the Cardinal with respect to
colonization. In return for all the advantages given the company, Eichelieu
demanded only one thing, namely, that it would make the greatest and most rapid
Levasseur, 261-282.
Memoirs, XXIII, 127.
^Testament Politique , II, Chapter I, sec. VI, 71.
Memoirs, XXIII, 128.
5Deschamps, 88-91.
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fort-one that was possible, and in whatever manner it wished, either by fish-
eries, by boat building, or by cultivating the soil of the colonies or by
establishing some manufactures, etc. "It was an admirable example of broad
and decisive views which indicate the correct judgment of the great man in
all affairs of state," says one writer. 1 This company likewise did not suc-
ceed, apparently because of the fact that the people of France were not capa-
ble of commercial enterprises at that time. However, Eichelieu went on and
formed other colonies, not a bit discouraged by past failures. One might say,
that it is important to remember that this company was the prototype of the
Fast India company of a later date.
Richelieu now turned his attention to America. Various attempts
had been made to settle that country before his time, and there was no little
interest to -:e found in France concerning this far-away land of promise. The
first trips by Frenchmen were those of James Cartier, Robeval
,
etc, from
1524 to 1599. In 1541 the first attempt at a permanent establ ishment was
made by Robeval . It was abandoned the next year. Various companies began
to be formed to settle in Canada. As a result a company was formed in 1602
of the leading traders of Dieppe, Rouen, and La Rochelle, with fur trade privi
leges, etc. Explorations were made under the leadership of one especially
notable man, Chamolain. In 1603 Sieur De Monts became chief of the colony
of Canada, and was to give the King one sixteenth of the product of the mines.
In 1606, in addition to the fur trade, the farming and exploration of the
new territory began to be considered seriously. Some new explorations had
made hnown the fertility of the soil. In 1508, Champlain //as sent out by a
company with three vessels, who repeopled Port Royal and folded Quebec.
^Goaraud, I, 197. Concerning this Company see Letters, II, 346-349;
Mercure Francois , XII, 44, etc.; Memoirs, XXIII, 127.
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But failure to take \:p the agricultural side in the colonies and constant
opposition on the part of Holland prevented any of the French colonial plans
from achieving a substantial measure of success before 1527.
At this time a new company was formed callei the company of the
Hundred Associates of New France or Canada. This company, which lasted longer
than any other of Richelieu's crsation, was granted its charter in an edict
issued by Hichelieu when he was before La Rochelle.^ Many merchant traders and
other rich persons had proposed to form companies to sttpport the colonies
already there, ani to establish new ones in the vast and little known country.
It was to these first associates that the King by his edict, conceded the
following privileges and conditions: the company must send two or three hun-
dred men of all trades, and duiring the following fifteen years, four thousand
persons of both sexes. The company should support the inhabitants for three
years. No foreigners or Protestants should be among them. Furthermore, three
churchmen should be in each habitation, etc. Homage was to be raid to the
King, and a crown of gold to the weight of eight marks, should be given him. *
In return for these requirements, the company was to have the follow-
ing privileges: full proprietorship of Quebec with all the land reaching from
Florida to the Arctic region, including the land of the Paint Lawrence river.
It received the cession of all mines and minerals discovered, the right
to build fortresses, monopoly of the fur trade and other commerce, etc Fishing
we re
rights to be open to all the King's subjects. The King was to give two war
Eonas s i eux , 35C-351
.
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vessels, exemption from euttome, ani finally the principal personages were
to receive letters of nobility.
*
However, in scite of the encouragement given the colonies by the
government, they failed in the end because of the fact that they tried to
to
buy from their colonists r^oods at a cheap price, and sell
A
thein at a dear price.
This was also the case with the natives, who preferred to trade with the
English and Dutch which gave them better prices. Then there was a lack of sup-
port in the mother country easily to be explained by the difficulties con-
fronting France during this period. As a result, the Dutch soon obtained most
of the commerce with the natives, ani in 1629, the English captured Quebec
and the surrounding territory.
In 1632, Champlain pointed out to Richelieu the necessity for the
!
restitution of New France to the mother country. 1^ As a result, the Cardinal
sent six armed vessels across the .Atlantic and compelled the English to cede
it back. Thus in 1^33, the company of New France reentered upon all its
former rights. Champlain as head of the French colony built up the settlement
and companies to a degree never before attained. In 1640, "Montreal was
founded and a fort called Fort Richelieu was established just above where
Quebec is at present, so that by the time of Richelieu' s death, the French
possessions in North America had a good start, and :'.t was not due to any direct
fault of his that they failed in the end.
M. Caillet, in accounting for the decline of the colonies places
the blame on the cupidity of the merchants, who neglecti-d agriculture for a
1 Isambert, XVI, 221-222.
%lercure Francois, XIV, 61, 232-240. Gives a complete account of the
colony including a discussion of its control by means of a board of directors,
etc
.
3Caill^t 342-345, Dumont.J. Corps Universal. Diplomatique du Droit des
Gens. 8 vols.| Supplement, 5 vols. /met. et La Haye, (1726-1739), vi.pt. l ,41-32.
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selfishly conducted fur trade. Furthermore
,
religious influences had a
tendency to injure the economic development of the colonies. Too much empha-
sis was placed on religion tc the neglect of agriculture. 1 The competition of
and of
the English and Dutch for the Indian trade, the governors and the colonists,
coupled with increasing neglect of the colonies by the home government, after
Richelieu 1 s time, all tended tc ruin the bright future of the French possession
in America. Indeed, one can not explain the failure of French colonial policy
at this tlae as being due to Richelieu's centralized system of settlements.
There are too many other incidents which go to make up a logical account <f
its failure
.
No better example of the difficulties confronting the Cardinal with
relation to foreign opposition is to be found than in his efforts to secure
a foothold in the "'est Indies and South America. 4 company of the Antilles
was formed in spite of the opposition of Spain and Portugal, who claimed sole
command of the seas surrounding that particular part of the world. Then one
finds the question of the sea coming up for the first time in French history.
The latter country in alliance with Holland (the famous work of G-rotius, 'are
Liberum, ax^reared in 1608) affirmed with energy the freedom of the seas.
Thus began the conflict between interests and doctrines which continues up to
the present time. In this particular case, it prevented France from doing
anything in a colonial way, either in South America or the "est Indies.
However, in 1625, the French and English established a colony on the island
Pigeonneau, II, 430-431. He defends Richelieu's policy in excluding
the Protestants from Colonies because of their constant efforts to form
alliances with the enemies of France.
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of "Saint-Christophe"
, which was destroyed by the Spanish, and revived by the
French later on. 1 Other islands as Guadeloupe
,
Martinique, Dominique, etc.,
were occupied by the French. A settlement was made even in Guiana. "Indeed,"
says one writer, "the French in their settlements in the ,,7est Indies, gave
proof of the brilliant qualities, perseverence , and initiative never exhibited
before."*1 But the important thing to notice is the fact, that French and
Bpanish Colonial interests were conflicting very sharply during the Thirty
Years rar, and this mu3t have certainly had more or less influence on the di-
plomatic relations betwsen the two countries. France was out for a world
colonial empire during Richelieu' s administration.
About the time the French were colonizing America, they were also
undertaking the task of assuming close relations with the Orient. Missionaries
were the means by which their efforts were to be made successful. The famous
Father Joseph was named by the ^ope in 1525, director of missions in the
Levant; and that nomination, together with the office of "grand master of
navigation, etc.," acquired by Bichelieu about the same time, is direct evi-
dence as to their aims in regard tc colonial and commercial expansion. Of
course religion was the prime motive of this movement in Asia, but it is in-
teresting to note that the French Jesuits sent into China, Japan, Persia, etc.,
were also diplomatic agents of the government.
The first society formed to trade in the East Indies was formed by
Henry IV in 1504, with exclusive rights for fifteen years. It had the port
of Brest and was otherwise favored bj the government. The jealousy of other
^igeonneau, II, 434-435; Isambert, X
,r
l, 421, 540-551.
2 Ibii., II, 439.
3Deschamps, 102-105.
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nations prevented this company from buying the necessary equipment from them.
Thus it did not really start at all. Letters patent, however, in 1615, gave
the company a new lease of life, and brave adventurers from Dieppe visited
the Indies and * aiagascar. 1 Finally in 1642, Eichelieu granted several indi-
viduals exclusive privileges in the East Indies fcr ten years. So it is quite
evident that France definitely began her East India policy at this time.
Settlements were established even in .Africa. Senegal especially
attracted the attention of the French. In 1521-1626 a colony was formed, which
was under the protection of the Cardinal, and which had as its purpose the
colonization of the land, in that territory. 2 To carry this out, Richelieu
even sent Admiral de Razilly with a squadron to aid in the work, but it was
of no avail, fcr the company had to be replaced in 1633 by a new one composed
of the merchants of Rouen and Dieppe, who obtained permission to trade for ten
years at Cape Verde and upon the rivers in Senegal. Various other similar
organizations were formed, but nothing of especial importance can be obtained
from a study of French colonization in Africa at this time, except that a
foundation for French influence in that continent was laid, which might have
amounted to more than it did, and only recently has been built upon.
However, one colony settled at this time seems to have been more
or less permanent, and that was the one established on the island of Madagascar.
Many attempts had been made during the reign of Henry IV and during the first
year of the rule of Louis XIII, to found settlements on this and neighboring
islands. Indeed, there was another purpose involved in the establishment
Isambert, XVI, 78-83.
2Caillet, 352-358.
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of a colons'- here besides mere colonization. The French intended to establish
trade With the East Indies, using this possession as a base or half way house,
and this made them all the mere persistent in their attempts to possess the
island. On March 2, 1611, Louis XIII granted permits to several men which
gave to them the exclusive right to settle these lands and begin trade. They
bad besides a monopoly in all commerce carried on with the East Indies for the
next twelve years. But as they made no use of that privilege, the merchants
of F.ouen resolved to take it away from them. They offered to carry on that
trade and develop it to the fullest extent, as they had the facilities to do
so if they had the chance. ^ However, the first company opposed any inter-
ference with their rights, and claimed that they were doing the best they
could, considering the obstacles which were erected by the foreign neighbors
of France. As a result of all this, the various companies and claimants to
their rights were united by the government into one concern.
This affair illustrates the direct control of the government over th
various companies. Whether it was for the best is a matter about which all
are not agreed. The chief argument against the centralized form of colonial
government is the assertion that this system curbs individual initiative among
the settlers, an I among the various communities. They leave everything for th
government to carry out, and indeed they must do so, for they are given no
chance to exercise many important duties, nn the other hand, others maintain
that lack of capital, imposition of the catholic religion on every company,
and the foreign political difficulties of France all explain her failure
Bailie t, 553-355.
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to make full use of her opportunities with regard to fostering colonial
development
.
The grant establishing this united organization stated that its
members should undertake the navigation of the East Indies, maintain its pro-
tection and enjoy its privileges. The fleet of Montmorency was to .defend
all the subjects of the King, as well as the interests of the company, and to
undertake any necessary trips from the coast to the Cape of Good Hope during
this space of twelve years, in order to aid commerce. However, in spite
of this liberal charter and t e various attempts made to settle the East
Indies, the plan failed in 1620, because of the pressure of the Dutch in that
part of the worla.
Finally, the company decided to place a colony on the island of
Madagascar, in the hope that if they could found a powerful settlement there,
it would serve to aid them in further expeditions to the Indies. So they went
back to the original plan which had been changed when the different coloniz-
ing organizations had been united. However, internal disturbances in France,
which took place in 1631, prevented them from carrying out this plan.
In 163S, another attempt was made by a man from Eouen to found a
colony in Madagascar, and he left a very interesting account of a voyage to
that island. 1 Finally, a new company was formed January 24, 1642, which
obtained from the Cardinal the exclusive privilege of sending into the island
of Madagascar and other adjacent islands the members of the organization, to
establish colonies and take possession in the name of the King.* As a result,
in the month of May a ship was sent to the islands, and they took formal
1Caillet, 355-357.
2
Ibid., 357-358.
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possession. Thus Madagascar was at last a real possession of France and a
way was prepared for further settlement. This was ths last colonizing
project started by Richelieu and it is certainly interesting to note that
this phase of his administration interested him up to the very end. He
acknowledged its importance, '''hat were the general results of all the effort
of Richelieu and his co-workers along this line?
"Geographical knowledge was extended if nothing else," says one
writer in relating the results of the colonial efforts of France during this
period. "Eichelieu himself," he says, "aided a man named Samson to found
a geographical school at that time* But there were other gains more impor-
tant than thsse, especially on the economic side.
r
'hen one looks over the field of the colonial activities unierta.ven
during Eichelieu 1 s time, he must conclude that very little had been accom-
plished on the material side. It seems that all the efforts of the Cardinal
were in vain, and while Holland, England, and Spain were forging ahead in
their colonial development and commercial activities, France was doing
scarcely anything along these lines- Yet on the other hand she had really
done something worth while, for she had at least made a start, which was not
too late and would have amounted to much more than it did, if the Cardinal
had lived to carry out his plans to their final conclusion. He deserves
great credit for the part he played in the colonial development of France.
In spite of many internal troubles, such as the relations of the government
and nobles, and his complicated foreign policies, he was always interested
in planting new French settlements on great unoccupied continents, and he
Caillet, 358.
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not only aided in the different colonization enterprises during the first part
of his rule, but also up to the very last.
Finally, one must not forget that this .reat man died before he could
carry out his ideas as regards this part of his administration. His Testament
Politique clearly indicates that he realized the aivanta^e of colonial develop-
ment as keenly as French statesmen did just before the present war. 1 Fur-
thermore, he looted ahead and foresaw the future rivalry with England upon
the sea. It is indeed unfortunate that he could not have lived to see the
dawn of peace in Europe, so that he could have carried out his entire economic
program, of which the formation of colonies was one important part.
However, a number of writers criticize Richelieu's colonial policy,
not without justice. 3ut they do not look at it with reference to the other
difficulties confronting the Cardinal at that time. Masson thought that it
was entirely too centralized, and D'Avenel, referring to one of his edicts
concerning the formation cf a colonial company, says, "that it is a source
of profound astonishment to me to see a mind as clear and practical as
Richelieu's in diplomatic and military organization, attempt to carry out his
dreams of that most peculiar economic despotism which modern people call
state socialism," (which is more or less popular at the present time.) "'The
edict of Morbihan is one which all France seeks,' says the Cardinal, whose
execution is alone capable of putting the Kingdom in a state of splendor.
'The proclamation, ' he continues, 'alarms already the English and the Dutch,
who fear that he will make himself master of the sea. Spain is afraid of us
also, for she fears the loss of her Indian possessions.'" 2 This would indicate
Tes tament Politique , II, Chapter I, 64-80.
Wvenel, Monarchic Absolus , III, 208-217.
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that Eichelieu saw the colonial struggles that lay ahead; and wished to pre-
pare for them in the best possible ways. Since individual capital to found
colonies was lacking, support by the government seemed to him to be the only
logical way, in spite of the fact that colonization is essentially due to
individual effort rather than royal plans. In other words, it is not the
general economic policy of the Cardinal relating to this branch of his admin-
istration whic : is at fault, but the Method he used of carrying them into
execution by means of the granting of monopolies to certain companies, respon-
sible only to the central power of France, "His colonial policy," says
one writer, "was marred by the practice, common to ail statesmen of the day,
of intrusting colonial enterprises entirely to exclusive companies. These
corporations, by which privileged individuals were protected at the general
expense of the body of consumers, were extremely unsuccessful in French
hands, partly through their excessive dependence upon the state parentage
and control, and partly through their total neglect of agriculture and the
consequent failare to form permanent and prosperous French settlements."^"
In other words, the chief criticism of the French colonial policy is that
it contained too much exclusive monopoly and not enough individual action;
too much emphasis upon conversion of the natives and not enough attention
paid to the economic side of colonial development. In short, the failure of
the French colonies can be laid to, (l) artificial imitation, (2) religious
narrowness, (3) too much on aid to the state, and not enough emphasis upon
commerce and colonization. Furthermore, the companies themselves are to
blame to a certain extent for the weak colonial policy of France, because
Lodge, Richelieu, 173.
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of (1) bad administrative direction, (2) premature distribution of dividends,
(3) lack of capital and credit, (4) bad economic organizations.
Indeed in view of the numerous difficulties confronting Richelieu
in this phase of his administration one wonders he accomplished what he did.
The very fact that the French people were unsuited for colonial efforts, and
that numerous internal troubles, financial and industrial for instance, a3
well as Richelieu's involved foreign policies, indicates the magnitude of the
task which the Cardinal confronted. Yet Richelieu's thoughts were constantly
turned toward this field of activity. Whenever there was a lull in political
and internal affairs, or when he was offered any favorable opportunity, he
did his best to found successful colonies in the new lands.
Seeley, in one of his books, maintains that the colonists were
subject to a multitude of strict regulations from which they would have been
free if they hai remained in France, Also France lost a large
part of her population in wars and in the expulsion of the Huguenots, and
came to be on the verge of financial ruin, so that as a result she had not
the means to develop colonization. "One might say," he says in another place,
"that France lost her colonies in a series of unsuccessful wars, but, like
Spain she had too many irons in the fire."
However, Richelieu should not be censured for hi3 part in the
development of French settlements. Even though his policy may not have had
important commercial results, yet it is far from having been worthless. It
is the beginning of French colonization and that indeed is of first rate
importance."5 He made a good start, which, if it had been carried out, would
1Seeley, J. H. , The Expansion of England , London, 1891, 7S
2Ibii., 110.
3Levasseur, I, 289.
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possibly have given France a great empire, other things being equal. If the
Cardinal had lived a little longer tilings might have been different, but
this is a matter of conjecture. He was trying to work up an interest in
colonies by means of inspiring accounts concerning them, published in his
Bttfjfenrg F rancois . Puolic opinion was aroused, as A illustrated by the numerous
publications made at this time concerning the colonies. 2 A few years of
peace might have brought about a great change in the colonial position of
France. But it is only within the last century that France has been able to
do anything in regard to colonization. And thus the general policies of
Richelieu have been revived at the present day, and so are doubly important
as constituting a force which is now continuing. That Richelieu deserves
more credit than he has obtained for his work in behalf of French colonization,
that whatever weaknesses existed in his charters granted to colonists were
of minor importance, an.i finally, that the foundation laid by this man which
would have resulted in the erection of a strong and powerful imperial edi-
fice was ruined by the inaptitude of the French people and the faults of
those who came after him, are the main conclusions to be drawn from a study
of this phase of his career.
JDeschattpB, 129-1 30.
2 Ibii.. 103-115.
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Chapter XII
RICHELIEU AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF FOREIG-N COMMERCE
Richelieu came to power at a time when foreign commerce was in
its infancy and the world was just beginning to awake to its importance.
"To Richelieu as well as Cromwell and other great people of his time," says
Bridges,"war and foreign conquest were no longer the primary occupations
of rulers. When they engaged in it they saw, dimly indeed, and inconsequently,
hut still they saw, the two grand tendencies of the modern world; peaceful
industry in the temporal sphere and morality based upon the unfettered
thoughts in the spiritual." 1 Thus the Cardinal was bound to be influenced
by this phase of his administration.
One of the first of the more important events in the administration
of the Cardinal was his appointment as "grand master and general superinten-
dent of navigation and commerce" in October, 1526. By this act, the old
offices which dealt with matters of the marine and commerce were abolished,
and all power with regard to these two factors in the French development
was concentrated in the hands of the Cardinal. That title did not give
him the actual command of the naval forces, but it did confer on him an
administrative authority with regard to these duties which extended over the
entire Kingdom.2 He became really a minister of commerce and the colonies.
Every means of developing the external policy of France was to originate
through his commands. He was the dictator of that part of the administration.
As has been shown, he did not occupy himself so directly with industry,
ABridges, 63.
2Isambert, XVI, 194-197.
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agriculture, interior commerce, or the finances. He left these activities
in the hands of subordinate officials. 1 Indeed too much emphasis cannot
he laid on the fact that Richelieu specialized in the external economic and
political policies of the nation. That accounts to a certain extent for
the meager results obtained from his internal policies. Its failure was not
due to lack of ability on Richelieu's part.
Richelieu at this time had the assembly of notables understand
not only that he was at the head of commerce but that he was going to develop
it and enrich his people and state thereby.2 In other words, at the begin-
ning of the Cardinal's administration, he decided to do all he could in his
official capacity to develop a great trade for France. This is remarkable
when one considers the other problems which confronted him at that time.
In 1627, a certain code of ordinances called the "Code Michaud",
was introduced. Richelieu, although an enemy of Michaud, accepted most of
these ordinances, one fifth of which dealt with commerce. In this code the
manufactures of silk, were to be encouraged by forbidding the importation of
foreign goods. Exportations should be aided and companies of commerce should
be established and encouraged. Nobles should retain their rank if they
engaged in commerce, and, as mentioned before, the privilege of nobility
could be conferred on traders under certain conditions. 3 Indeed, Richelieu
in trying to carry out these ordinances, really prepared the way for a great
expansion of French commerce, which would no doubt have taken place except
for internal and external wars.
Richelieu had known even before he came to power that Spain, Hol-
land, and other nations had increased in commercial importance, and France
Jpigeonneau, II, 389-390.
^Mercure Francois
,
XII, 359
.
aSee chapterTand Chapter XI, Tramhart, XVI, a73-27p.
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had been left far behind. It was for the latter to imitate them and through
supreme efforts to become their rivals on the seas. 1 Thus his initial efforts
all carry out his original aims.
Richelieu encountered many difficulties in his attempts to develop
commerce. In the first place, as stated above, such nations as England,
Holland, and Spain were far ahead of France in this phase of a nations strength,
The English even required all French goods to be sent to England in English
vessels. On the other hand the Dutch seemed to carry all the French trade
p
with the northern countries. In the Levant alone the French flag dominated
the carriage of commerce. But there also this supremacy was endangered by
England and Holland.
Therefore in order to aid French development of foreign commerce
certain laws such as that which laid a duty on foreign vessels, or such as
that which prohibited the exportation of wool and the importation of cloths,
were passed. These changes had a tendency to aid not only in the development
of manufactures in France but also in the growth of French commerce.4 The
creation of a large marine of course was another important factor in the solu-
tion of the problem of commercial growth. It is interesting to note that
Richelieu in his commercial policy followed out the ideas of Montchretien
to the letter. It was of course a narrow nationalistic policy, which was
based only on the idea of French grandeur and strength. In the latter part
of Richelieu's administration, he changed his ideas along this line. One
AGouraud, I, 157-188.
2
Pigeonneau, II, 406-407.
3Corresp. de Sourdis, III, 171-174.
4Cahlers de Normandie, III, 270-277.
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writer thinks that he permitted trade with the enemies of France and abol-
ished the restrictions on trade with England because of war conditions. 1
For instance, during the war he did not fear the introduction of English
cloth into France. Furthermore, a loss of trade with England, Spain, or
Holland because of restrictions would have been a bad thing for both sides.
However, the Cardinal changed his theoretical views also regarding the value
of a marine protective policy, as will be shown later.2 He realized toward
the last that there was such a thing as one nation'ssending goods to another
and obtaining goods for itself. In other words, Richelieu was not a firm
believer in the strict mercantilists theory of a favorable balance of gold.
However, Richelieu had internal as well as external troubles in
his efforts to build up commerce. For example, numerous towns and provinces
with ancient privileges objected to his efforts to build vessels in their
ports. "Les Messieurs de Saint-Malo M refused to allow the King to construct
some vessels in their ports. It was contrary to their franchises, they
said.** The Cardinal showed them that it was to the interest of their com-
merce to do so and promised further to increase their franchises. He conclud'
ed by saying that he was working for the interests of French commerce, which
was so necessary in order to make France strong and flourishing.4 Richelieu
was perfectly willing to aid local cities by subjecting foreign traders and
goods to high imports, etc., but he was not willing to have them establish
independent marines, etc. This was a matter for the central government. 5
^Pigeonneau, II, 414-415.
niercure Francois
,
XXIII, 390-393.
^lontchretien, Introduction, XC-XCVI
betters, II, 381.
^DeMBchamps, 135.
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Thus developed an interesting economic struggle between local privileges
and the growing spirit of centralization.
Contrary to the demands of Rouen, the city of Marseilles complained
to Richelieu not only of heavy impositions laid upon them, and slight protec-
of
tion afforded them, hut also
A
the lack of protection and aid to foreigners
whose trade they desired. In other words, while both Rouen and Marseilles
desired instant efforts made to repress piracy, the former desired the for-
eigners in France to be repressed while the latter wanted encouragement to be
offered to foreign commerce. 1 The problems of Richelieu were indeed intri-
cate. The only thing he could do was to consider the interest of the nation
as a whole and adjust his policy toward individual cities accordingly.
Now the Cardinal did not neglect the commercial problems in France.
He sent, for example, M. de Lauson, who was employed by him in a high position
in affairs of commerce and of the colonies, to investigate commercial condi-
tions, and had him return to consult concerning remedies which would aid both
the King and his subjects. 2 In other words, the Cardinal investigated commer-
cial problems and attempted to bring about better conditions with respect
to both consuls and other officials connected with commerce, and foreign rela-
tions. 3 He even went so far as to send instruction with regard to the desti-
nations of cargoes, etc., of French convoys. 4 At another time, in 1627, he
wrote a letter asking M. A.M. Le Bauigy for a report on the state of commerce.
"•Deschamps, 136-137.
betters, II, 345.
Censure Francois , XII, 782-784.
^Letters, II, 504-506.
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He assures him that merchants shall be given all reasonable privileges and
aid. 1 For exainple, in compliance with these promises he tried in 1627 to
establish a company of merchants in the capital city of each province, for the
purposes of navigation, and to give them special privileges. This was done
with the main purpose of building up commerce. One can find many other
letters which illustrate his solicitude for the state of commerce. 2
That it was highly desirable for a nation, he had no doubt. The
fact that Holland despite her unfavorable geographical position had built up
a great commerce and a 3trong national power as a result, justified all hi3
efforts along this line. 3 He felt that lack of commerce had held France
back; that with her great natural resources, she could take her place at the
head of commercial nations, if trade was only properly encouraged and protect-
ed. It was this idea as the basis of his philosophy, dominated by the ulti-
mate conception of the great state, that influenced him to build up commerce
and a great marine, and obtain colonies.
Dominated by this view, one finds that Richelieu had a more or less
definite foreign policy which affected all the important nations of the
world. The establishment of commerce was undertaken primarily with the hope
of placing France at the head of all commercial nations- This was especially
true with respect to Spain. Richelieu hoped that he might be able to reverse
the conditions, and make France strong upon the sea and thus able to domi-
nate Spain in commercial relations. During the first part of Richelieu's
Letters, II, 380.
2Ibid., Ill, 171-173.
3Ibid., Ill, 178-179.
Memoirs, XXIII, 261-262.
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administration, one finds that Spain imposed various restrictions upon
French commerce, but would not permit France to act similarly towards Spanish
commerce. It is significant to notice that Spain not only dominated commer-
cial relations between the two countries, but also between her colonies, and
Portugal and France. 1 Richelieu then decided in retaliation, to prevent all
trade with Spain, and in 1625 issued a declaration to that effect. However,
the fact that Holland and England were competing for French trade in Spain
accounts for the Cardinal's never absolutely cutting off trade between the
two nations. He knew that if Spain could be defeated in the Thirty Years'
War, commercial relations with her could be easily settled to the advantage
of France. So that rather than lose out during the period of war, he per-
mitted trade between the nations, which of course was of mutual benefit. How-
ever, he was sure that Spain, "whose sole wealth depended on the gold from
her colonies," was on the decline, and that time would make Francs her sup-
erior and dictator in commercial relations. 3
Turning to England, one finds that Richelieu appreciated the impor-
tance of that country as a commercial nation. 4 Her resources, manufactures,
and trade were all elements contributing to her grandeur and madLe her a direct
competitor of France. Just like Spain, England restricted French commerce
in her direction and opposed similar treatment in France. As will be shown
later, Richelieu's diplomacy, to a large extent, was centered around his at-
tempt to obtain a just recognition of the commercial rights of France by
Levasseur, I, 265.
2Isambert, XVI, 148.
Memoirs, XXII, 39.
4Testament Politique , II, 49-52.
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England, and also a claim for equality on the seas. 1 Of course he had to
temper these demands, because of his desire to retain England as an ally against
the Hapsburgs. Nevertheless, he recognized the fact that French commerce need-
ed protection on the seas and should have it.
During the Huguenot affair, commerce with England was prohibited. 2
Richelieu at that time was really afraid of an alliance of England, Spain,
Holland, and Savoy against France. 3 It was not long, however, before efforts
were made to bring about friendly relations between the two countries which
resulted in the treaties of 1629 and 1632, whereby friendly commercial relations
with England were restored, much to the credit of Richelieu, who even wanted
to establish certain rules of the seas which would govern commercial relations
in the future. 4
After 1632 Richelieu relaxed his efforts to settle critical commer-
cial questions, as he knew that the Thirty Years' War prevented any action like
that on his part. So that as a whole, commerce between both nations went on
a3 usual. Each sold products to the other. Most of the trade was in English
boats, and the English continued to annoy the French merchant who came to
trade at London, by taxes, formalities, etc.^ France had to become stronger
on the seas before she could settle commercial relations with England to her
satisfaction.
Richelieu was well aware of the power of Holland, and was a strong
admirer of her success in this line of endeavor.^ It was between the years
iSee Chapter XIII, Cahiers de Normandie , II, 84-85, 166-167 jLetters
^Letters, II, 774^Corps Universel Diplomatique, etc
.
,V,pt
.2,506-507?'
Memoirs, XXIII, 335.
4See Chapter XIII, Letters, VII, 676. Corps Universel Diplomatique,
SLevasseur, I, 264. etc '. V > P*- § , 581.
6See Chapters X and XI.
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1610 and 1625, that Holland assumed a strong position on the seas, in the
colonies, etc. She became at that time the great economic rival of England.
In a commercial way, trade with Holland was kept -up and fostered during the
administration of Richelieu. That country was the diplomatic ally of France
against the Hapsburgs, so that he was unable to undertake any economic ac-
tion against her except to injure her trade with Spain through France, by
means of ordinances. In other words, political and economic necessity else-
where prevented a direct economic connection between these two lands, although
friendly
two treaties in 1624 and 1627, arranged a more or less clear basis of econ-
omic relationship with regard to the seas, and colonies. 1
However, it is in a study of French commerce in the Levant that
one can obtain the best illustration of the economic rivalries of Holland,
England, and Spain with France. Since the death of Henry IV, the former
important commercial relations between France and Turkey had diminished,
while the influence of Holland and England in Turkey had increased. Centrali-
zation of the government of France took away the extensive commercial powers
of individual cities. But even this, up to Richelieti's time, had not aided
commerce with the Levant. When he came into office he encountered a chaotic
condition in this trade. The conflicting efforts of the central government
and the cities seemad to be making matters worse. "It needed a man," says
one writer, "with a definite policy, as Richelieu had to make an effort to
create a positive reform."2 In other words, trade with the East had been
neglected, and it was his task to restore it.
See Chapter XIII, Levasseur, I, 266, Corps Unive^sel g^gJSIgJ 1^
S&flasson, Histoire du Commerce de France dans le Levant , l85-l09.
'
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In the first place, he had to overcome the influence of the English,
Dutch, and others in Turkey. They were paying 3$ Import duty while France
paid 5$. The Porte favored the former powers. Inferior business methods and
goods had lost for France the cloth trade with the East in return for spices,
and was ruining the general commercial chances of the French in that quarter
of the globe. * However, in spite of this competition, France until 1635 had
an important trade with the East. Active entrance into the Thirty Years' War
at that time injured this commerce in that the Spanish ships and the pirates
hindered navigation, while cessation of trade with Spain cut off the supply
of gold, which France had been accustomed to send into the East. This in
turn accounts for the resiamption of commercial relations with Spain in 1639.
In other words, it was the strength of Spain on the sea, and the commercial
rivalry of England, Holland, and Spain, which Richelieu had to encounter
in the East. Of course his action with regard to them was tempered by the
needs of the Thirty Tears' War. However, one step towards a revival of eas-
tern commerce would be attained if Spain could be defeated in the war, and
Richelieu realized that fact. 3 It would have removed the greatest naval
and colonial rival of France in the Mediterranean.
"Richelieu has been accused of neglecting the Levant in the interest
of more distant colonies," says one writer. "This is not true. The Cardinal
understood better than his councillors the value of commerce in the East, and
was not the man to let himself be carried away with the dreams of another
crusade there, which seduced the imagination of Father Joseph."4 He goes
l-Masson, 118-119.
flMd., 11S-135.
Testament Politique . 11,55-56; 71.
^igeonneau, II, 443-444.
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on to indicate that the elements which caused the deplorable weakness of
France in the East, were the presence of pirates, poor conduct of diplomatic
relations, inferior quality of merchandise, and bad organization of the
consulates and their unfortunate conduct. All of these defects Richelieu
tried to remedy.
He furthermore encountered the war between Persia and Turkey which
made matters even more difficult. He tried to trade with the former country
by arranging a treaty with the northern countries whereby goods could be sent
through Russia and the Baltic. 1 However this plan did not succeed because
o
Russia would not permit French caravans to go through her lands.
was
Father Joseph at last got rid of his crusading dream, and
A
sent to
the East. He founded religious establishments in Jerusalem, Alexandria, Bag-
dad, etc. As a result, commerce was permitted to grow up under the wing of
the church. Richelieu had other men study the routes and condition of com-
merce in central Asia and the Orient, and they succeeded in writing and
bringing back vivid accounts of the East.3 Richelieu feared the commercial
influence of Spain, and other countries in Persia and the Mediterranean as
a whole, and was from the start very anxious to establish the supremacy of
France there. 4 The Cardinal knew that the influence of France depended on the
capitulations made with the Sultan. In 1631 he sent an ambassador to
See 196.
^igeonneau, 445-446.
3Ibid., 448-449. The best known of these men sent by Richelieu was jean
Baptiste Tavernier, who was not only a traveller but a merchant as well, who
founded French commerce in Persia, in India, etc Besides visiting Turkey
in Asia, Persia, and India, he also went as far as Sumatra and Java.
betters, II, 23-24.
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Constantinople to renew the capitulations, "with the very high, very excellent,
very powerful, very invincible Prince, the grand Emperor of the Musselmans,
in order to conserve and extend the friendship and union of the crown of
France and the Ottoman Empire for trade, traffic, and commerce with our sub-
jects. m1
In 1633 a committee of dignitaries, nominated by the council of
Marseilles (a city very much interested in eastern commerce), on the basis of
their commercial knowledge, reported and complained concerning the decay of
eastern trade, which they said was due to many causes. They cited the long
and important European wars, piracy, the oppression of ministers of the "Grand
Seigneur", corruption of officials in the Levant, and of traders, etc In
other words, they complained that the entire commercial system of France
in the East was debased. 2 Indeed, it was a difficult task which Richelieu
had to undertake, but he did the best he could under the circumstances.
In 1639 he sent a new ambassador to Constantinople with instructions
not only to protect Christians there, but to aid the French in developing
commerce by seeing that the capitulations were obeyed. He was to see that
all nations which had no ambassadors in the East, shotild sail under the French
flag and recognize the French consuls. He was also to investigate the heavy
impositions levied on the French merchants at Aleppo and Alexandria by the
natives. If there was no remedy the trade would be ruined or henceforth
be carried by the Venetians and English.*' The Cardinal thus made direct
efforts to strengthen and rectify matters in the East. He even went so far
""Letters, IV, 106; Mercure Francois . XVII, 896-817.
2Deschamps, 135-136.
betters, VI, 320-322.
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as to give advice with regard to the injury caused "by debts contracted by
past ambassadors. They should be settled at once in the interest of French
trade as a whole.
It is interesting to notice that Richelieu advised his ambassador
at this time to keep Turkey from forming an alliance with Austria against
France. He was to do this by telling the Sultan about the victories won by
the French over the Austrians. 1 In other words, the Thirty Years' War had
its effects even in the East. Bichelieu feared the loss of the Turkish
Alliance, not only through a victory by Spain but also by an alliance with
the Hapsburgs. This goes to prove that the war had its far reaching commercial
aspects. A victory over the central powers meant the dominance of France in
the East over Spain and Austria. But he realized that he still had England
and Holland to encounter. As a result, Richelieu was not able to strengthen
to a remarkable extent the commercial influence of France in the East. He
did put down piracy to a certain extent and reform corruption among French
officials in the Levant. But weak ambassadors at Constantinople, mediocre
missionaries, and the unfortunate rivalry of Persia and Turkey, caused the
o
gradual decay of French commerce there. Also, the Thirty Years' War so
occupied the attention of the Cardinal that Holland was able gradually to
take the place of France in the East, by way of the maritime route around the
Cape. 3
Richelieu, in his efforts to develop commerce, accepted the advice
and ideas of several of his officials, who were connected with the external
-Letters, VI, 323.
2Pigeonneau, II, 448-449.
^Levasseur, I, 270.
i.
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affairs of the nation. "Like all men of genius, he knew how to listen, but
the direction and execution devolved upon him."* Indeed one finds by con-
sulting his Testament Politique
, that he has left rather definite economic
views as to the future status of the external trade of France.
The Cardinal up to the very last recognized the value of eastern
commerce. "I will not enter," he says, "into detail at all as to the commerce
which can be carried on with the East and Persia, because the humor or caprice
of the Frenchman is so quick, that he wishes the end of his desires almost
as soon as he has conceived of them, and the voyages that are distant are
not agreeable to their natures." 2 It is interesting to notice that Richelieu
was keen enough to see and admit the colonial weakness of the French. His-
tory was to bear out the truth of his remarks. "However, as there comes,"
he says, "a great quantity of silk and tapestry from Persia, many curiosities
from China, as well as spices from there and other parts of that section
of the world, which are all useful to us, therefore this trade must not be
neglected. In order to make a good establishment there, it is necessary to
send two or three vessels commanded by some persons of quality, prudence,
and wisdom, with patents and necessary powers, to treat with the Princes
and make alliances with the people on all the coasts, just as the Portuguese,
English, and Flemish have done." This policy works better than forcing one's
way into a country, and holding it down by force, and thus stirring up hate
by deceiving them, as others have done." It is quite evident that Richelieu
desired close commercial relations with the East, and the fact that he did
^Pigeonneau, II, 383.
^Testament Politique . II, 70-71.
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not aim to accomplish that "by military force seems to place him ahead of many
of our more recent statesmen. But it really indicates his keen power of
observation. He knew that he could attain the best results by peaceful trea-
ties in the East and acted on the basis of that knowledge.
He even went so far as to list the merchandise involved in trade
with Naples, Rome, Smyrna, Constantinople , etc. Money and merchandise export-
ed from France in return for the silks, wax, leather, spices, drugs, etc.,
of the East. "Before the English and Dutch settled in the Indies," he said,
"all silks, drugs, and other merchandises of Persia came to Aleppo, from
whence they were sent throughout France, Holland, England, and Germany." 1
It is the loss of the monopoly of eastern trade which Richelieu bemoaned
and desired to get back again. "Now the very same English and Dutch," he
said, "have deprived us of comrterce, and deprived France not only of the
merchandise of Persia, but also are encroaching on the land of the 'Great
Seigneur' , which they have to go through. The merchandise is then sold in
Sicily, Naples, Genoa, Spain, Germany, etc."2 Furthermore , he points out
the fact, that the English and Dutch were getting spices and drugs directly
from the Indies, and thus were gradually obtaining control of the sale of
these goods.
Richelieu regretted this state of affairs. He feared that foreign-
ers would even control the trade of the East with France, and thus his nation
would lose the profit to be obtained thereby. He pointed out in his Testa-
ment, that the French took more hemp, cloth, wood, etc., to the East than
they did money. Furthermore, what money they did send was obtained from
'•Testament Politique . II, 72-73.
2Ibid., II, 73-74.
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Spain in exchange for merchandise sold to them. That France would profit
by a renewed trade he had no doubt, arid pointed out Marseilles as a city
which had made much money in the past by means of the eastern commerce."
One would think the attention Bichelieu paid towards the ad-
visability of the retention of money in France, would classify him as an
extreme mercantilist. Such was not the case. "I admit," he said, "that I
have for a long time been deceived as to the commerce which the people of
Provence founded in the East. I believed with many others that it was pre-
judicial to the state, founded upon the common opinion that it exhausted
the money of the Kingdom, in order to bring back merchandise, not necessary
at all, but only useful for the ease of our nation. But after having taken
an exact view of this trade, condemned by the public voice, I have changed
my mind, and if any one will examine the question, he will see certainly,
that I have done so with thought and reasoning. It is certain that we could
!
not do without most of the merchandise which is obtained from the East,
as silks, cottons, wax, rhubarb, and many other drugs which are necessary to
us." 1
This is one of the wiaast economic utterances of the Cardinal. It
marks a gradual change from the strict mercantilistic view, to a very liberal,
if not modern one. Believing in the great value of a retention of money
in France, he changed about, and toward the last recognized the fact that
after all it was the export of goods which other countries needed and the
import of goods needed by France, which counted. He could see that by this
means France could develop better than under the narrow policy of the past.
It is unfortunate that he did not live long enough to carry into execution
these new economic ideas which he had towards the end of his administration.
^•Testament Politique , II, 75.
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However, he was not concerned with the commerce between France and
the East alone. He desired France to be a distributing point and a manu-
facturing center for the products of the East, by which it could make 100$
profit. By this means, France could be assured of a great number of artisans
and sailors, both useful in peace and war, and of revenues from export and
import duties. In order that the French merchant could appreciate and be
stimulated to develop their commerce in the East, the Cardinal even advocated
the sale of governmental vessels to be used by the Franch in commerce.*
in other words, Richelieu wanted above everything else, to develop and build
up commerce with the East; for by so doing he would strengthen and solidify
France. One sees in his enlightened economic ideas and policies, the efforts
of the French statesmen to control that which the discoveries were taking
away from the Mediterranean powers as a whole. Also, the commercial rival-
ries which sprang up in the East are early hints of what was to follow as
regards the trade relations of the various great powers of Europe. For that
reason, it is of especial interest to all.
However, Richelieu had not only the competition of European powers
as a hindrance, for he also had to solve the question of the pirates, and
especially of the bad relations with North Africa which was their home. The
Cardinal built a stronger fleet to meet this difficulty and decided that the
taxes on commerce should pay for the navy. As the important treaties with
the Barbary States were completed in 1630 or a little after, the taxes dis-
appeared, but this was unfortunate, as a larger navy was needed against
Spain.2
Testament Politique , II, 76-7?.
^Iasson, Histoire du Commerce Francaise dans le Levant , 48.
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However, the Cardinal did try to settle affairs with Algiers,
Tunis, Morocco, etc., in North Africa. A representative named Sansom Napol-
lon was sent to Algiers and obtained in 1628 a treaty which stipulated
observation of all the articles of the capitulation between them. Trade and
fishing rights between them were adjusted and things looked bright again in
that part of the wo rid. *
In 1630, Isaac de Razilly was sent to settle the difficulties, and
he succeeded in obtaining the right of the French to trade freely, and have
consuls in that country. 2 Furthermore, the English were forbidden to send
arms to Morocco by this treaty. 3 in other words, by these agreements the
rights of the French in North Africa and on the sea, and the rights of the
natives of these countries to trade with France were confirmed. On the
whole the relations with the Barbary States were improved. There was, how-
ever, a little trouble in 1633, and another treaty was necessary in 1639.
In fact one might say, that in Africa as well as in France and America, Rich-
elieu's work was incomplete. He had ambitious plans for the development
of the entire Mediterranean, but did not live long enough for anything to
materialize . 4
However, Richelieu was interested not only in the East with regard
to foreign commerce. One finds for instance, that he desired to sell to
the Swiss, French salt, which was better than German salt, and at a more
^Levasseur, I, 266-267; Corps Universel Diplomatique, V,pt .2, 559-560.
2Isambert, XVI, 357-359.
3Mercure Franqo.is, XVII, 131; Corps Universel Diplomatique ,V,pt .2, 613-614.
4Pigeonneau, II, 453-455;Corps Universel Diplomatique, VI ,pt . 1, 18.
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reasonable price. He hoped by this means to pay the pensions due the Swiss
soldiers.* Indeed it would seem as if the Cardinal wa3 planning on using
the salt resources of France as one of its financial foundations. No wonder
he did not want to lose La Rochelle.
With regard to Poland, Richelieu had an interesting remark to
make. He said in 1629, that France had little trade with Poland because the
former had no need of wheat or wood, which could be obtained in nearer markets,
in Norway and Denmark. Furthermore, she could get tar from Norway and leather
from Sweden, so that trade with that country was not really important. 2 How-
ever, Richelieu admitted that the Austrians dominated Poland at that time,
which may account to a certain degree for his attitude toward Poland. He de-
clared that France furnished Poland some salt and wine, which the Dutch really
controlled. "Our more important trade is in Spain, Italy, and the Levant.
England might better desire peace in Poland because of her great trade with
that nation. 3 Here one sees a clever effort on Richelieu's part to push
England into the conflict in 1630 because of commercial interests in Poland.
Richelieu evidently recognized the powerful influence of commerce in diplo-
matic relations.
He also constantly considered commerce from its purely economic
standpoint. "While the King was in Italy," he said in 1629 in hi3 Memoirs,
"the Cardinal was not troubled by so many of the affairs of his Majesty within
and without the Kingdom, that he did not think of the enrichment of that nation
by means of the increase of commerce. He proposed to his Majesty that some
AMemoirs, XXIII, 289-290.
2Ibid., XXV, 129.
Memoirs, XXV, 129.
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one be sent to represent France in Moscow, to treat with the ruler of Russia,
and obtain freedom and permission for the French to trade there under
reasonable conditions. As regards Denmark, French merchandise had suffered
because of the duty imposed by the King of that country when it passed
through the straits (the Sund) . Efforts were to be made and were made to
reestablish a treaty which gave France a tax of 1$ instead of b$ on mer-
chandise. "This was a great advantage," said Richelieu, "to the commerce
and navigation of France. However, it was limited to 8 years so that Eng-
land and Holland would not complain. Promises were made to continue the
treaty when it expired.
Turning to Russia, one finds that full commercial rights were ob-
tained there. However, the French were not to be allowed to go through
Russia on their way to Persia. Russia was to furnish such a good market for
France that they could get the goods from the East as cheap as if they went
after the merchandise themselves. It certainly is interesting to notice that
the original plan of founding a commercial company in France, which was to
trade with Russia, and which included a plan to bring Persian goods by means
the
of the Caspian Sea,
A
Volga river, and the Baltic Sea to France, culminated
in the first real commercial treaty made by the French nation with Russia. 2
Richelieu was looking out for French commerce and in 1630 he believed that
the Baltic Sea was to be the way by which he not only could trade with the
north but with the East. One can readily see why he was so anxious to
arrange treaties with the Scandinavian countries. Also, the effect upon
Memoirs, XXV, 342-343.
Memoirs, XXV, 131 \ Corps Universel Diplomatique, V, pt.2, 594-598.
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France if Austria had controlled the Baltic must have been obvious to Hiche-
lieu. It is no wonder that he founded the alliance against the Hapsburgs and
fought his fellow Catholics at a time when the religious controversy still had
its place in affaire of the world.
However, Bichelieu desired not only to open up trade with the East
through the Baltic, but he also wished to increase the commerce of France with
such countries as Denmark, Norway and Sweden. In the treaty of 1629 arranged
with Denmark, the latter was promised pure salt from France instead of the
impure product which the Dutch sold to them. France would have also a better
market for the purchase of such things as hemp, masts for boats, etc., which
she needed. 1 In other words, Richelieu desired the creation of an increased
commerce between those two countries.
A commercial treaty was also arranged with Sweden. In it an alli-
ance was agreed upon which was to last six years, and in compliance with
it they agreed to defend oppressed friends, to assure freedom of commerce from
the north to the Baltic, etc.^
Thus one sees that France during this period was interested in the
Baltic not only for diplomatic reasons or on account of the fear of the
growing Hapsburg dynasty, but she also desired to assume more friendly and
important commercial relations with the northern countries. It is possible
that this was done partly to bind the nations more closely together against a
common foe. It was likewise brought about in order to obtain an advantage
over the competition of at least Holland in this particular part of the world.
^Caillet, 328-332. (Les Voyages de Monsieur des Hayes, baron de Courmes-
min en Denmark 1669, p. 99 et seq.)
2Martin, II, 316.
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Whatever were the motives, Richelieu was the instigator of this policy and
thus deserves the credit for what he accomplished along these lines. It will
he shown later that his accomplishments here had important consequences in
the progress and outcome of the Thirty Years' War.*
But it is in Richelieu's Testament Politique , that one finds his
final ideas with regard to commerce in general. He repeats (and seems fond
of doing so) the story of the commercial rise of Holland. "It is proof,"
he says, "of the utility of Trade. Though that nation produces nothing but
butter and cheese, yet they furnish all the nations of Europe with the great-
est part of what is necessary to them."2 He then proceeded to tell how they
had ousted the Portuguese from the East Indies and were preparing to do the
same in the West Indies. One can not fail to see the yearning in the heart
of the great statesman for a similar growth on the part of France. He real-
ized that if this could only take place, France with its geographical and
economic advantages could become the leader of Europe. After all it was the
economic side of a nation which was the foundation of its strength and all
his attempts at political centralization were for the purpose of bringing
about a successful culmination of his "ideal state". France is so fertile in
corn, so abounding in wine, flax, hemp to make cloth, and riggings, so neces-
sary for navigation, that Spain, England, and all the neighboring states must
have recourse thither, " he said, "and provided we know how to improve the
advantages which nature has given us we will get the money of those who have
occasions for our goods, without troubling ourselves much with their commodi-
See Chapter XIII.
'Testament Politique , II, 65.
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ties which are of little use to us." 1 One can readily see by these remarks
that the Cardinal wanted only the chance to carry out these plans, but it
was denied him. He knew that his country was being exploited by the commer-
cial progress of other nations, and that if she found herself, she could not
only develop her commerce and fisheries, necessary at that time, but she
also would be able to keep her sailors at home, who up until then had sought
employment in Spain.
The development of French industries, French commerce, and French
wealth were the underlying foundations of his philosophy. "Instead of
importing cloth from Spain, England, and Holland, let us make it ourselves,"
was his earnest demand. 2 "France is industrious enough, if she desires, to
dispense with some of the best manufactures of her neighbors."3 He then goes
on to praise the plush made at Tours, as ahead of that made in Italy and
Spain. France could make as good silk as any nation,was his boast. It would
seem as if he indulged a typical "made in France" argument, such as is not
out of fashion at the present time. Efficiency was his motto. He could see
in the revival of commerce and industry, a chance whereby everybody could
have an opportunity to work. So that sloth, laziness, and a desire for lux-
uries would be overcome. A man who advocated the use of the entire material
and human resources of the country in order to create a wealthy and strong
state is certainly not to be classed as mediocre either in the political or
the economic sense of the term.
he possessed
No one can doubt that keen business ability. "There are many ad-
A
vantages in navigation," he says; "The fur trade of Canada is very useful,
'•Testament Politique , II, 66-67.
2Ibid., II, 67.
3Ibid., II, 68-69.
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as you can carry on an exchange of goods for goods." 1 He then goes on to
point out the advantages of trade in the East Indies and in North Africa.
"The merchants of Rouen, " he says, "have at one time established a silk
and cloth trade in Morocco by means of which they obtain a great quantity
of gold." He then goes on to bemoan the lack of a great merchant marine,
which could carry all the traffic of the north which the Flemish and the
Dutch had taken over. Because the north had an absolute need of wine, vine-
gar, spirits, etc., all commodities in which France abounds, and which she
can not consume herself. (The idea of a surplus of products is clearly
brought out here.) "It is easy," he says, "to carry on a commerce with them,
and better in that the French vessels can bring back wood, copper, etc.,
things not only useful to us but necessary for our neighbors, who must get
it direct from us, if they do not wish to lose the freight of their vessels
going for it." 2 It would seem as if Richelieu intended not only to carry
on French trade with the north in French vessels, but desired to have the
French merchant marine have a monopoly of the trade of all nations with the
north. It was a large scheme, but it fits in exactly with his general econ-
omic and political idea of a great state, and the destruction of all forces
which would hinder that conception. A great state would certainly mean a
nation which was the predominant commercial center of the world. The first
step in order to bring this about and assume control of commerce in the West
Indies, etc., was to overpower Spain by means of a great war. This was the
underlying economic element in their relations in the Thirty Years' War,
•'•Testament Politique , II, 66-69.
2 Ibid., II, 69-70.
3Ibid., II, 71.
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as will be shown.
Thus, commerce and the methods to attain a development of it in
France, dominated his thoughts towards the end of his administration, and no
better indication of its importance, and of the keen intellect which solved
its difficulties is found than in his change from a supporter of a high export
and internal tax on goods to a lower one, in order to increase trade thereby.
Richelieu was willing to change any of his theories to bring about the long
sought for ends. This fact alone illustrates and justifies the statement
that he was an economic statesman. He seems to have followed not only his own
ideas, but also the contribution of other men of his time, like Montchretien.
The only test that he required was whether they would bring about the growth
and grandeur of his beloved nation. If so, he adopted them.
Testament Politique , II, 88, etc.
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Chapter XIII
THE ECONOMIC ELEMENTS IN THE DIPLOMACY OF RICHELIEU
Richelieu' s entire administration was taken up with the fulfilment
of two objects: in the first place, to develop the external commerce, marine,
and colonization of France, and make her one of the strongest nations from
an economic point of view, in the second place, to make France one of the
strongest political powers in Europe, and, as a consequence, place her in the
center of the nations united or opposed to each other, in order to preserve
the balance of power. In other words, he wanted to create, as one writer
say3, a combined continental and colonial power.
*
Richelieu, in his capacity of "grand master and superintendent of
commerce, etc." gave the external economic development of France a good start.
He intended to complete this phase of his administration together with the
reorganization of internal economic affairs in France, after peace should be
declared. But before he could do all this he had to establish the security
of the frontiers of France and prepare that nation to assume a leading place
in coming national struggles. This purpose served to bring out his great
power of diplomacy. How he used it in the critical phases of the Thirty
Years' War is known to students of history.
However, it must be remembered that back of all this lay the su-
preme purpose of Richelieu's, to make France a strong, powerful, and thus a
valuable economical political possession of the King. This as has been shown,
accorded with the general mercantilists doctrine, and all phases of his
1Vignon, L . L' expansion de la France . Paris, 1891, 28-34.
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administration were
-unconsciously controlled and guided by this central
policy. Few people at that time comprehended this ultimate purpose, as is
shown by the fact, which Richelieu admitted, that few people could see the
necessity of war, which he believed was really needed in order to preserve
the dignity and credit of the King and state, over against other European
powers. "Merchants and people in general, do not see this point," he says,
"they complain about the burdens of war but do not see the value of it for the
state as a whole. "1 In other words, the Cardinal had the security of the
nation in view, as a prerequisite for future prosperity. But the people
could not look so far ahead. They could see the benefits of the suppression
of the nobles, but the Thirty Years' War was above their political or econ-
omic comprehension. The need of a strong frontier, the maintenance of the
balance of power, and the question of the control of the sea as a part of a
strong economic and political state were above them. Richelieu realized
this and it is a question whether this did not cause him to hold back many
of his advanced policies until the coming peace would enable him to undertake
them with a better chance of success.
However, he followed in his diplomatic accomplishments one general
policy without any exceptions. This was the intention to bring about the
2
pacification of western Europe as the essential basis of all future progress.
He saw that other nations were and would be economic and political rivals of
France, and it was his duty to bring the situation to a general peace of a
character favorable to the continued existence of France. To do this he had
Memoirs, XXVI, 87-91.
2Testament Politique , I, 285-286.
r' 3
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to pay a heavy price in money and lives, which was perhaps worth while in the
end.
The theoretical rule guiding his relations was of course to assure
the welfare of France by means of favorable negotiations with other countries.
For example, this policy meant that the spirit of political and economic
reciprocity should govern his relations with other lands. 1 In other words,
give back what you receive; do not bow down before any nation, for it weakens
your own position. The diplomatic relations between France and Spain during
the period serve as a good illustration of this policy.
Spain, when Richelieu came into powe^was beginning to decline, but
nevertheless was able to be a very powerful and active foe. The Cardinal
feared her and sincerely believed from the first, that the welfare of the
world would be aided by the destruction of her power as well as that of the
Empire. 2
This nation was not only a danger to the existence of France on the
seas and along her boundaries, but also threatened her internal status. The
French Court, which was led by Anne of Austria, and others suspected of treason,
was half Spanish; 3 and furthermore, the Spaniards were more or less interested
in the attempts of the Huguenots to obtain independence.4 Why? Of course,
in part for political reasons. Spain desired to weaken France, in order to
be permitted to unite with Austria across Italy, etc. But it should not be
forgotten that La Eochelle was important as a center for the distribution of
salt. England realized this and Spain no doubt did so, for she herself car-
ols to ire Gene rale , Paris, 1896,12 vols., V, 368.
2Letters, II, 150.
bridges, 113.
4Testament Politique , I, 1S-22.
I
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commodity
.
ried on a trade in that
A
In fact, Richelieu complained in 1627, (the time
of the Huguenot affair) of the attempts of the Spanish to hinder French
commerce in salt with the Flemish people. So that there was evidently a
commercial rivalry existing between France and Spain with regard to the salt
traded When the most important salt producing center of France revolted,
it was naturally aided by Spain. The latter country would clearly have
welcomed an independent La Rochelle from the economic as well as the political
point of view. Gaston at that time did not approve of the connection "between
the attempts of Richelieu to establish the commerce and marine and overcome
Spain, and the attempt to take La Rochelle. In fact he criticised the econ-
omic value of the latter part of Richelieu's program. 2 Richelieu according to
his policy of secrecy, which was condemned by Gaston, did not offer to reveal
to the latter the underlying motives behind it all.
The Cardinal was well aware of the commercial plans of Spain. He
knew that she wanted to monopolize commerce in Flanders and indeed in all
of her possessions. Furthermore, he was aware of her attempt to deprive
the Dutch of their trade in the Mediterranean and the Indies. Spain desired
even at that time to become dominant in commerce in the Levant and in Russia,
and to prevent the trade of Holland with France and England.4 The good
relationship with Holland on the part of France is partly accounted for by
this statement. Richelieu believed from the beginning of his administration
that the Spanish nation was the one power which intended to spread its
ABa8 80Bipierre, III, 432.
2Memoirs, XXIII, 261-262.
^Mercure Francois , XXIII, 334-335.
4Ibid., XII, 4-8; 30-35.
Ja
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commercial monopoly over all the world, and that therefore its plans should
be blocked. Holland was the natural ally in such a program.
Immediate efforts were made to oppose the ambitions of Spain. Com-
mercial relations were broken off for the time being and at the same time,
about 1626, the French began to form large companies to reestablish commerce,
colonies, etc.* Steps were also taken to build canals through France, and
thus cause all goods from the Mediterranean and the Levant to be sent north
through France, instead of going by way of Spain, in other words, as was
said, "to make France the common deposit of all the commerce of the earth. 1,2
location which
Even the superiority of geographical
A
France possessed over Spain was considered
from an economic point of view at this time. The Mercure Francois quotes the
statement made by the King's "Garde de Seeaux" , that Spain in order to trade
with Italy or any part of the Mediterranean, had to pass by France at night
or under the "culverins" of the islands of Provence. Furthermore, in order
to trade with Flanders, Holland, England, Denmark, and other northern lands,
it was necessary for Spanish vessels to pass "le Sos Sainct Mahe", at the
mercy of the French cannon, which could control the English channel with
little difficulty. In other words, France would find it easy, because of
her fortunate geographical position, to defeat Spain in her commercial
ambitions
•
The favorable position of France on the Mediterranean Sea was
brought forth a little later in the same way. The good coast and harbors of
Provence could easily hinder the commerce of Spain and communication by water
with Italy, so necessary in peace and war. At this point appears the definite
Mercure FrancPls , XII, 3.
2Ibid., XII, 359.
3Ibid.. XII. 359-60.
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object of keeping Italy independent of Spain, in order to separate not only
their political but also their economic relations. 1 In other words, the
attempt to form a political and economic aollverein between the Empire and
Spain through Italy was to be broken, because it endangered the very existence
of France, politically and economically. 2
This brought up the question of the control of the sea which was
as important then as it is now. The government realized that such control
was necessary in order that France might employ its great wealth in comnerce.
Spain was sterile and possessed no such possibilities. "The geographical
position of France with her good harbors, etc., enables her to attack Spain,
Holland,or England, inflict a loss and return promptly. Furthermore, the
innate ability of Frenchmen, and the adequate supply of sailors, mariners,
etc., insure a continuation of the past efforts of the French to gain control
of the sea against the pirates of Spain and other lands. ^ Thus the develop-
ment of the marine and the control of the sea was the important factor in
the economic defeat of Spain, the great rival of France. "The first thing
to do," says Richelieu in a letter, "in order to meet Spain, is to become
powerful on the sea, which gives entrance to all the countries of the
world."4 The other step was of course to keep Spain out of Italy. These
were to remain the two aims of France in spite of temporary efforts to avoid
a struggle and settle them by peace terms. ^ Insults and invasion of the
rights of the French on land and sea were to be prevented only by the posses-
1Mercure Francois , XIII, 248-253.
2Letters, II, 81; Memoirs, XXVII, 222-223.
^ercure Francois . XXVII, 239-248.
betters, III, 181.
^Mercure Franc Sis , XVI, 202-203.
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N
sion of a strong military and naval force.
However, Richelieu in his rivalry with Spain on the sea was willing
to compromise. In spite of the desires of French merchants to retaliate
against the Spanish and Portuguese, who committed depredations upon their
vessels on their way to and from the Indies or America, Richelieu tried to
preserve peace, and asked the merchants not to conanit hostile acts when they
were in neutral waters. 1 In other words, Richelieu professed belief in the
principles of what we now call international law.
In 1634 Richelieu, in order to prevent trouble with the Spanish
and Portuguese, agreed that they should have full rights within certain waters
leading from the Indies and America. However, he asked that the French be
permitted to sail into the ports and harbors of Spain and Portugal, as
long as they did not impose on the limits of the ports of the ocean reserved
for the Portuguese and Spanish. 2 Thus he was willing to concede certain
rights to his colonial rivals in return for privileges for France.
At the same time, when Richelieu was attempting to overthrow the
power of Spain in Italy, and was advocating a large navy in order to sweep
them off the sea, he left the situation north of France to be taken care of
by the Dutch. The latter prevented any attempts on the part of the Spanish
to strengthen their possessions in the Netherlands, by means of canals, etc.,
and thus build up their economic interests in those lands. 3 The Mercure
Francois , in 1627, mentions the attempts of the Spanish to obtain a closer
union with their colonies and other lands, for the purpose of defence against
Memoirs, XXVIII, 204-205.
2Isambert, XVI, 409-411; Mercure Francois . XX, 711-712.
^Mercure Franco is , XIII, 566-571.
^
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enemies.* Of course this would be dangerous economically and politically
for France and should be prevented. The people of Flanders were consequently
influenced to oppose these efforts of Spain. 2 Richelieu saw the economic
struggle going on between Holland and Spain for control of the Indies and the
j
sea. "The rise of either, " he said, "would bring about the ruin of the
other." As a consequence, he played one against the other in the interests
of France
.
This was the general diplomatic position taken by France toward
these two nations throughout Richelieu' s administration. In 1635 the Cardinal
declared that war with Spain was the only solution for the peace of Europe
and the safety, the repose, and the commercial rights of the French people. 4
At this time, in spite of the economic rivalry existing between Holland and
France, an offensive and defensive league was made between then; against the
Empire and Spain.
^
In 1639, Richelieu was still pegging away at the Spanish in Italy
besides trying to get the English into an alliance against Spain. The three
of them were to drive Spain off the seas. Indeed, Richelieu gave orders at
this time for the fleet to attack the Spanish towns, and (which is more
important by far) her colonies. 7 Apparently the Cardinal had imperialistic
ideas of the most advanced sort. Control of the seas meant colonies to him
as it did to many other statesman after him. His Testament, shows that this
was hi3 final intention and was his advice for those who were to follow him.
•LMercure Francois, XIII, 590-595.
2Ibid., XIII, ^598.
Memoirs, XXVII, 362-365.
betters, V, 151-153; Mercure Francois , XX, 959.
5Ibid., V, 383.
~~T~
6 Ibid. , 550-555.
7 Ibid.,658.
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He says that "there is little left for Franco in western commerce. The only
chance is to obtain control of places occupied now by the King of Spain
by means of a powerful war." 1 In another place he says that a navy will
overcome Spain and protect France. It has been the only instrument which
has enabled Spain to retain her colonies.2 Furthermore, Richelieu advised
a strong marine in order to keep Spain from Italy and make the Barbary states
respect France. 3 In other words, Richelieu believed that the only solution
for the economic and political development of France lay in the defeat of
Spain on land and sea:4 on land so that she would not threaten the boundaries
of France; on the sea, so that she could not hinder French commerce, and so
that France might obtain some of the rich colonial rewards which she so
much desired. Richelieu's part in the Portuguese revolt was probably taken
because of his desire to break up the colonial empire of Spain.^
In one respect Richelieu looked upon Spain from a more or less
friendly point of view. The latter purchased wheat, silks, etc., from France
in considerable quantities. The Cardinal permitted this trade to be carried
on, because it added to the wealth of France. "Richelieu in 1639," says
one writer, "handled this difficult proposition very well. He allowed the
traders by an edict the right to export goods at their risk. It was a sort
of authorized contraband by which both countries profited."**
This illustrates the principle back of the Cardinal's administration.
The political and external economic power of Spain wa3 a danger to the
development of France; therefore, it should be destroyed. However, enmity
^•Testament Politique , II, 71.
2 Ibid., II, 52^53.
3Ibid., II, 54^64.
%ercure Francois , XXIII, 125.
^akeinan, 116
.
^igeonneaul II
'
t
423.
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to Spain should not prevent France from taking advantage of any opportunity
to better herself, even though it should lead to trade with a nation with
whom they were at war. French merchants actually became the overland carriers
of goods between Spain, the Netherlands, and Germany.
Richelieu was guided by the same nationalistic ideal in his diplo- I
matic relations with England. The latter country had failed to observe the
various clauses of the commercial treaty of 1623. In other words, the Eng-
lish placed various restrictions upon the importation of French goods, such
as cloth for example. Now the French desired their government to retaliate
and consequently there arose in France the demand that the English should be
treated in France as the French were treated in En^and. 2 Therefore when
Richelieu came into office he had the problem confronting him of arranging
commercial relations which would be satisfactory to both countries.
One of the first steps in that direction wa3 the marriage of
Henrietta of France to the English Prince of Wales. The Cardinal hoped
that this alliance would result not only in the establishment of good rela-
tions between the two countries, but that it would serve as a counterweight
to the grandeur of Spain, 3 and also would prevent a powerful commercial and
colonial alliance between England and Holland. 4
The effect of this alliance was temporary, although both England
and Holland lent boats to France in 1625, to be used against La Bochelle at
a time when France was at war with Spain. Yet this "entente" did not
''Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 162.
2Levasseur, I, 273.
Memoirs, XXIII, 78.
4Ibid., XXII, 293.
• t& ft n
. "is?
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last, and before long the English were supporting the opposition to France.
The explanation for that change is simple when one considers not
only the religious side of the marriage alliance but the commercial diffi-
culties in the way of a happy consummation of the aims of that alliance.
Francs and England were beginning the intense commercial rivalry on the sea
which was to be the keynote of their diplomatic relations for the next two
hundred years. Indeed, Richslieu in a letter said that the three roots of
trouble between France and England were firat^the religious difficulties
concerning the right of Henrietta in that respect ;^ secondly, the commercial
side as seen not only in the retention of French vessels and their goods
by the English, but in the retaliation in a similar manner by the French;2
in the third place, the aid of La Eochelle by the English. 3 However, the
first cause of trouble could have been settled easily if the latter points
of dispute had not prevented any lasting solution during the entire period.
In fact, one might say that the first four or five years of Richelieu's
administration were taken up with a sharp commercial controversy with England,
with the military base of operations at La Rochelle. After that, this rivalry
Even the marriage of Henrietta had its economic: side because of the fact
that the French in spite of the demands of the English had failed to pay the
dowry which had been promised. In fact the Venetian ambassador summarized
the causes of the trouble between the two countries as follows: (1) the La
Eochelle affair, (2) navigation troubles, and (3) the question of the dowry.
See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 66.
2Calendars, (Venetian), XIX, 592. "Seizure of vessels on both sides
makes both nervous. Starting as a friendly dispute between Denmark, England,
and France in 1626 over the question of navigation, it now began to assume
serious proportions." See Calendars, (Venetian), XIX, 482-483.
betters, II, 243.
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was extended over the seas toward various colonies, where the actual rivalry
of the two nations is seen at its best. The Thirty Years' War complicated to
a certain extent their diplomatic relations so far as Europe was concerned,
because England was a much sought for ally, so far as this war was concerned. 1
In the first place, however, one can find traces of a sharp rivalry
on the sea, which resulted in depredations on French commerce, which in turn
led towards the preparation of a war marine to protect French merchants.
Richelieu stated openly in 1627 that he was going to protect French trade on
the sea. 3 Furthermore, in following out this policy of protection for French
commerce, he used the same mercantilistic policy toward England as toward
Spain. He would not permit the importation of English cloth, but desired
England to send over her raw materials, such as iron, hides, etc4 He desired
to build up the manufactures of France, as being one of the requirements of a
strong state. It is no wonder that England was afraid of the results that
would follow if Richelieu carried out his policy.
^
Colonial interests began to occupy a place in the English-French
relations as early as 1626. "For," says Richelieu, "the establishment of the
company of Morbihan in 1627 alarmed the English and the Dutch who fear our
control of the sea as an ultimate goal." 6 This fear on the part of the English
^So far as affairs in Europe were concerned, the relation of France and
England in the Thirty Years' War was influenced largely by territorial desires.
The question of the Palatinate and Lorraine was at issue. England was in-
terested in the former and France the latter. Neither country was enthusias-
tic over the demands of the other. See Revue, des Questions Historlque , 1889,
XLV, 489-501.
2Letters, II, 279-281; 305.
3Ibid., II, 389-390.
4Pigeonneau, II, 423.
5In his report concerning the relations existing between France and Eng-
land in 1626, the Venetian Ambassador to England says, "Richelieu's care for
naval affairs, either by means of a company or otherwise; the passage of the
Galleons from the Mediterranean to the ocean and other manoeuvres of France all
furnish pretexts for comments, suspicions, etc" See Calendars, (Venetian) , XIX, 592
Memoirs, XXIII, 127.
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is substantiated "by the reports of the Venetian ambassador to England in 1627.
He says that the dispute over the Queen's household and the shipping are
merely pretexts and not difficult to adjust 1 but that they would never
permit the French to strengthen themselves at sea, because they are so close."
More than one person told me franklji that not to oppose this would amount
to giving the French the keys to his majesty's dominions. He goes on to
point out the fact that the English look upon Richelieu's attempt to build
up a marine as a means whereby he can make himself supreme, not only over
England and her India trade, but in France itself. This and other quotations
indicate that the English feared the colonial aspirations of the French and
realized that the control of the sea was the means by which France might not
only break up their beginnings of an empire, but even attack England itself. 3
"The secretary Conway," writes the Venetian ambassador in 1626, "whom I visit-
ed spoke to me and read a letter addressed to the King announcing the great
attention paid by Richelieu to maritime affairs, the ships expected from
Holland, and others off La Rochelle and in the ports of Brittany and Normandy,
the arrangement made by the merchants for a company to trade off the East
France had failed to pay the rent for the ships loaned by the English
for use against the Huguenots in 1526, much to the disgust of the English.
See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 122-123.
Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 98-99.
3Ibid., (Venetian), XX, 242. The Venetian ambassador in France writes
in 1627, "They are making forty pieces of artillery in the foundries here
for the fleet, according to the invention of Targoni I wrote of The
terrible results they produce are shown by experiments. .... .before the 8ar-
dinal, etc. He called upon me yesterday and said he was going in a fort-
night to Brittany, not only to reduce La Rochelle but he boasts that he will
enter the ports of England itself, etc"
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generally 1lnaies etc This is contrary to the comn.on weal and i«n>t .understood, etc ."
Both England and France realized that they were to be mortal ene-
mies for control of the sea and all that goes with it. As Gouraud says,
"Richelieu constantly believed that Spain, England, and Holland derived their
greatness and power from the marine. Like a genius, he plunged into the
future. He knew that Spain would not control her colonies much longer, that
j
Holland, whether she maintained herself or not, would never be the great danger
\
to France. But as for England, he feared her and the more she increased in
power, the stronger he wished to make France."2
The capture of merchant ships by both sides served as the basis of
their opposition to each other. "This has to be stopped," says Richelieu,
"or war will result-"^ Consequently the great economic struggle between these
two important nations found a first significant expression in 1626 over this
question of navigation.4 Richelieu even went so far as to call the English
pirates, accusing them of committing all sorts of outrages against the French
merchant ships. "No heed was taken of any agreement made with France. "5
In fact, they even took advantage of the faith the French placed in peace
agreements between the two nations.^ Of course he failed to consider the
English side of the case- At any rate it is clear that at the start, the
Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 31.
2G-ouraud, I, 191.
SMemoirs, XXIII, 236-237.
Calendars, (Venetian), XIX, 222-223, 286; XX, 267.
Memoirs, XXIII, 271-272, 277.
Henry IV, notwithstanding his dire need of the English Alliance; fre-
quently protested against the violation of the freedom of French ships. See
Cheyney, E.P. A History of_England. N.Y. 1914, I, 446.
%emoirs, XXIII, 314.

218
Cardinal decided that if France was to be powerful and wealthy, the English
must be met and overcome. Both England and France knew that it was a struggle
for control of the sea.*
One of the first steps taken to settle the trouble between the two
nations was the establishment of a marine, as has been discussed before. 2
Efforts were made to arrange a satisfactory solution of the affair by means
of negotiations. However, the piracies committed upon the merchant ships
of both nations brought in another element which made a peaceful settlement
difficult. In 1627 the King of England forbade all commerce with France, and
confiscated French vessels and goods found in England. Louis XIII in re-
taliation forbade his subjects to trade with England and accused the latter
of breaking her agreement. ^ Evidently the La Rochelle affair and the marriage
question were not the leading points at issue between these two powers.
Richelieu believed that he had a good cause, and it is interesting
to note how he tried to influence public opinion against England. For ex-
ample, the Mercure Francois mentions the accusation of the English, that
the French were laden with taxes, etc. "However," it says, "if the people
of France suffer because of the war, the English endure just as much, and
curse the Duke of Buckingham for having caused the rupture of commerce. The
merchants have lost all their trade, and the people are overburdened with
the military expenses. All for the imaginary purpose of obtaining power."4
Memoirs, XXIII, 270-271; Corresp. de Sourdis, Introduction, II-III.
2See Chapter X,
^Mercure Francois , XIII, 200-206.
^Mercure Francois . XIII, 832-833. Richelieu had good reason to desire
the support of his people, because of the fact, that the war with England
ruined the business of French merchants along the coast, who constantly com-
plained on this account. The English even expected the fall of the Cardinal
because the merchants of Bordeaux, Rouen, G-ascony, Giuenne, etc., depended
on English trade. See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 122-123, 257, 134.
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One can find many traces of the birth of the intense rivalry of these nations
at this time. Both suffered, hut were willing to endure, because of the
bright rewards of the future and the thoughts of the weakness and suffering
of the other side. Public opinion was influenced then as now in the direction
of material gains. The resemblance of the past to the present appears when
Richelieu in the Mercure Francois
, accuses the English of double-dealing and
lining up his allies against him.* In a certain sense it would seem that
the edict prohibiting all commerce with England, except by the permission of
Richelieu, was the first step in the economic struggle between the two na-
tions, which was to come to a climax in the famous blockade phase of the
Napoleonic War.
But the match which really set off the struggle of 1627 was found
in the aid given the Huguenots by the English. Not satisfied with undergoing
the displeasure of the Cardinal with respect to the marriage alliance and the
question of French and English commerce, the English had incurred his wrath
by taking issue with him in regard to La Rochelle. They had captured the is-
land of Re' and had, he believed, tried to draw other people to their side,
using as a pretext the religious question.**
•"•Mercure Francois
.
XIII, 833-835.
^Trevelyan says that English interference in the Huguenot question stul-
tified the European policy of both nations. "The Duke of Buckingham," he 3ays,
"couldn't blind Parliament to the truth, even by undertaking, with huge Pro-
testant bluster, the relief of those very Huguenots whom he had been helping
Richelieu suppress." He then goes on to say that the English were sent to
seize the island of Re' off La Rochelle which was to serve as a basis for Eng-
lish commerce and privateering at the expense of France, secured by the neigh-
bourhood alliance of the great Huguenot party. See Trevelyan, G.M. England
under the Stuarts
.
N.Y., 1910, 136-138.
Another English writer says that Buckingham took command in 1627 with
instructions first to offer the citizens of La Rochelle the help which they
would need if threatened with attack by their King, and then to make good the
English mastery of the sea and destroy French and Spanish commerce. "The con-
quest of Re' would have given the English a good basis for naval operations and
political intrigue." See Montague, F.C. History of England (1603-1660 ). Politi-
calHistory of England
,
VII, N.Y.
.
Ig^j__l43-144. _
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At that time salt was one of the principal products of the external
commerce of the French. Both political and economic interests influenced her
to engage in it, and develop the exportation of that important commodity.
A valuable trade in salt was carried on in northern Italy and with the Swiss. 1
This might account to a certain extent for Bichelieu's interest in that part
of Europe. Furthermore, the large amount of salt consumed in Flanders has
a peculiar significance when one comes across attempts on the part of Austria
and Spain to gain absolute control in that country, much to the distress of
France, as will he shown later.
La Rochelle was one of the best ports on the ocean, in spite of the
efforts of Richelieu to build up other harbors where foreigners could obtain
salt.* The great discoveries had brought about the rising importance of
all the Atlantic ports- 3 As a result, La Eochelle, Nantes, Dieppe, etc, be-
came very important not only in the eyes of Richelieu, but in the eyes of
foreign nations as well.
The Cardinal felt that England did not have much personal sympathy
for the Huguenots. He was materialistic enough to base the affair on the
principle of a struggle for sea power. Indeed, to control the sea was the
desire of all enemies of France. "None of them," he says, "not even the
Huguenots, saw the advantage of the control of La Rochelle because of its
salt mines."4 Richelieu was probably mistaken in the latter part of his
assertion. For it is unlikely that the economic importance of La Rochelle,
especially with regard to the salt mines, was the principal thing which caused
England, Spain, and Holland to be friendly toward the Huguenots. Of course
^•D'Avenel, Absolue Monarchie . II, 275.
2lbid., Ill, 194-5.
3Laviffie.E.Histoire de France , V, 277.
Memoirs, XXIII, 262.
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each country had other motives, but this was common to all.
Fundamentally, the struggle between England and France was one for
sea power even at that time. 1 But the salt mines and the control of the
Garonne and Loire rivers, together with the revenues to be obtained from the
Dutch and other peoples as a consequence of the control of the salt mines,
were an object of desire to the English, especially since they carried on an
important commerce in that cownodity with La Rochelle. Even the Venetian
ambassador at London seems to have had difficulty in swallowing the statement
of the English ministry that they had lately conceived of the war against the
French as based upon the sole preservation of the reformed church and the
public weal. 3 There can be no doubt that England had an economic interest in
the welfare of her fellow Protestants in La Rochelle. On the other hand,
Richelieu at this point frankly admits that one of the predominating motives
back of his desire to retain La Rochelle was commercial, namely, the control
of the salt mines.
Asa first step in opposition to the efforts of England with regard
to La Rochelle, Richelieu proposed a union with Spain. He did this not only
for political but also for economic reasons, and even though this plan failed
it is of importance because it illustrates his diplomatic skill not only in
Calendars, (Venetian), 77, 191-192, 282.
2Ibid., (Venetian), XX, 341.
(Domestic), X, 534, 553.
"After the capture of Re' they (the English) mean to attempt Oleron, which
is also very important on account of its salt pans, and both islands are very
convenient as they command the mouths both of the Garonne and the Loire, the
chief rivers of France, enabling their possessors to take toll sufficient to
pay the cost of the garrison and fleet with something over, indeed, some say
that already certain Dutch ships which went to lade salt evaded a duty claimed
by the English, by main force and flight." From a report of the Venetian am-
bassador to England in 1627. See Calendars, XX, (Venetian), 191-192.
Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 374.
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political but also in economic affairs.
He knew that Spain and France were competitors in the salt trade.
Therefore he proposed a scheme whereby a price was to be set on that com-
modity which was to be raised or lowered only by common consent. In this
agreement he brings out the importance of the salt trade with the northern
countries, and then says that a mixture of Spanish and French salt would offer
the best market, due to the fact that one was too strong and the other was
too weak.* In other words, he offered Spain a partnership in a salt monopoly
as an inducement towards an alliance against England. The commerce in this
commodity must have been very important to have caused him to use it as a
means of bringing about such a vital alliance.
However, even though he did not succeed in this plan, he went ahead
and tool: action against the English, who were constantly preying upon the
French commerce. The Duke of Guise was ordered to prepare a fleet and to
oppose them. ^ The English were ready to meet them, for the fear of a union
between France and Spain had caused that country to take a definite stand in
her relations to La Bochelle.3 England must have seen at a glance that this
was a plan which promised to break French commercial and political ambitions.
An edict of September 20th, 1627, breaking off relations with Eng-
land, indicates that the two nations were on the point of an armed conflict. 4
This marks definitely not only the beginning of the struggle for control
of the sea but also the contest for the colonial empire of the New ^orld.
Richelieu had taken the first step toward this great event, when he began to
build up the marine. He took a second step when he attempted to increase the
Memoirs, XXIII, 288-289.
%ercure Francois . XIV, 38.
Calendars, (Venetian)
,
XX, 77. .
4Isambert, XVI, 215; Memoirs, XXIII, 277-278.
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political and economic importance of Brittany and Normandy and make the
harbor of Brest the commercial emporium of the world, together with other
ports near it. 1 England saw at a glance the danger which threatened her and
even considered the capture of Brest as a means of thwarting designs of the
Cardinal, who would have liked to make this port the center of trade and
navigation. She was afraid of the growth of France, and even the commercial
alliance proposed between the Hansa cities and France caused her to fear
the Cardinal as an opponent of England's claims to supremacy on the sea.**
On account of this distrust of the ambitions of fiichelieu, Great
Britain began to look for an ally. It was natural enough that La Rochelle
with its economic importance and its relative political and religious inde-
pendence should attract the English. Here was the one great chance to de-
stroy the growing naval power of France before it could threaten either Eng-
land or her colonies. Both countries began negotiations to break the neutral-
ity of La Rochelle. The French tried to influence them by the fear of their
land forces, near at hand; the English by setting forth the interests of the
place and by blandishments toward the inhabitants, having issued a decree that
all may trade and bring food into the town and islands, as, according to
ancient claims, they belong to the English crown, etc In other words, the
French proposed force, and the English, an economic alliance and old political
claims
.
^Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 191
^Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 281.
"Something has also been said," says the Venetian Ambassador, "about the
Port of Bre3t, which is considered <£ great advantage for thwarting the designs
of the Cardinal, who would fain make it the center of trade and navigation,
but when on the spot they will make their choice."
•^Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 56. the
"I believe that Richelieu will gladly listen to this^proposal of the
Hansa towns) for the sake of his marine, and it will generate ill will here by
reason of their claims to supremacy at sea," says the Venetian ambassador to
4Cal endars
f
<V»™» t.
,
XXa , 341
.
,_ England^ ,
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Both the English and French were well aware of the economic impor-
tance of these lands of the Huguenots, and each feared the control of the
latter by the other. But this fear was further increased when the English
saw in the control of La Rochelle by the French together with an alliance
with Spain, a loss of English maritime and colonial power. On the other hand,
j
the French saw in English control an invasion of their country, and a loss of
j
valuable economic territory, as well as the chance for future naval expansion.
It is not surprising that Richelieu said that he would not talk peace with
the English as long as their flag waved above French soil, 1 nor that in his
efforts to convert France from a continental into a naval power, he threatened
England with dire misfortunes, when he should have a fleet large enough to
defeat them.*" The English knew when he became superintendent, grandmaster,
etc., that they would have to look out for his increase of naval strength
and his political alliances, especially with La Rochelle. 3 If these two
countries began their colonial struggle at this time, it is to the credit
of Richelieu, that France won the first engagement in the capture of La Ro-
chelle .
The sols basis on which the French would make peace with the Eng-
lish in 1629 was that England should give up all thoughts of La Rochelle and
the Huguenots forever.4 Richelieu realized that if France was to attain
national political and economic unity, and was to be able to enter upon an
expansive policy, both Spain and England would have to be guarded against.
Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 371.
2Ibid., (Venetian), XX, 179, 199.
3Ibii.
,
(Venetian), XX, 155.
4 Ibid., (Venetian), XXI, 7.
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France must have her place in the sum, and no interests of that country
should be endangered by either nation. 1
In 1629, the rivalry between two nations had extended into the
distant colonies. Port Royal in Canada and the island of Saint-Christophe
had been taken from the French by the English. As a result, Richelieu sent a
fleet "to show the English that they were not Kings of the sea any more."2
Under the leadership of Cahusac, they in 1629 recaptured the island of
Saint-Christophe. 3 Richelieu accused the English of entertaining the desire
even at this time to cast the French out of Canada, a remarkable forecast of
later events.
Meanwhile, in 1629 the Sardinal sent Chateauneuf to England as his
representative to try to arrange a settlement of disputes and a conmercial
treaty, which would enable both countries to live in a happy union. 4 Under
these general directions the ambassador had specific instructions which he
was to try to carry out. For example, he was to try to settle the dispute
to
with regard
A
the commercial relations of both France and England with Spain,
for both nations were trying to prevent each other from trading with the
latter. He was also to take up the affair of the flags, in regard to salutes
on the high seas.
But what was the cause of this change in policy? A little while
before Richelieu had demanded a fight to the finish for the control of the
sea, not only with the Spanish but with the English. Now he desired peace.
Memoirs, XXIII, 281.
betters, III, 446-447.
3Ibid., Ill, 451.
betters, III, 447-448 ; 518-519; 477-478.
1i
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The explanation is simple. The Thirty Years' War had reached a stage where-
in the defeat of the Hapsburgs in Austria and Spain seemed a necessity.
Richelieu wished England to join with him in aiding Sweden. 1 Therefore,
he had to give up his active struggle with England for control of the sea,
in order to obtain her aid in the Thirty years' War. Whether he would have
continued the struggle after the war if he had lived is a mere matter of
conjecture. The probabilities are that when peace had been declared and his
long delayed marine had been created he would have taken up again an economic
and political opposition to England.2
However, Richelieu showed his diplomatic genius by having his ambas-
sador demand a new treaty from the English, which would bring about secure
3 I
and free mutual commerce. All agreements in past treaties were to be renewed'.
jFurthermore, the problem concerning the restitution of vessels captured by
the English was to be taken up, 4 and at least a compromise wa3 to be agreed
upon. England was no longer to call into question her neutrality by selling
ammunition to the "infidels", which caused even the English people to murmur, i
The colonial question arose at this time, but the French ambassa-
dor wisely placed the emphasis in the other commercial questions. However,
it is significant that in his Memoirs Richelieu reports that the King of Eng-
land told Chateauneuf , that the King of France would produce a better indica-
tion of his desire of living in peace and good friendship with him, by de-
parting from his desire to become master of the sea. In other words Riche-
lieu himself points out that even the English centered the entire struggle
betters, III, 447-448.
2See Calendar of State Papers , XX, 179.
SMemoirs, XXV, 198-199; Levasseur. I. 264.
4A peace agreement had been made April 24, 1629, which established ffee
commerce, etc. But this agreement had been broken by England. See Memoirs,
XXV, 199, also Corps Universel Diplomatique, V, pt. 2, 580-581.
^Memoirs, XXV, 199-201.
6Memo i r
s
,
XXV, 201-205. !
/
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on the control of the sea. "Jealousy of French power on the ocean caused
English opposition in 1629:" says the Cardinal, "even the merchants of Eng-
land were jealous of those of France." 1
The recapture of Saint-Christophe strengthened the fears of the
English. But Chateauneuf assured them that the French desired only to en-
force the peace terms, and that they should have no fear of the growing sea
power of the French.
~ The English King replied that just as Queen Elizabeth
had warned Henry IV to leave the sea alone, he, Charles I, would do the
same. For the continued strength of France on the sea would make for her
many enemies. 3
Richelieu, in order to settle the trouble concerning the sea, had
then sent Count de Nitschdil to see the King of England. But the latter was
not willing to concede that equality on the sea which Eichelieu demanded.
He said that the French were causing trouble by persisting in increasing
their marine power. The French representatives laughed at the idea of anoth-
er person's telling a great ruler what he should do in his state.4 Richelieu
in reply asserted that the arms of France were always for defence and
assistance against enemies and never for purposes of oppression.^ In other
words, the welfare of France demanded a strong marine and a power on the sea
regardless of the desires of other nations. Richelieu saw clearly the
^Memoirs, XXV, 211. The Dutch ambassador in France wrote in 1628 "that
the Cardinal clings to his old idea about establishing companies as in Hol-
land, and extending navigation. The English will never permit thi6, so as
not to put arms in the hands of thousands of hostile neighbors against an
open Kingdom like this, and state policy does not allow it." Calendars,
(Venetian), XXI, 446.
2Memoirs, XXV, 201-5. A good example of the fears of some of the English
people is found in a letter of an English captain in 1630, who feared the in-
tention of France to dominate Canada and iiew England to the detriment of the
English. Calendars, (Colonial, 1574-1660), I, 106.
Memoirs, XXV, 204-205.
^Memoirs, XXV, 205-6.
oMemoirs. XXV, 205.
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importance of this phase of his administration, and furthermore must have
seen what was behind the demands of the English. Commerce and colonization
could not help but be important factors in the conflict.
In 1630 De Fontenay-Mareuil took Chateauneuf ' s place in England.
Richelieu instructed him to try to obtain the restitution of Canada, and the
restoration of the merchandise and vessels captured since the peace agreement
of 1629, and to try to arrange a good place between the two crowns, and set-
tle all commercial difficulties. He even mentioned the so-called "Laws of
the Sea", as giving the final decision with regard to the restitution of the
ships. "Reason and justice are to decide affairs," he said. 1 The new am-
bassador was to try and settle the commercial relations between France and
England, and furthermore to determine England's attitude in the Thirty Years'
War, especially with respect to the Palatinate . 2
Finally, on March 29, 1632, after many negotiations, the treaty of
Saint-Germain was signed. In this treaty justice was to guide the nations
in the matter of prizes of the sea, depredations, and reprisals. Commerce
and navigation were to conform to the liberal principles of the past treaties
of 1606 and 1610, which, according to the French, had been ignored by the
English. Lastly, the colonial posessions taken by England were to be returned
to France.'^ It seems that the importance of this treaty has been overlooked.
It shows clearly the competency of Richelieu, in settling not only political
disputes but economic problems as well. It was a clever solution of the
difficulties between England and France. Richelieu obtained what he desired
ijevasseur
betters, III, 518-519.
2Ibid., Ill, 671-672.
ercure Francois . XVIII, 39-52; Calendars, (Venetian), XXI, 311-315;
, I, 264; Corps Universel Diplomatique, etc., VI, pt . I, 31-32.
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and strengthened the commercial and colonial power of France thereby.
After this, the Cardinal was busy with the great continental
struggle and could not concentrate so much upon the foreign economic and
political situation. However, in 1635 he sent a combined French and Dutch
fleet to guard the channel
. But the Dutch did not remain long with the
French. They were afraid of the English claim of being "Lord of the sea".
To avoid taking sides in a sea dispute between the two nations, the Dutch
sailed away and left the French alone. 1
"The King of England," says Richelieu.'in a notice placed in the
Bourse affirmed the English control of the channel. Commerce should be
free but under English supervision." Thus the struggle between these two
countries for sea and colonial power was already assuming an important place
with eyes of both nations. 2 But Richelieu was forced to overlook this phase
of his policy and adjust it to other parts of his administration. He tried
to keep up friendly relations with the British and keep them in an alliance
with Holland and France instead of with Spain. 3 He even tried to settle the
question as to who should salute when English and French ships met on the
high seas. %e favored their relative location as determining this matter.
That is, if they met near the French coast, the English saluted the French,
and if they met near the English coast it was vice-versa.4 Nothing was
^Memoirs, XXVIII, 359-360.
^The English, in 1636, were constantly threatened by French ships. The
French sailors called the English, "English dogs". Eichelieu according to
reports had promised a sum of money to those men of war who could interrupt
the King od England's packet. English vessels coming from La Hochelle, were
forced to avoid the French fleets for fear of capture. See Calendars,
(Domestic, 1635-1636), IX, 561-562.
^Letters, IV, 559-567.
betters, V, 66-70.
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accomplished with regard to this point.
In 163?, he still tried to get the English to break their neutrality
and come in against Austria and Spain. "However, the gain," he said, "in
selling contraband goods as a neutral with warring nations, made England a
neutral." 1 It is plain that Rfchelieu could see the economic forces under-
neath the diplomacy of the nations at that time. In his Memoirs in 1638,
he say3, "Is this neutrality of England due to an honest love of repose, or
is it due to the gain to be derived thereby, during such a neutrality, by
carrying contraband goods to warring nations as well as carrying on during
the wars the entire commerce of France and Spain. Is that why. England kept
from a direct alliance with France? 1 '2 At another place he complains because
of the fact that England constantly aided Spain to the detriment of France. 3
England still feared the French on the sea, and Richelieu realized this as
is shown by the fact that he instructed his ambassador there to avoid a dis-
cussion of England's imaginary empire of the sea. 4 One must note that even
at this time Richelieu called it a dream. He knew that England was torn
between two policies, the materialistic neutrality, or the aid of the Elector
Palatine by participation in the war. It was the aim of France to get her
to follow the latter policy. 5
When the Cardinal died, his plans, of course, were left incompleted.
What he would have done after the Thirty Years' War is not mere conjecture
however, for in his Testament Politique , he has strongly advised the necessity
of a powerful marine to oppose the claims of the English as being Lord of the
Seas."6 In other words, he would have disputed England's claims to the sea,
Hatters, V, 854-856.
^Memoirs, XXX, 523.
3lbid., XXX, 529.
^Letters, VI, 10-12.
5Testament Politique. II. 49-50.
6Testament Politique. II. 50-52
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and the outcome would, in all probabilities, have been a war in which the
French would have been better prepared than they were later on.
The Cardinal looked at England to a large extent from the economic
point of view. He saw in England and Holland, two of his great rivals in the
East Indies and Persia. 1 In fact one must conclude that the former was
a definite colonial and commercial opponent of France at that time. Spain
was on the decline and he knew it. England was the enemy of the future and
he wanted to prepare against her. That the latter was the inevitable oowr.er-
cial and political rival of France was plain to the Cardinal. If he had
lived long enough to carry out his economic policy it is a question as to
whether our land would have contained one English-speaking nation as today.
At any rate the Thirty Years' War put off the commercial and colonial struggle
for a hundred years, for better or for worse, and Eichelieu seems to have
been aware that it had to come in the end.
Turning to Holland, one discovers that Eichelieu 1 s attitude toward
that country was different from that toward England and Spain. As has been
shown before, he admired the Butch industrial and commercial genius, built
up in spite of numerous obstacles. Indeed, he described it as a model for
the future growth of France. 2 He was at no time actually willing to under-
take a hostile attitude toward this nation, although he threatened her with
dire punishment when she refused to lend him boats to be used against Eng-
land. ^
Just as with England, the economic rivalry between France and
Testament Politique . II, 73-74.
2See Chapter XII, 184, 186.
Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 192.
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Holland, even though it existed, was not permitted to dominate on account
of the Thirty Years' War. 1 In fact it seems that the alliance of 162? with
the Dutch, for mutual protection and satisfactory commercial relations, was
an effort on the part of Richelieu to enlist the aid of this country not
only to put down the Huguenots, but also to aid in the prosecution of the
Thirty Years' War. 2 He was constantly afraid of an alliance between Spain
and Holland, 3 and also, he did not like to see the Dutch carrying most of the
French commerce on their vessels.
The treaty of 1627 was arranged with the purpose of removing these
difficulties, and of engaging the Dutch to act as the protectors of the
French marine which was being built at that time. Improved commercial rela-
4tions was the result of this treaty. Yet the Dutch were not as friendly
as they might have been, when one is shown the incident in which they
looked on in glee while the English captured some French vessels near Holland?
The fear of the English by the Dutch, was one of the most bitter complaints
made by Richelieu during the Huguenot affair. He says that Spain proved
to be a false ally, and Holland an unneutral neutral, in that she persisted
in sending ammunition to the English. She was afraid of the latter country
and really favored her. 6 Richelieu did not like this, as is shown by his
letters. He thought it right for France to trade with Spain, as their
commerce was important; but for the Dutch to do so was wrong.
^Levasseur, I, 266.
^ercure Francois , XIV, 14.
3Maximes D'Etat , 730-731
.
^evasseur, 1-, ~266; Corps Universel Diplomatique, etc., V, pt. 2, 523.
^Mercure Francois , XIV, 159.
6Letters, III
,
66, 78.
7 Ibid., Ill, 471. Holland as a matter of fact was rather in sympathy
with the Huguenots and the English as against Richelieu. She not only refused
to take action as an ally of France, but would only lend boats to the French
to be used against Austria and Spain. See Calendars, (Venetian), XX, 115,
192, 310, 353.
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It is interesting to follow the economic motives which guided
all nations. Each one was looking after his own interests regardless of
international rights. A breach on the part of another country wa3 considered
however, as a sufficient cause for a strong protest.
Both Holland and France were looking after their own interests on
the sea. The former country had before this supplanted French navigation
upon the East coast of Africa, and was very strong in the East Indies. * She,
like England, took pleasure in carrying on depredations upon French commerce,
even forming an alliance with the Barbary pirates to do so. Richelieu tried
to force the Dutch to accept terms by which rules of reciprocity should
guide their commercial relations. "He did not want to undertake a tariff
war," says one writer, "which would have alienated the valuable Dutch commerce
and influence. He tried to make the Dutch his associates in enterprises in
the East and in the Americas. The treaties of 1624 and 1627 stipulated that
they aid the French merchant boats, and allow their men to associate with
the French in the navigation to both of the Indies." In other words, Biche-
lieu desired to settle their commercial relations by means of a compromise
and thus open north Europe, the Levant, Africa, Canada, the Indies, Persia,
etc., to trade.
The Cardinal knew that even though Holland was a dangerous economic
and political rival, yet she was the natural enemy of Spain and as such should
be used as one of the elements which was to contribute to the defeat of the
Hapsburgs. In 1630 he took this stand definitely when he arranged a treaty
iLevasseur l I, 273.
2pigeonneau, II, 424-425. T>his treaty illustrates the fact that Holland
also desired to stay by her agreements with England. Probably she was afraid
of the France of the future. Furthermore, this treaty broke up the Franco-
Snanish alliance, much to the dlfcgust of the latter. See .Calendars, Clenetian)
,
ttCra See Corps Universel Diplomatique. etc. , V, pt . 2,^52^454', 525, 605-
*
606 i VI, pt. I, 59-70, 134-125, 127, 343-243.
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with Holland which completed those of the past. After this she was one of
the allies, and her conmercial power was forgotten for the time being by the
French.
However, the Cardinal did not forget the economic side, as shown
by the fact that in his Testament Politique , he left plans for obtaining the
commerce in the north which the Dutch and the Flemish had controlled.2 This
has an added significance when studied in connection with the Thirty Years'
War.
Richelieu's relations with Italy were of course bound up with his
purpose of keeping the Spanish and Austrians from uniting through that country,
which would have been the death blow to any plans that he had with regard
to the development of France. Her boundaries had to be secure, not only at
that time, but also for the future.
Richelieu did not desire territory in Italy. In fact he proposed
the formation of a confederation in that country, 4 which would keep Austria
5
and Spain separated, for the Cardinal frankly admitted in 1637 that the
French did not desire new lands in Italy, or on the Rhine border. 6 All he
wanted wa3 an opportunity to develop France without any fear of foreign in-
vasion, a prerequisite to a strong economic state. Until a lasting peace
was assured for France so far as it concerned foreign affairs, Richelieu was
willing to fight.''' Indeed the Cardinal goes so far as to claim that peace
a
as he see3 it would be a true peace for all Christianity. However, his
^Isambert, XVI, 356*Corps Universel Diplomatique, etc. ,V,pt. 2, 605-606.
2Testament Politique , II, 69-70.
•
^aximes D'Etat
,
815, etc.; Letters, I, 260-267, 294-296.
4Letters, III, 239.
5Ibid., VII, 695.
Slbid., V, 595-597.
^Memoirs, XXVI, 42.
betters, IV, 29.
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altruism was not such that this can be entirely accepted.
The Cardinal's interest in Sweden and the North in general was close-
ly bound up in the Thirty Years' War and the question as to the control of the
Baltic sea. Of course the aid given by Richelieu to the Swedish King in his
attempt to overcome the Hapsburgs has been mentioned by most writers. But the
motives which caused Richelieu to do so have been brought forth in rather an
unsatisfactory way. The Cardinal did use this Scandinavian country as a tool
to defeat the Emperor. But why? In his memoirs he says that Sweden entered
the war on account of the fear of the increasing size of the Emperor's domin-
ions, which threatened her boundaries; and also, to aid the poor northern
German states.and preserve freedom of comirerce in the Baltic. * Richelieu
therefore sent Charnace to Sweden as his representative, who was to tell the
king that France was in sympathy with the misery of Germany, and was afraid
of the extension of the frontiers of the Empire, whose ambitions had no limits.
He desired to furnish troops and money to aid the Swedes, which should be used
to maintain the liberty of the Princes, communities, and cities of Germany,
and to conserve the security of the two seas, the Baltic, the ocean,and their
ports. To do this, the forces of the Emperor should be driven out of Ger-
many and their fortresses demolished. To assist in thi3 undertaking, France
was to furnish money yearly, as long as necessary, and the English, Dutch
and Danes were also to aid the Swedes. In other words, Richelieu feared the
growing universal power of the Empire. The Danes had failed to stem the tide.
Now the control of the Baltic was in danger. Richelieu and his allies, in
order to stop this threatened economic and political control of the entire
Memoirs, XXVI, 397.
^ercure Francois , XVII, 469.
i
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north by the empire, urged Sweden to sacrifice herself. She was to restore
the freedom of commerce on the Baltic and the ocean, which Richelieu desired
so much. In order to do so, the German Princes must be given control of the
coast, and the imperial forces had to be pushed back from their advanced
position.
It may be that Richelieu's relations with the northern states were
largely economic. He saw the value of trade in the north and in the Baltic.
In 1640 mention is made of the fact that France did not carry on much trade
with Poland, for it was mostly in the hands of the Austrians. 1 Indeed it is
likely that the control of the Baltic was one of the great factors in the
Thirty Years' War. At any rate, Richelieu desired the Baltic and its commerce
to be free. Thi3 together with the fall of the Empire was bound to have
great economic and political consequences. Richelieu as shown by his efforts
to develop foreign commerce, would have been only too glad to increase the
3French trade in the north. He could have accomplished this, if the Baltic
had become controlled only by the Baltic countries with whom he was on
friendly terms.
It seems quite probable, as Deschamps has pointed out, that Riche-
lieu might have preferred if he had the choice, action along colonial lines,
instead of a continental policy.'-* Both parts of his administration were
intermingled, and he realized that success in both was a requirement neces-
sary to be carried out if he wanted to develop and increase the political and
economic grandeur of France. Just as the Seven Years' War was closely bound
betters, VII, 691-892.
2See Chapter XII, 199.
^Deschamps, 80.
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up with the colonial struggle of France and England, the Thirty Yeara' War
decided whether or not the Hapsburgs were to be the continental and colonial
powers of the world as against the claims of France, England, and their
allies. "The possession and exploitation of the colonies had become an inter-
national political question at that time." 1
Richelieu continually claimed that France desired no territory as
a result of the Thirty Years' War, beyond rounding our her natural boundaries?
What then was his purpose in entering the war and playing the part he did
if one grants him the truth of that statement?
In his Memoirs, he claims that he sought a permanent peace. He
wanted to prevent the ambition of Austria from causing her to overcome the
weaker German States. Each nation should get what belonged to it. 3 Accord-
ing to the Cardinal, his policy was to protect the rights of small nations,
against the growing power of the Empire. He claims that he had no material
interest in doing so, but only desired a peace which would be for the benefit
of all the allies- 4 In a letter to the Swiss Cantons, he assured them that
he was working only for a permanent peace, and while fighting for it, he
would not infringe upon their territory. 5 It seems probable that Richelieu
really believed that a victory over Spain and the Empire would benefit the
world. Yet he constantly considered the welfare of France, even before that
of any other nation or group of nations. That was the guiding force of his
entire administration.
Now carrying this idea of "state interest" to its logical conclusionj
••Deschamps, 80-88.
2Memoirs, XVII, 403-406.
3lbid., XXVII, 517-521; Letters, VI, 243.
4Ibid., XXVII, 499-500.
5Ibid., XXX, 340.
.t
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it seems quite in harmony with the rest of Richelieu's administration to say,
that his opposition to Spain naturally involved an alliance to overpower her
on the Baltic as well as on the Mediterranean. Deschamps has mentioned
an anonymous Memoir of 1626, which affected Bichelieu to a marked extent and
indicates the patriotic policy behind the Cardinal's administration at that
time. The end proposed was a commercial and maritime league to weaken Spain
on the Mediterranean, and the first step was to be the creation of a navy
and increased commerce in that field. 1 Richelieu in his creation of a marine
accomplished this first step. His attempts to draw England, Holland, Denmark,
and Sweden into the war against the Hapsburgs marks the second step taken by
Richelieu toward the completion of that plan.
In 1632, Richelieu received from a Hollander by the name of Wilhelm
Usselingue, a written plan which proposed an association (commercial and
Colonial) with Sweden and the German princes. The purpose of it was to drive
Spain from the control of the seas. The writer gives as his reason for this
plan, that the house of Austria has been the cause of all the trouble for
more than a hundred years, and the King of Spain was the chief supporter of
that ambitious house. Since the ruler of Spain was only powerful through the
money brought from the American colonies, it was for France to form a com-
pany which would destroy Spain commercially and colonially. Richelieu's
efforts to obtain allies against the Hapsburgs shows that he probably heeded
this advice.
But it is evident that Richelieu must have realized the economic
importance of an alliance against these powers, when the Mercure Francois , in
1628, published the various efforts of Spain and Austria to form a commercial
^Deschamps, 93-94.
2 Ibid., 95-96.
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and political alliance against France, England, and Holland. In 1628, one
can read an account of the attempts of the Eapsburgs and Poland to control
the Baltic by means of a mutual alliance, together with the aid of the
Hanseatic cities, especially Lubeck, Danzig, and Hamburg, which cities were
all offered great privileges, in return for which they should leave the com-
mercial alliance with Holland and England. The Hapsburgs even tried to get
Sweden in by offering Prussia to the country in order to separate her from
Denmark (which they desired to overrun) . They said openly that their purpose
was to control the trade and commerce of the Baltic and to ruin the Dutsh
thereby. To do this they planned a strong fleet on the Baltic. 1 It is no
wonder that Bichelieu was so anxious to bring Sweden and the North German
states into an alliance with France. It was plainly to be seen that France
and her allies were threatened by a combination founded by the Hapsburgs,
which might cause their political and economic ruin if allowed to continue.
It is no wonder that Bichelieu tried to settle the commercial
troubles with England and Holland by means of a compromise, in order to meet
this great rival. One sees why he neglected the finances more or less*
"Spain," says the Merc -are Francois
,
"frankly admitted that in alliance with
the Empire, she intended to gain control of the principal commerce of Europe,
by means of control of the Baltic, together with the aid of Lubeck, Danzig,
etc"** In 1624 a council of commerce and an admiralty had been established
in Spain and in the Netherlands and the navy was increased. Agents were
then sent to the German cities offering a commercial treaty with Spain together
with the promise of removing all the traces of past devastation in those
^•Mercure Francois. XIV, 354, etc.
2Ibid., XIV, 355-373.
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regions. But this plan failed, as the cities refused to unite against England
and Denirark, etc. Also, the Empire was not able to seize the control of the
straits from Denmark, as Holland, Denmark, and Sweden all opposed that move.
It is interesting to note that the result of all these negotiations only
served to unite the German cities more closely to Sweden, Denmark and Holland.
It is evident that Richelieu appreciated the danger of a sort of
zollverein comprising the Imperial lands, Spain, and the German states,
against Sweden, Denmark, England, Holland and France. This would have re-
sulted in a commercial war which would have been extended to all parts of the
world, and so he took steps to prevent its success, by promoting the entrance
of Sweden.
Unfortunately for Sweden, and happily* for Richelieu, Gustavus
Adolphus was killed in the battle of Lutzon in 1632. For in 1633 appeared
in the Mercure Franco is a very significant account of the proposed political
and economic alliance between Sweden and the northern German states, in order
to complete the war against the Hapsburgs, and to begin a commercial and
colonial policy which extended even into the Americas and the East Indies.
Gustavus Adolphus planned this in 1626, and Oxenstiern tried to carry it out
in 1633,1 It is not to be wondered that Richelieu became rather cool towards
Sweden when he learned about this plan, and the military successes of her
2
great King and leader made it probable that she might be able to carry it out.
The Cardinal was not guided purely by political ambitions, when he threw
France into the war in 1635 and assumed the leadership in the war by this act.
It is possible that something besides political considerations caused a protest
on the part of France as to the intentions of Austria to control Liege in 1637,
^Mercure Francois, XIX, 468-485. In 1630, Gustavus Adolphus arranged a trea-
ty of commerce between Danzig and Sweden. See Corps Universel Diplomatique,
etc.
,
V, pt. 2, 596-59S.
2ffakeman. 94.
,,
_
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with which France carried on important commercial relations. 1 Speaking in
general terms, Eichelieu definitely desired France to develop not only on
the continent but in colonial possessions as well. Austria and Spain both
stood in the way of the first step to be taken toward the achievement of that
policy. As a result of the Thirty Years* War, Germany became open to the
power of the
European powers, and the
AEmpire a thing of the past. France was thus afforded
a chance to expand toward her natural frontiers. Spain fell further in
national power. The Portuguese revolution in which Richelieu was especially
interested left her Empire in a very weak and helpless condition. What a
chance for political and economic expansion for France! How unfortunate it
was for that country, that her great minister was unable to live long enough
to complete the economic side of his administration, as well as the political
which he had so well begun'.
Thus it was the result of the Thirty Years' War which decided
the first question as to who should control the commerce and the colonial
projects of the world. Eichelieu helped to remove Spain and the Empire from
their claims along those lines. Who among the allies would be the leader
in the economic and political affairs of the time, was a question of the
future. As was said before, Eichelieu knew that England was the great power
that France would have to contend with for control of the sea, after the
ambitions of Spain in that direction had been settled. His external policy
was his method of preparing for this coming emergency.
In the last place, it does not seem that due credit has been given
Eichelieu in his conduct of the Thirty Years' War. The very fact that he
'Mercure Francois , XXII, 55.
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was able to throw other countries against the enemy by furnishing them
with money, certainly indicates his genius. For while he was doing this,
he tried to settle internal affairs and develop his external policy, so that
after the war France would be able to assume the leading part in European
affairs, because of her own great economic and political strength and grandeur.
"All this was a matter of prudence," he says, "for by keeping your enemies
occupied with your allies, you have time not only to furnish them money, but
to save some for yourself. However, when your allies really need you, then
it is an act of wisdom and courage to come to their aid.
It certainly would seem that Richelieu followed out to the highest
degree his principle of placing the interest of the state first, in his con-
duct of the Thirty Years' War. After all, what he desired was the political
and economic supremacy of France in Europe. In order to gain this he pushed
his allies into the war, and finally at the opportune time entered it himself.
When he died, things were shaping themselves in such a way that he could have
turned his undivided attention to the economic development of his nation,
and to the questions which would have arisen out of his attempts to develop
such phases of his government as colonization. Of course England was a prob-
lem for the future. But what would the future have brought if the Cardinal
had lived? At any rate the English and French colonial struggle was the
natural outcome of Richelieu's administration. Imperialism had begun.
^Memoirs, XI, 307; Testament Politique , I, 45.
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Chapter XIV
CONCLUSION .
The early death of Richelieu was certainly an unfortunate event
for the development of France, for his career ended at a time when he was
planning to carry to final completion the magnificent political and economic
program which he had planned out and begun. It was doubly unfortunate he-
cause of the fact that his successor, while he was able to carry out the ex-
ternal political phase of Richelieu's administration, nevertheless failed
to aid in any way the general economic and internal political ideas promulgat-
ed by the Cardinal. As a result, whatever Richelieu accomplished in an
economic way was neglected until Colbert came along, and by that time France
had lost to a certain extent her great opportunity. One writer suggests
that if a man strong in both political and economic affairs had succeeded
Richelieu, no doubt the final disappearance of feudalism in the 18th century
would not have been delayed. The French Revolution would probably have come;
but the horrors of the French Revolution would have been spared. Aristocracy
and hereditary monarchy would have been swept away none the less, and the
republicanism of modern France would have arisen, as it has arisen in their
place, but the substitution would have taken place without convulsions and
without bitterness. "The question after hi3 death is whether the monarchy
will stay with the Third Estate or will turn on them and be conservative.
In the first case, there will be the peaceful establishment of the modern
era, and in the second, a reign of terror and war." 1 The second choice was
^Bridges, 40-41.
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made, and it is indeed unfortunate that the death of this great man became one
of the forces leading to the great catastrophe of French history.
Colbert, who succeeded Mazarin, was able to build upon the foundation
laid by Richelieu. "One must admire," says Gouraud, "the security of princi-
ples, when after twenty years of civil troubles and debasement of nearly all
commerce the foundation laid by the latter great man was found nearly intact,
and it was upon this that his economic successor built the great commercial
grandeur of France." 1 One can easily confirm the truth of this statement by
consulting the achievements of Colbert. Indeed to Colbert alone comes the
glory of having made France for a brief period the greatest colonial power of
modem times. "In this," says one writer, "he showed himself to be the docile
son of Richelieu. He borrowed from him the method of forming companies with
privileges and monopolies. The contracts of 1664 were formulated in the same
manner as those of the time of the revolution. Indeed the patents of the
company of the 'one hundred associates' and the company of the 'West Indies'
,
seemed to have been written by the same hand."2 Colbert completed the colonial
conceptions of Richelieu. The latter had placed conquest and settlement of
the new lands in the first place. He considered the honor and welfare of the
Kingdom, and its influence in Europe. Colbert, minister of finances, took
upon himself the task of increasing the richness of the country, accomplished
by means of colonization, which wa3 an economic effort. He put in the first
place the commercial interests, which had remained in the second place accord-
ing to the Cardinal's conception. 3 One might go on and show just in what way
Colbert built upon the economic foundations laid by Richelieu with regard to
••Gouraud, I, 198.
2Deschamps, 144-146.
3Ibid., 146.

245
finances, the marine, industry, etc., but it suffices to say that the accom-
plishments of Richelieu served as a worthy basis for the brilliant protective
policy of Colbert. It is indeed unfortunate that the continental policy
of Louis XIV should have prevented the carrying out of the peaceful economic
ideas set forth in the Testament Politique , which Richelieu left to posterity.
Richelieu unconsciously believed in the mercantilistic doctrine
and tried to follow it in his administration, in spite of the many external
and internal political troubles, which tended to weaken his efforts along
this line. Indeed, he tried his best to make the state as strong as possible
internally as well as externally. His financial policy was weak in some res-
pects, but this was due more to the unfortunate war than to any personal
mistake made by him. On the other hand he diminished the power of the Hugue-
nots and nobles as well, and after he had put them in their proper position
of subordination to the central power, he did all he could to encourage
them to devote themselves to agriculture, industry, and commerce. ^ This il-
lustrates his efforts to make France strong within. One writer says in re-
gard to his relations with the nobles: "Richelieu's razing' of the fortresses
of the nobility was one of the most important steps ever taken towards inter-
nal freedom of intercourse within France." 2
In regard to his foreign political policy, it suffices to say that
the Cardinal was strongly influenced by his economic and political conceptions
of the strong state. Indeed, besides the economic problems involved in the
Thirty Years' War, as well as the aim of accomplishing the downfall of the
rival house and the territorial settlement to be obtained thereby, he saw in
Rambaud, Civilisation Francais , I, 572.
2Schmoller, G. TheJAerca^te^Jza^, N.Y. 1902, I, 54.
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the peace to come the climax of the economic growth of France. For after all,
a strong state politically, a good economic foundation, and an era of peace
in which the work could be accomplished, was the ideal of Richelieu, and no
correct conception of his career can be obtained, unless this is taken into
account.
That he fully intended to develop his country in the time of future
peace is clearly brought out in hi3 Testament Politique , which was written
toward the last of his career when he knew that death was going to prevent
the carrying out of his plans. "Ju3t as his Memoirs were the accomplishments
of the pa3t, so hi3 Testament Politique '.1 he says, "would be the guide for the
future." 1 Then in concluding the first part of his great work, he sums up
the keynote of his entire administration when he says: "Up to the present
the deeds of your Majesty have been related. I certainly believe that they
will end happily if they are followed by a repose, which will give the means
by which the state may be heaped up with all kinds of advantages, gains, etc."2
There is no doubt that Richelieu desired and looked forward to a future golden
age which would follow the troublesome times of which he was a part. One
finds evidence of this in his various writings. For example, in his Testament
Politique
.
he has the following to say concerning peace. "Tour Majesty being
naturally of a tender constitution, not very healthy, of restless impatient
humor, especially when you are with the army, of which you take the leadership,
I should think myself guilty of a crime, if I did not make it my humble re-
quest for you to avoid war for the future, as much as possible; which I do
upon this basis, that the levity and inconsistency of the French, can only
be vanquished by the presence of their master, and that your Majesty cannot
^Memoirs, XI, 269-271. (Includes Introduction to the Testament Politique ,
and part one.) Testament Politique , Introduction, I, 1-5.
2Ibid., XI, 349-350; Testament Politique, I, 60.
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without exposing yourself to ruin, fix upon so lasting a design, nor conse-
quently expect a good success from it. You have shown your valor and
military power sufficiently to think of nothing like that for the future,
but to enjoy that peace and tranquillity which you have acquired for the King-
dom by your labor, being in a position to defend yourself against all those
who, contrary to public faith, would offend you anew." 1 In other words, peace
was the final goal toward which the Cardinal had worked. And even though
he admitted the heavy cost in treasures and suffering, yet he believed that
the ideal was worth the efforts and the privations.
In fact, the erection of fortifications was brought about simply
for the security to be obtained in the time of future peace. 2 During the
progress of the Thirty Years' War Eichelieu asserted that he wanted a peace
which was to be secure and general."' Which of course would have had to be
a peace dictated from the French point of view. Yet at no time during the
war did the Cardinal desire any great territorial gains except those which
affected the security of his boundaries. 4
Richelieu as a consequence of his policy had numerous enemies among
the nobles, clergy, Huguenots, etc., who were more or less restricted by his
efforts. Thus, as has been pointed out, he appealed to the people through
his Mercure Francois for support.^ He recognized the fact that their interests
and the King's were the same, and thus sought to make clear to them the
reasons for what he did. One of his representatives pointed out at one time
the advantages of the state of peace which was to follow, and the consequent
revival from past disasters, war, etc** "Thus, as a consequence, "says
1Testament Politique , I, 196-197.
2 Ibid., I, 58.
Memoirs, XXVIII, 412.
^Bridges, 96.
%ercure Francois, XII, 759.
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Bonnefon, "in contact with the logical and firm policies of the Cardinal,
the French people began to take notice of the true interests of the country
and the public, and if it had at first been distrustful of the minister be-
cause of the brutality of his plans perceived now the farsightedness
and the justice of the policies which he conceived and was carrying out."*
In this regard the beautiful letter of his contemporary Voiture is significant.
The latter praises the farsightedness of the Cardinal's costly military policy,
as being a necessary prerequisite for the future wealth and growth of the
country. "One must admit," he says, "that instead of ruining France, he has
saved her millions by simply taking La fiochelle, which has been in a state
of constant revolt and thu3 a constant expense."2 He then goes on to justify
the part taken by Eichelieu in the Thirty Years' War. "If the war ends,
as it appears to indicate, in a victory, Eichelieu will then find the means
of winning the admiration of all. Being as wise as he is, he has realized
after so many experiences, what is best; and will turn his attention toward
making that state the most flourishing of all, after having made it the most
formidable. He will make evident an ambition which is the most beautiful
of anything which can fall into the views of mankind, namely, of making France
the best and most loved of Kingdoms and not the most feared. He knows that
the most true and noble conquests are those of the heart and the affections;
and just as a plant is barren which gives shade and no fruit, so will he
enjoy the fruits by which peace is crowned. There is not so much glory in
extending the limits of the land as in diminishing the taille. This is seen
by Eichelieu. He also knows that there is less glory in overcoming a hundred
bonnefon, 32.
2Voiture, Works , Ubicini Edition, I, 271-279.

249
thousand men, than in putting twenty millions at their ease and security.
Also, this great spirit who has only been occupied with the means of furnish-
ing money for the war and of raising men, taking villages and winning wars,
will occupy himself henceforth, only in establishing repose, riches, and
abundance. Instead of being a leader in war, he will lead in the advancement
of the arts. He will make new edicts to regulate luxury and establish com-
merce. Large vessels accustomed to carry arms will bear merchandise, and hold
the seas free from pirates, etc. Then the people will admire him and the
middle classes will sing his praises This is a rather enthusiastic
eulogy of the Cardinal, but it is interesting as indicating the growth in
sentiment in his favor among the intellectual French people . They began to see
the ultimate purpose of Eichelieu's administration; that war was a necessary
evil, accepted only for the sake of better conditions under future peace.
A study of Eichelieu's life leads to the conclusion that he was an
economic statesman and that he was one of the unconscious economic and
political founders of the French mercantil istic state. Yet he was not an ex-
treme advocate of the doctrines of mercantilism, for one finds that he differed
radically from other influential men of his age. The extreme mercantil istic
view held for its fundamental belief the idea that money is wealth. It follows
that a nation should have a favorable balance of trade in order to keep gold
and silver within its boundaries, and should never let them go out of the
land, because it is the possession of specie that makes the state strong. When
the Cardinal took up the work of his administration, he believed more or less
in this doctrine, which was commonly followed and obeyed at that time. But
as he began to study the economic side of the question; as he was confronted
with commercial conditions in which the fallacies involved in the idea were
•I
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brought to light in various ways, he gradually came to the conclusion that
this theory was wrong, and admitted it. In referring to this change of
economic doctrine, M. Masson says that the other French officials still be-
lieved in the theory, but Richelieu changed completely to the other side.
This is a very important event in the economic history of that time, because
it tends to locate in the age of Richelieu the transitional stage of develop-
ment from the mercantilists doctrine to the belief in free trade. Just what
was the influence of the Cardinal's ideas upon those who came after him,
presents a different historical and economic problem. That Eichelieu was
not strictly a follower of either the old or new school is evident from a
study of his life, although the main outlines of his governmental policy
are based largely upon the mercantilists conception of the strong state.
He may be regarded as an unconscious medium whereby the old mercantilists
views finally became merged into the ideas which finally led to the doctrine
of free trade. For example, one of his letters illustrates very well the
modern view he possessed in regard to duties on imports. "If one must endure,
he says, "the heavy import duties which foreign lands put upon our goods
which enter their lands, and upon those which come to us, let us charge such
duties on their goods and raise them in proportion as the foreigners raise
their duties on us."2 Thus he believed in the system of retaliation, which
is more or less modern. As a result, it may be asserted that Richelieu
deserves more consideration upon the economic side than has hitherto been
given him. The Cardinal may indeed be regarded as a forerunner of the
"Mas son, Histolre du commerce Franc&ls dans le Levant , Paris, 1896, 149.
2Letters, II, 332.
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exponents of the modern school of political economy.
In conclusion a word concerning the economic importance of Richelieu
for his own age, as well as for subsequent time. When Richelieu came into
power, he found a nation without credit, deeply in debt, and without a real
army or navy. In fact France was in the depths of poverty and ruin. His
keen analytic mind easily comprehended the economic necessities of the land
and her resources, both geographically and industrially. 1 He believed that
his nation was ideally situated so far as commerce was concerned, and that she
was rich in natural resources which were necessary for her upbuilding. Every-
thing that he did was done with the intention of making France strong commer-
cially as well as politically. "His treaties with England, Holland, and Ger-
many, and his defiance of Spain, were all economic policies," says D'Avenel;
"he extended the boundaries of France in order for her to be secure." 2 In
other words, Richelieu did not take possession of territory solely because of
a desire to add land to the French nation, but, as was said oefore, because
he wanted to strengthen the boundaries of France. One notable example of his
desire not to add territory is found in his treatment of Italy, where he took
no land.*5 He desired to make France a strong commercial nation, and, "in the
spirit of reciprocity, he gave to foreign merchandise the same rights as they
gave to French goods."4 Thus, even though he left France in an unfortunate
financial condition, because of his wars, he gave an impetus to the economic
side of her development, which would have placed her in the lead, if unforeseen
events had not prevented the successful outcome of his plans.
1Lavalle'e, Histoire de France , 6 vols., Paris, 1861, III, 476.
^Letters, I, LXXX.
^Bridges, 137.
^Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire Gene rale . V, 368.
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It is indeed difficult to account for the failure on the part of
students of his life and times to bring out the economic side of his career.
His political activities certainly deserve a prominent place in any account
of his life, hut his administration has its economic phase and this also must
be considered. He who laid the foundations for the commercial supremacy
of France and in doing so did away with such internal disturbances as the
political power of the Huguenots and the nobles, as well as the growing
strength of the Hapsburgs, surely deserves to be studied carefully from the
economic point of view.
All of these accomplishments must have raised the general economic
condition of the people. In fact the great force which kept the people back
was the bad financial system, which, being broken down because of the wars, was
a heavy strain upon them. But it really had to be endured, as the Cardinal,
looking into the future, realized that the present must suffer for the benefit
of the ages to come if France was to be made powerful, and he acted accordingly
As a result, the people of modern France have gained more from his political
and economic policies than did those of his day. Colbert tried to build upon
the foundations laid by Richelieu but was unable to proceed far. The reckless
ambition of his King, the splendor of the Royal Court, and the unfortunate
outcome of the political policies of the administration, all tended to ruin
the building constructed by this worthy follower of the Cardinal.^-
A series of ups and downs has kept France on the whole in about the
same position, so far as her commercial importance is concerned, as in the
age of Richelieu. Nevertheless, the last few years before the great war of
Bridges, Parts I, II, and III. This work treats the accomplishments of
Colbert as a logical outcome of the activities of Richelieu.
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1914, saw a great change in this phase of her development. She had begun to
pay more attention to her marine and colonization projects. Indeed before the
present crisis, it seemed as if the fundamental economic work carried out by
the Cardinal was to become a part of a much greater connercial structure
than France had hitherto attained. 1
"The deeds of great men live after them." In other words, a man
is truly great if he has accomplished something which has a living force in
times after his own. All accounts of Richelieu's life have brought out clearly
the importance of his political work, but have failed to give similar attention
to the economic phase of his career. This treatise has endeavored to take up
the internal and external commercial policies of the Cardinal, and has thus
limited itself to an interpretation of his economic accompli shments. It has
tried to establish that Richelieu, as measured by his activities in this par-
ticular field of his career, comes up to the requirement as to what consti-
tutes a great man. Two general contributions to economic thought and practice
entitle him to this position. In the first place, he made an addition to the
theoretical side of economics by taking a stand in favor of increased freedom
of trade and opposing the extreme mercantilistic doctrine. This unconscious
contribution made by the Cardinal might have influenced the development of
the modern doctrine of free trade. In the second place, his ideas as to "state
building", by means of a marine, colonization, and commerce in general, have
formed the basis, as has been said before, of most activities in this particu-
lar field ever since.
In the last place, Richelieu's political achievements ^largely accom-
plished with the intention of obtaining a peace which would for one thing
lBracq, France under the Republic , 30-74.
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afford an opportunity for France to expand in an economic way, are essentially
modern. Traces of his ideas can be found after nearly three centuries in
the economic policies of modern France, and of other nations. His greatness
cannot be limited to the political sphere, but clearly extends with approxi-
mately equal credit into the field of practical economics. A contemporary
poet sums up the economic achievements of Bichelieu in the following poem: 1
lis chantent quel fut ton merite
Quand au gre' de vos matelots
Tu vainquis les vents et les flots.
Et domptas l'org-aeil d'Axnphitrite
.
Quand votre commerce affoibli,
Par toi, puissamment retabli.
Dans nos havres deserts ramena l'atondance
Et que surcent vaissaaux maltrisant les dangers
Ton nom seul au Fran^ais redonna 1 'asseurance
Et fit naitre la crainte auxcoeur des etrangers . . .etc.
lis chantent tes conseils utiles
Par 4ui malgre l'art des mechants
La paix refleurit dans nos champs
Et la justice dans nos villes
lis disent que les inauortels
De leur culte et de leur autels
^This poem was written by Jean de Chapelain (1595-1624), and appeared
under the title: Ode a Monseigneur le Cardinal Due de Richelieu . (Paris, Jean
Carcusat, 1633). See De Brienne Memo ires . I, 241-243.
Chapelain ranks among the intellectual men of that age and was a meaber
of the French Academy. The above poem is considered his best.
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Ne doivent qu'a tes soins la pompe renaissante,
it-t que ta prevoyance et ton autorite
Sont les deux forts appuis dont
1' Europe tremblante
Soutient et rafferrr.it sa foible liberte'.
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Appendix B.
THE AUTHENTICITY OF THE TESfAM3SHT POLITIQUE
Because of the fact that tais thesis is based largely
on the writings of Cardinal Richelieu and especially upon his
Testament Politique, it see_.s best to discuss the problem of the
authenticity of the latter work, which has been a perennial ques-
tion ever since it was first published. The work belongs among
the most interesting memorials of French history in the 17th
century, as shown by the great warmth with which the scholars have
fought over its authenticity. "But," says iioehm, "such was the
fate of this work that its authenticity, and therewith its value
or worth must be placed in doubt because of a succession of cir-
oumst anees, not yet cleared up. Thus it has been under suspicion
until now. An important individual has opposed the work and since
then various teachers have, exerted their ability to defend or ap-
prove it. Indeed, few works of the world's literature have oeen
subject to such a searching criticism. n
Tiie i e st ame nt ? o 1 i t i cue was written sometime between
the years 1538 and 1642. D'Avenel says that Richelieu continued
his memoirs as far as 1638, and seeing that he could not finish
them, wrote the former work. 2 It is divided into two parts, the
first of which gives a short account of the reign of Louis XIII
xboehr.i, Introduction, 1.
2 Letters, VIII, 383.
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up to that time, according to Riohelieu'a interpretation. The
second part is concerned mostly with matters of administration,
such as colonial development, the marine, finances, etc. Indeed
its contents demonstrate that in writing hi a Testament Politique,
Richelieu desired to leave it as a guide for the King after his
own death, when the coming peace would afford him a chance to
build up his state. Also, it was to serve as a vindication ox the
Cardinal's administration, which had been grossly attacked by
many enemies.
The personal nature of the work accounts for the fact
that it was not published, or known at first by the public at
large. Indeed, only a few people were aware of its existence.
Yet the fact that mention was made of it in a funeral oration upon
the Cardinal, arnica has been found in trie British Museum, certain-
ly would indicate that some were acquainted with the v.ork and its
important contribution. Furthermore, the writer of the oration
bemoaned the fact that the King had not published his copy of the
Testament Politique . This showed that the King had a copy which
he was keeping secret, and explains the late public appearance
of the work. .cover, since neitaer the King nor Richelieu left
direct evidence that a copy was presented to the former and was to
be kept secret, one cannot be certain as to the precise reason
for the late appearance of tae work. "The probabilities are,"
says one writer, "that it was considered so important that it was
reserved -or the King alone and thus its publication was
Boehm, 15.
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delayed. 1,1
There are a number of copies of t le Testament Politi que
Among tiiese are four important manuscripts, the first of vrtiich
is found in the French department of foreign affairs. It was y
probably brought over in 17G5 with the papers of Richelieu as a
wftole, which ,;ere sent there by permission of Louis XIV. ^ The
second manuscript was found in the Sorbonne, which institution ob-
tained it from a formes secretary of the Cardinal. The third was
found in the possessions of LI. Frudaine, councillor of state and
of the royal council. The fourth belonged originally to a. de
Saint-Palaye. The last two were manuscripts found in the hands
of private individuals and are thoup,ht to be copies of the
manuscript found in the department of foreign affairs. Thus the
first two can be regarded as original, since one was found a-nonp;
the paper 8 of tne cardinal, and the other given by his secretary
who recognized its authenticity.
In spite of the existence of tnese copies of the in-
teresting work, the historian Auoery, who took upon himself the
task of writing t..e life of the Cardinal, fadled to find it among
the papers of Richelieu, which were in the possession of his niece
the Duchess of Aiguillon. He went ahead and published in 1578
a »vcrk entitled le Traite de la Regale . But ifhen the Testament
appeared about ten years later, the latter work proved t ht his
conception of Richelieu's ideas with regard to the royal preroga-
tive was wrong. Indeed he found his reputation as an authority
T^oehm, 16-17.
^Memoirs* XI, 267-268.

Xiv
on the life of the Uardin-1 to be injured, and as a result it
was a question of either his downfall or that of the Teat a::.ent
Politique, and of course he favored the fall of the litter.
Thua tne fight started. "Aubery in his history of
the Cardinal Mazarin, n says Bpehffl, "took a determined stand against}
tae authenticity of the work, but his criticism was purely per-
sonal and not scientific." 1 Hoi ever, his failure to find the
manuscript gives evidence of the effort made to keep the work se-
cret as a ;:ersonal possession of the King. No apparent effort
was made between 1643 and 1687, to make the public aware of it.
Nevertheless, once it got into print, its intrinsic importance
made it an object of eager debate, and the question of its au-
thenticity became a live one.~
One comes next to the Treat debate of 1749 between the
historians Voltaire and Foncemagne with regard to the last
writing of the Cardinal. Voltaire hated Richelieu from the very
start and saw a chance to pay his respects to the departed
churchman.
At this point one must take into account the attitude
of certain groups toward Richelieu as largely influencing the
secrecy of the Testament and accounting for the violent opposi-
tion to it. Sympathy could not be expected for the Cardinal or
for hi 3 work from such opponents as the nobles and the Parlement
of Paris, Indeed, it is surprising that they permitted the work
;fpoehm, IS.
"Toil., 13.
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to appear at all. It certainly did not suit their political am-
bitions, and therein lies the political explanation for the sup-
pression of and the opposition to the great book.
On the otner hand, Richelieu left some stron;; friends I
especially among the intellectual class. Gabriel Hanotaux, for
'
example, may be cited as the greatest livino exponent of the true
greatness of the bishop of Luzon. It is due to such men that a
reliable account of the life of Richelieu can be obtained at
present
.
voltaire made an unauthentic, prejudiced attack which
was answered by Foncemagne in a clear, fair, and concise manner.
"In fact," says Hoehm, "he knev; hew to return every thrust with
absolute certainty and effect."^ However, as the dispute was
a personal one, it is not v/orth consideration except in so far an
the motives behind it aid in an explanation of the results obtaireu,
In other words, the opposition to Richelieu in a political and
personal sense, found a v/elcome outlet in numerous attacks on his
last »vork. For example, Voltaire's second assault upon the
Testament was brought about more from personal enmity against cer-
from
tain Amsterdam publishers than Aa desire to oppose the ^gstament
Politique . He was determined to "show up" tnese publishers as
being frauds, and picked upon the last contribution of the Cardi-
nal as the means by which this was to be done. The result was
Boehm, 2o-24.
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a torrent of sarcastic abusive personal remarks which really
meant nothing against the book itself.
Opposition developed to the attacks of Voltaire, and the
Testament Politique had *any defenders. Foncemagne in a letter,
made a reply which put the former on the defensive . But notning
positive came out of this conflict. The authenticity of the work
was net proved as yet, and the question as to whether Richelieu
had written t :e notes and t:ie text or vice versa was unsettled.
In fact, the crux of the argument no,v centered around a study of
the original manuscripts, which contained the text and some notes
written on their borders. Of course, the Cardinal is accused of
obtaining his ideas in finances from Sully, but this proves noth-
ing, as Boehm points out, for any writer at t hat time used the
intellectual ideas -.of the age as common property. This is also
illustrated in Richelieu's memoirs, but they i-usc be considered
likewise a part of his own ideas.
Both Foncemagne and Ranks recognized the spirit of
Richelieu in this ./ork, but ffhen they found anything in the book
which reminded them of other authors they put down a question a,ark
as to that particular section. sThe best example is perhaps the
chapter devoted to the finances, whioh was considered to have been
written by Sully or someone else who had read Sully's ..crks.
However, Foneem&gne admitted finally that the chapters concerning
the finances and the marine, if not written by tas Cardinal, were
1Boehm, 28. Also, the Cardinal might have obtained his
ideas from Mont Chretien, but .m.at does this prove?
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set down by his secretaries under his supervision, lioehm does not
doubt that they were the ideas of -ticnelieu and of no one else. x
The final stage of the controversy was reached when
nanctaux Drought out his gragpentsj axi..es de Kicheiieu , which
were written by Richeliey. without doubt, since his handwriting
has been recognized.
Wow these fragments are a part of his Testament Poli-
t i aue . That is, ail the passages having a certain mark are found
in the latter work, Furthermore, alon:
:
the margin of certain
passages is found the word Test ament , which would tend to prove
that particular sections were to be inserted in his last great
. ork.
"However, Hanotaux's discovery does not absolutely
prove the authenticity of the Politique," says Boehgi. It mere-
ly supports the funeral oration mentioned above in the proof that
tjfcie Cardinal actually intended to write a work of that kind.
One must further conclude that the real Testament roliticiue arose
VLniformly and grew as an organic unit, that it was written during
the latter part of his life, and that it was completed and was
not a mere "torso". The Fragments to Boe.h$s a^re just a part of
the work. The marginal notes on the text are changes to be
made in the revision of the v/ork. He has no doubt that the frag-
ments, the text, and the marginal notes comprise what Richelieu
-£oehm, 2S-3C
sMaximes D'Etat, 707-728.3-
oehm, 30-31.
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planned should be part of a final copy which he was not able to
finish. Dees this not help to explain the late publication of
the work and the silence concerning it?
In other
.
crds, the Testament Politique we now have
is a combination of the text, the marginal notes, and trie fragments
That numerous editions aay bring about slight mistakes i3 to be
expected, but this fact does not prove the falsity of the work.
Finally, wnen one considers again tne purposes which
Richelieu had in writing this book: (1) to get the King to ;/ait
until the coming peace, to ta.-ce up the great reorganization of the
state, (2) to leave a defense of his life-work against future
attacks that might be made against him; one cannot doubt its im-
portance and truth: "out of these purposes grew the great inter-
est which Richelieu put into this work and the value he attribut-
es
ed to it. That he tried to adopt and follow out a system based
is
on i?hat Ain his Testament Politique is evident to students of his
administration. Indeed, the tenseness and unity of it all, the
firmness with which the portions were tastily inserted in the
building up of the whole work, and above all the high personal
purpose of it all, makes Richelieu responsible for every line of
it
.
Indeed, when one studies his life and finds out how
he constantly considered tae future of France; when one compares
this work with his Memoirs and letters, and sees the conformity
ISoehm, 30-31*
3Ibid., 32.
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in style, judgment j and opinions, it seems inconceivable that
this is the Tork of any other man than the Cardinal.
It seems impossible to believe that there was another
man in France capable of writing, a work as ^re-^t as tne Testament
Polit jque
. Bonnefon say 3, "It is a work uriiich shows the man more
than t ie writer", and this makes it of supreme value; for in
reading it, one can conceive of no other personality than that of
Richelieu behind it all. Pigeonneau sums the whole matter up
when he says that it is his work in thought as in style. 3 The
authenticity of the Testament Politique is today generally ad-
mitt ed.3
-"•Bonnefon, 41o-413.
3Pigeonneau, II, 376-377.
^Molinier, XI, 35.
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Appendix C.
VITA .
The writer of this thesis, Franklin Charles Palm, was
born at Willmar, Minnesota, August 13, 1390. After preparing
for college in the high school of that place, he entered Oberlin
College in 1909, and received the degree of Bachelor of Arts in
1914 from that institution. In 1914 he entered the University of
Illinois as a scholar in history and received the decree of Mas-
ter of Arts in June, 1915. The following year he held a fellow-
ship ?~nd during the scholastic year of 1316-1917, he served as
assistant in the department of history. During the first half
of the year 1917-1918, he was Professor of History and Economics
in Buena Vista College, Storm Lake, Iov/a.



